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GLOBALIZING JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
ERNEST A. YOUNG† 
ABSTRACT 
 This article argues that the field of “Federal Courts” scholarship 
ought to expand to consider the relations not just between state and 
federal courts, but also between domestic courts and judicial 
institutions operating at the international level. Both relationships 
raise similar sorts of “interjurisdictional” problems—issues of 
standards of review, abstention, procedural defaults, and the like. 
Moreover, the study of supranational courts would benefit from the 
Legal Process jurisprudence that dominates the field of domestic 
Federal Courts law. In particular, I emphasize Henry Hart and Al 
Sacks’ notion of “institutional settlement,” which holds that decisions 
should be allocated to particular institutions on the basis of 
institutional competence and that decisions by the primary institution, 
once made, should generally be respected absent a sufficiently good 
reason for overruling them. 
 I illustrate how a Legal Process approach to supranational courts 
might work through two primary sets of examples. The first involves 
the tug of war between American domestic courts and the 
International Court of Justice over foreign nationals convicted of 
capital crimes in state courts after failure by local authorities to notify 
the accused of his rights to consular notification under the Vienna 
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Convention on Consular Relations. This issue recently came to a head 
in the Medellin case, which the Supreme Court elected not to resolve 
last Term but is likely to see again. The central question in these cases 
is whether the ICJ should respect domestic rules of procedural default, 
which bar litigation of Vienna Convention claims in domestic habeas 
corpus proceedings where those claims were not first presented to the 
state trial court. The second set of examples involves arbitration 
proceedings under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. In the Mondev and Loewen cases, NAFTA panels 
engaged in what was, for all practical purposes, appellate review of 
state courts on questions of state law. The question here is whether 
international law should sanction “denial of justice”-type claims that 
make domestic law questions re-litigable at the supranational level, 
and, if so, whether supranational tribunals should adopt a more 
deferential standard of review. Institutional settlement, I argue, has a 
good deal to say about both sets of questions. 
 The last part of the article speculates more generally about what a 
Legal Process approach can tell us about supranational adjudication. 
It considers some international law principles—like the “margin of 
appreciation” in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, as well as the principle of “complementarity” in the statute of 
the International Criminal Court—that already incorporate norms of 
institutional settlement. I argue that institutional settlement has 
something to offer both skeptics and enthusiasts of supranational 
adjudication: it can moderate the intrusiveness of such adjudication, 
while at the same time increasing its legitimacy. 
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International law . . . has at times, like the common law within states, 
a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from 
morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests its 
jural quality. 
– Justice Benjamin Cardozo1 
There was a time when international lawyers had to defend their 
discipline against the charge that “international law” is an oxymoron. 
John Austin famously argued that international law can’t really be 
“law” because there is no single sovereign to enforce it,2 and H.L.A. 
Hart more recently reached much the same conclusion because, 
among other deficiencies, international law lacks “secondary rules of 
change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts.”3 
 
 1. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934). 
 2. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 152 (David 
Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., Dartmouth Publishing 1998) (1832). 
 3. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961). 
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Even worse, political scientists in the Realist tradition argued that law 
is practically irrelevant to international relations; that field, they 
insisted, is instead dominated by national power and self-interest.4 
These debates seem to be fading now. Although international law still 
confronts serious debates about its legitimacy, efficacy, and content, it 
is increasingly clear that international law functions as law in many 
important contexts.5 This is true in part because of the proliferation of 
supranational institutions for the interpretation, application, and 
enforcement of law, such as the European Court of Human Rights or 
the tribunals established under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA).6 
We are, indeed, increasingly surrounded by supranational courts. 
Eight years ago, Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter spoke of 
a “renewed millennial faith in the ability of courts to hold states to 
their international obligations.”7 As Jenny Martinez recently pointed 
out, “there are now more than fifty international courts, tribunals, 
and quasi-judicial bodies, most of which have been established in the 
past twenty years.”8 Professor Martinez goes on to observe that 
 
 4. See, e.g., GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900–1950, at 89–101 (1951); 
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 
244 (4th ed. 1967) (“Where there is neither community or interest nor balance of power, there is 
no international law.”). For a more recent example of unabashed Realist thinking, see generally 
JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001). 
 5. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 205 (1993) (arguing that doubts about the force 
of international law have largely been resolved in the last several decades). This need not mean 
the end of Realist thinking; what it does mean is that Realists, to be realistic, will incorporate 
the operation of international law and institutions into their theories of power competition 
among states. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (2005) (“International law is a real phenomenon, [but] the best 
explanation for when and why states comply with international law [is] simply that states act out 
of self-interest.”); MEARSHEIMER, supra note 4, at 364 (“[S]tates sometimes operate through 
institutions [and may use them to] maintain, if not increase, their own share of world power.”). 
 6. Perhaps the most successful example is the European Union’s Court of Justice, but it 
may be better to think of that court as the supreme tribunal of an emerging federal state. But see 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 84 (2004) (“[L]eading national courts [in 
the EU] . . . see themselves as still interacting with a supranational rather than a federal 
tribunal.”). The critical point for my purposes is that unlike most supranational courts, the ECJ 
is attached to a full-fledged government with executive and legislative functions, broad 
regulatory powers of its own, and more developed lines of political accountability than other 
supranational organizations. 
 7. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 387 (1997). 
 8. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 430 
(2003); see also id. at 436–44 (surveying many of these institutions). 
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“[i]nternational courts are acting more and more like, well, courts: 
They are convicting people of international crimes and sending them 
to prison; they are exercising compulsory jurisdiction over trade 
disputes; they are enforcing the rights of individuals against 
governments.”9 Nor are these supranational bodies acting in a 
vacuum; rather, we see “a growing pattern of transnational 
interactions among courts,” including “a strong dimension of judicial 
‘review’” of national courts.10 Although many of these supranational 
adjudicatory bodies remain controversial, there is little doubt that 
legal scholars must take them seriously. 
But the acceptance of international law as law carries with it 
certain difficult obligations and responsibilities. Discourse about 
international law has often been aspirational in tone; the articulation 
of broad human rights, for example, has sometimes been seen as a 
method of progressive pressure on less enlightened governments 
without any real expectation that the rights in question will be 
implemented immediately or directly. In these situations, the 
mechanics of implementation—for instance, the relationship among 
various national and supranational adjudicatory bodies that must 
administer the rights in question—tend to get relatively little 
attention. Moreover, the discussion of implementation that does 
occur tends to be compartmentalized within categories like human 
rights or international trade, with relatively little cross-fertilization.11 
As Cesare Romano has observed, “[t]o date, the international judicial 
process and organization has not been considered as a field of study 
in itself.”12 
That needs to change. The more international law operates as 
law, the more we are going to have to think about these issues of 
institutional detail—the structure and composition of supranational 
bodies, and their relationships to one another and to domestic courts. 
 
 9. Id. at 432. 
 10. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National 
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2004). 
 11. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of 
Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 795 (2002) (noting this problem and providing a rare 
counterexample of synthesis across subject matters). 
 12. CESARE P.R. ROMANO, PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, 
MATERIALS AND PUBLICATIONS: MATRIX: INTRO (1999), at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/matrix/matrixintro.html. The research matrix itself is a very cool interactive graphic 
displaying the characteristics of a variety of supranational adjudicatory bodies. MATERIALS 
AND PUBLICATIONS: MATRIX: RESEARCH MATRIX (2000), at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/matrix/Matrix-main.html. 
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This is necessary on the level of theory if international law is to meet 
H.L.A. Hart’s challenge to develop “secondary rules of change and 
adjudication.” But it is even more essential on the level of practice. 
As international law begins to have a real impact on the internal 
workings of societies, like the United States, that had basically seen 
themselves as legally self-sufficient, that law is beginning to generate 
real opposition. Proponents of the death penalty and opponents of 
gay rights, for example, have protested the use of international law to 
forbid forms of capital punishment or prohibitions on sodomy;13 
likewise, but from a very different political perspective, 
environmentalists and other critics of globalization have criticized the 
impact of free trade agreements on domestic regulation.14 Developing 
doctrines and institutional practices to mediate conflict between 
supranational and domestic institutions may be a key to international 
law’s ability to weather these sorts of storms. 
American lawyers have seen similar sorts of problems before. 
For over two centuries we have operated a dual judicial system: two 
parallel systems of courts, each with generally concurrent jurisdiction 
to apply two parallel systems of law.15 Many of the great political 
conflicts of our history have had important echoes in the ebb and flow 
 
 13. See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Whom is the Supreme Court Listening To?, eagleforum.org, 
(Nov. 10, 2004), at http://www.eagleforum.org/column/2004/nov04/04-11-10.html (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s references to the European Court of Human Rights and other foreign sources 
in its famous sodomy ruling, Lawrence v. Texas). The Supreme Court’s recent decision 
invalidating the juvenile death penalty, which relied in part on international views on the capital 
punishment, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198–1200 (2005), is likely to further galvanize 
this opposition. See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Justice Kennedy’s Mind, NAT’L REV. ONLINE,  
(Mar. 9, 2005) at http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg200503090749.asp (criticizing 
references to foreign law in constitutional cases generally, and in Roper in particular). 
 14. See, e.g., Public Citizen, “GATT-Zilla vs. Flipper” Dolphin Case Demonstrates How 
Trade Agreements Undermine Domestic Environmental, Public Interest Policies (Apr. 11, 2003), 
at http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/ENVIRONMENT/articles.cfm?ID=9298 (arguing that trade 
agreements “lead to the erosion of domestic public interest policies”). 
 15. For the first century of our history, the state courts were in fact the primary forum for 
litigating claims under federal law, because the lower federal courts lacked general jurisdiction 
over cases raising a federal question prior to 1875. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. 
MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 320 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. There is still a strong 
presumption that state courts are competent to hear federal claims. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 
U.S. 455, 458 (1990); see also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1947) (holding that state 
courts generally cannot refuse to recognize claims under federal law). Likewise, the federal 
courts have broad jurisdiction over questions of state law in cases that involve parties from 
different states or where plaintiffs plead both federal and state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(2000) (covering diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (authorizing supplemental 
jurisdiction over state claims in federal question cases). 
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of authority and jurisdiction between these two judicial systems. The 
first great expansion of federal court jurisdiction was repealed in 1802 
as a threat to the Jeffersonian Republican revolution of 1800; the 
creation of broad federal question jurisdiction and the expansion of 
federal remedies for violations of federal civil rights were key 
components of Reconstruction in the late Nineteenth Century; and 
much of the reaction against the Warren Court’s revolution in 
criminal procedure found its expression in new limits on the ability of 
federal courts to review state criminal proceedings via the writ of 
habeas corpus.16 Throughout this history, these two judicial systems 
worked out ways to live together by developing an intricate web of 
interjurisdictional doctrines and statutory provisions. 
These doctrines are at the center of the field of legal inquiry 
known, somewhat misleadingly, as “Federal Courts” law. A better 
term would be closer to the title of the leading treatment of the 
subject, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler’s pathbreaking 
casebook/treatise The Federal Courts and the Federal System.17 This 
field, existing at the intersection of constitutional law and procedure, 
once enjoyed great prestige in the legal academy; more recently, 
however, some of its leading lights have worried that the field is 
stagnant or dead.18 The central point of this Article is to propose a 
new research agenda for the discipline. We need to extend the 
“Federal Courts” idea outward, to encompass not only the way that 
domestic institutions relate to one another but also how those 
institutions relate to supranational courts and organizations. 
It is not just the subject matter of federal courts law that is 
critical, however. In American law, that field remains dominated by a 
particular jurisprudential paradigm: the “Legal Process School” 
pioneered by Hart, Wechsler, Albert Sacks, and others in the 1950s. I 
argue here that the development of interjurisdictional rules relating 
supranational courts to domestic courts should likewise reflect this 
Legal Process approach. In particular, such rules must pay heed to the 
Legal Process principle of “institutional settlement,” which holds that 
law should allocate decisionmaking to the institutions best suited to 
 
 16. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 34–36, 1296–97. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 993 (1994); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler 
Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (1994) (noting a “restiveness . . . among many Federal 
Courts teachers” toward the “Hart and Wechsler paradigm”). 
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decide particular questions, and that the decisions arrived at by those 
institutions must then be respected by other actors in the system, even 
if those actors would have reached a different conclusion. 
This will strike some readers as an elementary, even banal 
principle, but I contend that it is far too often ignored or discounted 
in debates about the allocation of authority between domestic and 
supranational courts. Indeed, the most distinctive thing about the 
present Article in the emerging literature on supranational courts is 
that I write from a perspective of what Ken Anderson has called 
“democratic sovereignty.”19 That view holds that “[s]overeignty is 
justified as a means of expressing and respecting the democratic will 
of a particular political community”; it emphasizes “the fidelity of the 
state to its own internal democratic processes” over “any exterior 
structure of rules, law, or commands from larger global institutions.”20 
This perspective does not necessarily preclude a high degree of 
respect for and involvement in supranational institutions. It insists, 
however, that those institutions respect the “settlement” of important 
prerogatives in domestic bodies. 
Someone needs to write a sequel to the Hart and Wechsler 
casebook called something like The Federal Courts and the Global 
System. I hasten to add that this Article does not attempt to write that 
sequel—it simply presents an argument for why it should be written. 
My goal is not to press for particular conclusions, but rather to point 
out directions for future scholarship. The argument has four parts. 
The first Part briefly surveys the interjurisdictional problem as it 
appears both in foreign affairs law and in American federal courts 
law; I also present an overview of the Legal Process approach, with 
particular emphasis on the principle of institutional settlement. 
Although a “Legal Process” school of international law scholarship 
already exists, I suggest that this school has not emphasized either the 
interjurisdictional sorts of questions upon which Professors Hart and 
Wechsler focused or the principle of institutional settlement. 
Part Two develops two examples of interjurisdictional problems 
in foreign affairs: recent litigation in the federal courts and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) involving federal habeas corpus 
remedies for state violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
 
 19. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global 
Governance through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2005) (book 
review). 
 20. Id. 
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Many scholars have noted the changing concerns of international 
law. Jack Goldsmith, for example, has written that while “[f]oreign 
relations was traditionally understood to be relations among the 
national governments of sovereign nation-states,” more recently “the 
traditional agenda of foreign relations has been replaced by a variety 
of issues formerly the concern of domestic governance alone.”23 These 
issues include human rights, migration and asylum, environmental 
protection, drug trafficking and other forms of international crime, 
epidemics and other health issues, and trade.24 Modern international 
law thus replicates many central concerns of the domestic regulatory 
state. Time has also expanded the set of actors with whom 
international law is concerned: where before that law primarily dealt 
with relations among states, it now takes a keen interest in the way 
states treat their own citizens.25 
Even in areas where international law retains a more traditional 
focus on a state’s treatment of foreigners, modern international law 
tends to confer rights more broadly than in the past. International law 
has always recognized that one state has an interest in another state’s 
treatment of the first state’s citizens,26 but a combination of 
widespread travel and immigration with broad rights-creating treaties 
like the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations means that these 
issues seem to come up more often. More importantly, international 
law now sometimes permits the affected foreign citizen to raise claims 
against a state, rather than having to persuade her home government 
to espouse her claim for her.27 That development tends to minimize 
 
 23. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1617, 1670–71 (1997). 
 24. Ivo D. Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in 
International Relations, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF 
SUBNATIONAL UNITS 1, 2 (Hans J. Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990); see also 
Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 1671–72. 
 25. Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 1672. 
 26. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 497  
(6th ed. 2003) (citing EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS [THE LAW OF NATIONS]  
bk. 11, ch. 6, ¶ 71 (Joseph Chitty ed. & trans., Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson 1876) (1758)). 
 27. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of 
Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights,  
15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 438–39 (2001) (discussing individual claim mechanisms under 
several human rights treaties); Renée Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The 
U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 244 (“[The] concept 
of the state alone having a legal personality in international fora began to crumble with the 
advent of international arbitration conventions in the 1950s and 60s.”). 
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political and inertial checks on litigation, as the domestic experience 
with “private attorneys general” amply demonstrates.28 
The second development is the advent of institutions at the 
international level that make and apply law. For much of its history, 
the lawmaking and law-applying organs of international law were the 
states themselves along with their domestic institutions. H.L.A. Hart’s 
critique argued that international law was not a legal system because 
it lacked law-making and law-applying institutions of its own: “The 
absence of these institutions,” he argued, “means that the rules for 
states resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of 
primary rules of obligation, which . . . we are accustomed to contrast 
with a developed legal system.”29 But this situation is changing. Our 
globalizing world order increasingly features “vertical networks” that 
“replicate the governing functions that states exercise regarding their 
citizens.”30 Any number of supranational courts now apply 
international law, and in the wake of Legal Realism we know that 
such “application” of the law is often tantamount to making it. It is 
harder to find overt examples of supranational legislation,31 although 
the WTO’s power to adopt binding interpretations of its open-ended 
trade agreements by a three-fourth’s vote of its members would seem 
to come close.32 In any event, modern international law is hardly 
institution-less in the way that it once was. 
These developments, especially in combination, drive an urgent 
need for principles to govern the interaction of supranational and 
domestic institutions. For example, Professor Helfer and Dean 
Slaughter have discussed the impact of private rights of action in 
 
 28. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1810–22 (1993) (arguing that “private attorneys general” undermine 
accountability). 
 29. HART, supra note 3, at 209. 
 30. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 20. 
 31. The European Union would provide an obvious and dramatic example, but in my view 
integration has progressed to the point that the EU institutions are no longer “supranational” in 
the same sense as the WTO or the United Nations. See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a 
Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 56 (2003) (“[T]he 
Union is in so many respects a constitutional system and not a construct governed by classical 
principles of international law.”); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the 
European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 
1641–42 (2002) (suggesting that the EU is best viewed as a form of federal system). 
 32. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-
Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1574 (2003) [hereinafter Bradley, International 
Delegations] (“The WTO has the power to adopt binding interpretations of the various trade 
agreements by a three-fourth’s vote.”). 
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conjunction with supranational judicial institutions in Europe. They 
observe that 
The provisions for such jurisdiction in the founding documents of 
[the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights] provide a point of departure for penetrating the surface of 
the state, allowing the tribunals to interact directly with the principal 
players in national legal systems. Further, stripping the state of its 
unitary facade creates the possibility of direct relationships between 
the tribunals and different governmental institutions such as courts, 
administrative agencies, and legislative committees.33 
Helfer and Slaughter go on to note that “the right of individual 
petition is spreading rapidly, both to other human rights tribunals and 
to various entities charged with resolving trade-related disputes.”34 
Such developments put a premium on addressing the ways in which 
relationships between supranational and domestic legal institutions 
should develop. 
The “Federal Courts” paradigm offers a good place to start. 
America’s parallel judicial systems may be viewed as an early 
example of Dean Slaughter’s “disaggregated state.”35 Once our 
Founders “split the atom of sovereignty,”36 the states and the national 
government have not confronted one another as sovereign “black 
boxes”; rather, they have developed complex vertical networks 
relating state and national actors in the legislative, bureaucratic, and 
judicial spheres. The judicial aspects of those relations are the central 
concern of Federal Courts doctrine and scholarship. 
Federal Courts law has addressed these interjurisdictional issues 
through a variety of statutory and judge-made rules. I list a few 
examples here in order to suggest the sort of interjurisdictional rules 
that foreign affairs law may need to develop: 
Rules of justiciability: A key limit on the power of the federal 
courts to interfere with the workings of other governmental 
 
 33. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 277; see also Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2154 
(“[I]ndividual access can be expected to enhance international court influence, both by creating 
a domestic constituency for the Court’s rulings and eliminating discretionary barriers to the 
review of sensitive cases.”). 
 34. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 281. 
 35. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 5; Kal Raustiala, Transgovernmental Networks and 
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 10–11 (2002). 
 36. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
110305 YOUNG.DOC 12/19/2005 3:04 PM 
2005]  GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT 1155 
institutions—both state and federal—has been the confinement of the 
power of judicial review to “cases and controversies.”37 Doctrines of 
standing, ripeness, and mootness determine who can seek judicial 
review and at what point in a dispute; in consequence, they constrain 
the opportunities of courts to exercise power.38 
Rules of abstention, exhaustion, and noninterference: Federal law 
has long barred federal courts from issuing “a writ of injunction . . . to 
stay proceedings in any court of a state.”39 The courts have 
embroidered this statutory principle with a variety of judge-made 
doctrines designed to protect state court proceedings from federal 
interference.40 Other principles require that, in some instances, federal 
claims be presented to state authorities prior to bringing suit in 
federal court.41 
Standards of review and limits on collateral attack: Federal courts 
review state court decisions both when federal questions are appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court and when state criminal convictions are 
attacked collaterally under federal habeas corpus.42 Both statutory 
and judge-made rules have limited the scope of this review and 
 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 38. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 
(1983); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries’, and Article 
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
 39. Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 335. The present version of the Anti-Injunction Act 
provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a 
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000). See generally 
Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970). On the state side, the 
Supreme Court has held—without any statutory analog to the Anti-Injunction Act—that state 
courts generally lack the power to enjoin federal court proceedings. See Gen. Atomic Co. v. 
Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977) (per curiam); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). 
 40. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (holding that federal courts should 
generally abstain from interference with pending state criminal proceedings); Rooker v. Fid. 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (holding that the federal courts lack jurisdiction to 
“entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify” a state court judgment). 
 41. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985) (concluding that federal courts may not hear takings challenges to state or local action 
until the plaintiff has first sought relief from the relevant governmental agency); Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (holding that a petitioner’s failure to present his federal claims to the 
state courts in accordance with state procedural rules generally bars federal habeas review). 
 42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (covering direct appeals from state courts to U.S. Supreme 
Court); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (providing federal habeas corpus for state prisoners). 
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provided for deference to the state courts’ rulings, especially (but not 
exclusively) on questions of state law.43 
Remedial doctrines and governmental immunities: Federal Courts 
law concerns not only the relation of different judicial systems to one 
another but also the relations of courts to other political institutions. 
One critical variable is the ability of courts to provide remedies 
enforceable by private individuals;44 another concerns their ability to 
impose liability on governmental entities or compel them to 
undertake or forego certain policies.45 
Res judicata and recognition of judgments: Federal law requires 
both federal and state institutions to give “full faith and credit” to one 
another’s public acts and judicial proceedings.46 Because state and 
federal courts have developed their own preclusion rules, judges have 
had to grapple with complicated questions concerning which 
preclusion principles apply to judgments rendered in other courts.47 
Horizontal and vertical choice of law: Horizontal choice of law is 
familiar to international lawyers, but federal systems have also had to 
grapple with vertical choice of law where disputes arise as to whether 
state or federal law governs a case. The most important questions 
have involved preemption, that is, determining the extent to which 
 
 43. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (barring habeas relief unless the state court 
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law”); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 626 
(1875) (limiting the Supreme Court’s inquiry on direct appeal to questions of federal law). 
 44. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (discussing private rights of 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for federal statutory violations); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 286–90 (2001) (discussing availability of implied private rights of action under 
federal statutes); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688–95 (1979) (same). 
 45. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress 
may not generally abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from suits for money damages under 
federal law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148–49 (1908) (holding that federal courts may issue 
injunctive relief against state officers to prevent them from violating federal law). 
 46. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to give full faith and credit to other 
states); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (requiring the federal courts to give full faith and credit to state 
court proceedings). The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, effectively requires state 
governments to give full faith and credit to federal acts and judgments. See generally Allen v. 
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
 47. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (discussing 
the preclusive effect of federal court judgments in diversity cases on future state court 
litigation). See generally Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law after Semtek, 
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527 (2003). 
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federal law on a question ousts state law on the subject,48 and the 
power of federal courts to fashion common law rules where federal 
enacted law does not apply.49 
Principles of avoidance and judicial restraint: American courts 
have developed prudential principles designed to narrow the scope of 
judicial decisions and, in particular, to avoid decisions of 
constitutional matters.50 Prominent examples include canons of 
construction that disfavor readings of ambiguous statutes that raise 
difficult constitutional problems51 and order of operations rules that 
counsel resolution of cases on nonconstitutional grounds if possible.52 
International law has given more thought to some of these areas 
than others. Recognition of foreign judgments, for example, has 
drawn extensive attention in private international law,53 whereas the 
ability of a supranational tribunal like the ICJ to enjoin governments 
from taking particular actions pending resolution of a case remains 
much disputed.54 This is an important time to address such questions: 
many supranational courts are in their formative stages, and they 
ought to be structured in such a way as to ensure their ability to 
 
 48. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (holding that federal 
airbag regulations preempted state product liability rules); see generally Louise Weinberg, The 
Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743 (1992); Ernest A. 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 41–45, 130–34 (2004). 
 49. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts 
generally lack power to fashion common law rules in the absence of federal statutes or 
regulations). See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal 
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). 
 50. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (listing various doctrines in this vein). 
 51. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 
GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997). 
 52. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass 
upon a constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other ground upon which the 
case may be disposed of.”). See also R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941) 
(holding that a federal court should abstain altogether from deciding a case involving difficult 
constitutional issues where a state court might be able to resolve the case on state law grounds). 
 53. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-
Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
167 (1998). 
 54. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 49, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 
(1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 97-8214) (noting “substantial disagreement among jurists as to whether an 
ICJ order indicating provisional measures is binding”). 
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develop workable interjurisdictional rules. Moreover, doctrines that 
mitigate conflict between supranational and domestic institutions may 
offer the best hope of preserving a role for supranational adjudication 
in the face of attacks on its basic legitimacy. 
I do not suggest that the field has lain fallow until now. Jenny 
Martinez recently outlined an ambitious vision of an “international 
judicial system,” and that vision included some of the same sorts of 
intermediary doctrines that I discuss here.55 Likewise, the Helfer and 
Slaughter study of supranational adjudication considers some aspects 
of interjurisdictional relations.56 Nonetheless, I find myself a good bit 
more skeptical of supranational institutions than many of these 
scholars. In particular, I think that scholars with a primary focus on 
international law have been too driven by a perceived need to “build 
up” international law and institutions57 and not focused enough on the 
need to preserve institutional arrangements at the domestic level. 
Equally important, the American study of interjurisdictional conflict 
and cooperation at the domestic level offers not only a laundry list of 
issues but also a particular jurisprudential orientation that may well 
be central to the success of institutional accommodation. I discuss that 
orientation in the next section. 
B. Institutional Settlement and the Legal Process Tradition 
Perhaps more than any other field of law, Federal Courts law is 
dominated by a particular jurisprudential paradigm. That paradigm 
derives from Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler, who authored what 
remains the dominant casebook in the field.58 As Richard Fallon has 
observed, “Hart and Wechsler defined the field as we now know it, 
and . . . their definition links the subject matter of Federal Courts 
 
 55. See generally Martinez, supra note 8. 
 56. See generally Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7; see also Alford, supra note 11 
(surveying the question of deference by domestic courts to supranational ones across a wide 
variety of subject areas). 
 57. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 683 (1998) [hereinafter Henkin, Provisional Measures] (criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Breard v. Greene on the ground that it “did not contribute to the 
rule of law in international affairs” and “did not strengthen the place of international law in the 
law of the United States”). 
 58. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). Akhil Amar has described the book as “probably the most important 
and influential casebook ever written.” Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 
688 (1989) (book review). Except where otherwise noted, I will refer to the present edition that 
appeared in 2003. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15. 
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inquiries almost inextricably to the Legal Process methodology that 
they likewise pioneered.”59 The “Legal Process,” of course, refers not 
only to a jurisprudential school but to another influential set of 
teaching materials authored by Henry Hart and Al Sacks in 1958.60 In 
this Article, I urge that the law of foreign affairs should both focus on 
the sorts of interjurisdictional problems that characterize the Federal 
Courts course and adopt the basic jurisprudential approach that the 
Legal Process School brought to those problems. 
The allocation of decision-making authority is central to the 
Legal Process tradition.61 Professors Hart and Sacks distinguished 
between “substantive understandings or arrangements about how the 
members of an interdependent community are to conduct 
themselves” and “constitutive or procedural understandings or 
arrangements about how questions in connection with arrangements 
of both types are to be settled.”62 They argued that “[t]hese 
institutionalized procedures and the constitutive arrangements 
establishing and governing them are obviously more fundamental 
than the substantive arrangements in the structure of a society . . . 
since they are at once the source of the substantive arrangements and 
the indispensable means of making them work effectively.”63 More 
fundamentally, Hart and Sacks found implicit in these constitutive 
and procedural understandings a principle of “institutional 
settlement.” They recognized that the basic facts of social living give 
rise both to disputes and to differing ideas about how those disputes 
should come out. Under these conditions, “[t]he alternative to 
disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized 
and peaceable methods of decision.”64 The principle of institutional 
 
 59. Fallon, supra note 18, at 956. 
 60. HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 
1994). For an account of these materials, see the introductory essay by Professors Eskridge and 
Frickey. Id. at xi. On the Legal Process School generally, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205–99 (1995). 
 61. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 58, at 691 (“The legal process school focuses primary 
attention on who is, or ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or ought, 
to be made.”). For a somewhat different account, stressing the school’s commitment to 
“reasoned elaboration” of the grounds for judicial decisions, see G. Edward White, The 
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, reprinted in G. 
EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136 (1978). 
 62. HART & SACKS, supra note 60, at 3–4. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 4. 
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settlement reflects the respect that members of the society owe to the 
outcome of these agreed-upon procedures; as Hart and Sacks put it, 
institutional settlement “expresses the judgment that decisions which 
are the duly arrived-at result of duly established procedures of this 
kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless 
and until they are duly changed.”65 
In the Legal Process tradition, domestic notions of federalism 
and separation of powers are simply manifestations of this idea of 
institutional settlement. A central task of governance is to assign 
particular decisions to particular institutions, like the President, or 
Congress, or federal administrative agencies, or state courts.66 Once a 
decision is assigned to an institution, that institution’s decisions are 
taken as settled absent some particularly powerful reason for 
changing them.67 “Settled” need not mean conclusive; there may be 
varying degrees of weight or deference. But at least some of the time, 
we must accept an institution’s resolution of an issue even though we, 
as observers or participants in some other institution, might have 
resolved the matter differently.68 The class of cases in which this is 
true may vary in size, depending on how much deference we accord to 
the original decisionmaker. What remains constant is that the 
argument for overruling the initial institution’s decision must include 
something more than the mere contention that the initial 
decisionmaker got that decision wrong on the merits. 
In assigning tasks to particular institutions, the Legal Process 
school emphasized considerations of comparative institutional 
competence.69 We determine which institution should be assigned a 
particular task, and how much deference that institution’s decisions 
should get, by considering the particular capacities and liabilities that 
each institution brings to the task. In an area where technical 
expertise is at a premium, for example, a court may defer to the 
superior competence of an expert administrative agency by applying a 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See DUXBURY, supra note 60, at 255. 
 67. Cf. White, supra note 61, at 148 (noting that the Legal Process School “favored 
institutional conservatism in the judiciary”). 
 68. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 962 (“[A]uthority to decide must at least sometimes 
include authority to decide wrongly.”). 
 69. The Hart & Sacks materials thus put as central questions, “What is each of these 
institutions good for? How can it be made to do its job best? How does, and how should, its 
working dovetail with the working of the others?” HART & SACKS, supra note 60, at 158. 
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very lenient standard of review to the agency’s actions.70 The role of 
courts in the Legal Process tradition is often similar to that of a point 
guard on a basketball team: the court takes provisional responsibility 
for a dispute, but may well decide to pass it off to other actors in the 
system, either through mechanisms of direct referral or, more likely, 
by deferring to prior judgments by legislative, executive, or private 
actors.71 The key point, however, is that these decisions about who 
gets the ball are made according to assessments of comparative 
institutional strengths and weaknesses in dealing with particular sorts 
of problems. 
Another important Legal Process insight is that the means of 
institutional settlement include not only the classic constitutional 
principles of limited powers, but also the host of more interstitial 
doctrines about jurisdiction, justiciability, standards of review, choice 
of law, and remedies that I identified earlier.72 Professors Hart and 
Wechsler argued that these more “technical” doctrines would often 
surpass overt limits on governmental power in terms of their practical 
importance.73 Those sorts of technical rules governing the interactions 
of judicial bodies at various levels are my focus here. Although much 
of the literature on supranational adjudication has focused on what 
Hart and Wechsler called questions of “ultimate power”—that is, on 
what tasks the Constitution does or does not permit our government 
to assign to supranational institutions74—I want to emphasize instead 
 
 70. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court 
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”). 
 71. I am indebted to Bill Powers for the “point guard” metaphor. 
 72. See supra notes 37–52 and accompanying text. 
 73. The first Preface to the Hart and Wechsler casebook argued that “[f]or every case in 
which a court is asked to invalidate a square assertion of state or federal legislative authority, 
there are many more in which the allocation of control does not involve questions of ultimate 
power”; in the latter cases, “[C]ongress has been silent with respect to the displacement of the 
normal state-created norms, leaving courts to face the problem as an issue of the choice of law.” 
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 58, at xi. 
 74. See generally Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 32; Brian F. Havel, The 
Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257 (2000); Julian G. Ku, 
The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old 
Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and 
International Government, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2000). This work is important; there may well be 
constitutional limits on the ability of the United States to accede to various forms of 
supranational adjudication. I want to suggest, however, that the most important issues will be 
played out in the details of interjurisdictional interactions. 
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questions of how those institutions should behave in relation to the 
domestic legal system. 
It may seem strange to suggest that one of the most cutting-edge 
legal developments of our time—globalization and the advent of 
supranational decisionmaking—should be addressed by recourse to a 
jurisprudential approach developed in the 1950s. The Legal Process 
school in general, and the Hart and Wechsler paradigm in Federal 
Courts law in particular, have had their critics.75 I tend to agree with 
Richard Fallon, however, that “no one has yet advanced a better 
paradigm for the study of Federal Courts issues than the Legal 
Process paradigm pioneered by Hart and Wechsler.”76 The principle 
of institutional settlement, moreover, is based on the judgment that 
members of a society are unlikely to agree on many primary questions 
of law and morality; hence, the best we can hope for is agreement on 
a process for resolving these disputes, and the results of that process 
should then be accepted as legitimate.77 That insight seems even more 
compelling in an international environment featuring vast 
disagreements of morality and policy and lacking any sovereign able 
to compel agreement on contested questions. 
To be sure, the Legal Process school has not lacked adherents in 
international legal circles.78 Harold Koh coined the phrase 
“Transnational Legal Process” back in 1995 in his Pound Lecture at 
the University of Nebraska.79 His lecture, however, was concerned 
with rebutting the claim that international law is not law; the term 
“transnational legal process” refers to a process-based account of why 
nations obey international law.80 Abram and Antonia Chayes’ 
important work on “The New Sovereignty” likewise stressed the 
 
 75. See generally Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. 
COMMENT. 557 (1994–95); White, supra note 61, at 153–61 (arguing that, by the 1970s, the Legal 
Process model prescribed an overly modest role for courts in society). 
 76. Fallon, supra note 18, at 971; see also DUXBURY, supra note 60, at 208 (noting the 
Legal Process school’s continuing relevance). 
 77. Fallon, supra note 18, at 964. 
 78. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY COURSE (1969); Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334 (1999). 
 79. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183 (1996). 
 80. See id. at 205 (“Once nations begin to interact, a complex process occurs, whereby 
international legal norms seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal 
and political processes.”); O’Connell, supra note 78, at 351 (“Chayes, Ehrlich and Lowenfeld 
developed international legal process to demonstrate that law does play a role in international 
affairs.”); see also Burley, supra note 5, at 213. 
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importance of process as a spur to compliance, without focusing on 
how that process should be structured to ensure the continued 
viability of domestic constitutional arrangements.81 The international 
law version of Legal Process thus has not tended to stress the value of 
institutional settlement.82 
My task here is to apply the Legal Process model to the questions 
that arise once we take Dean Koh’s case as largely proven: assuming 
that international law is law and will generally be obeyed, how should 
the various supranational and domestic institutions that make up the 
resulting legal structure interact? My focus diverges from the 
“International Legal Process” of Professor Chayes, Dean Koh, and 
others in two principal respects: First, I emphasize the value of 
institutional settlement as a component of the Legal Process 
perspective. Second, my attention is directed not so much at the 
interactions of state actors and supranational institutions on the 
international plane, but rather on the relationship between 
supranational and domestic judicial institutions, that is, the problem 
of parallel judicial structures. These are the sort of concerns that have 
traditionally preoccupied the Hart and Wechsler branch of Legal 
Process; they are the place where Federal Courts scholars may, 
perhaps, make their own contribution. 
II.  TWO EXAMPLES OF THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM 
I want to explore these questions through two different 
examples. The first concerns the remedies for breach by American 
state officials of our treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations.83 That issue came to a head in two recent 
cases: the Avena decision by the International Court of Justice in 
2004,84 and the Medellin case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
2005.85 Avena held that the U.S. had violated its obligations under the 
Convention and ordered “review and reconsideration of the 
 
 81. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). 
 82. See O’Connell, supra note 78, at 338–39 (observing that “confidence in institutional 
settlement” was “not originally incorporated” into international legal process and that more 
recent scholarship has focused on supplementing traditional legal process perspectives with a 
greater emphasis on normative values). 
 83. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
 84. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), (Mar. 31, 2004), 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm [hereinafter Avena]. 
 85. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005). 
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convictions and sentences” of approximately 50 Mexican nationals.86 
Medellin, a federal habeas corpus suit brought by one of those 
Mexican nationals, asked the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the 
appropriate response of domestic courts to the Avena ruling.87 
The second example arises out of international arbitrations 
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Chapter 11 guarantees the rights of foreign investors against 
“expropriation” by NAFTA parties, and it provides individual 
investors with a private right of action against the host state before a 
NAFTA tribunal.88 In two recent cases, Loewen and Mondev, such 
tribunals effectively have conducted appellate review of state court 
decisions resolving questions of state law.89 
Each of these examples raises difficult questions concerning the 
relations between supranational and domestic adjudication. I cannot 
hope to deal with those questions in any sort of comprehensive way 
here. These examples should, however, indicate the need for a web of 
statutory and doctrinal mechanisms to mediate the developing 
conflicts between these two levels of courts. 
A. Avena, Medellin, and the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations 
José Ernesto Medellin was tried and convicted of capital murder 
in a Texas state court in 1994. His confession related that, as part of a 
gang initiation in Houston, he participated in the brutal gang rape of 
fourteen-year-old Jennifer Ertman and sixteen-year-old Elizabeth 
Pena. Medellin recounted that, following the rape, he strangled the 
two girls with one of his shoelaces. A jury sentenced him to death.90 
Medellin had spent most of his life in the United States, attended 
American schools, and was fluent in English. Indeed, he was no 
stranger to the American justice system, having once been a juvenile 
 
 86. Avena, supra note 84, at ¶ 153. 
 87. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089 (discussing the questions on which the Court granted 
certiorari). 
 88. See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 
42 I.L.M. 85 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002) [hereinafter Mondev]; Loewen Group, Inc. v. 
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003) 
[hereinafter Loewen]. 
 90. See Medellin v. State, Order, No. 71997 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 1997), reprinted in 
Joint Appendix to Petition for Certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, at 4a-6a; Joint 
Appendix for Certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928, at 14–18 (on file with author). 
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probationer.91 Nonetheless, he remained a Mexican national. As such, 
he was entitled to important rights under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations. Article 36 of the Convention provides that “if 
[the accused] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving 
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending 
State if  . . . a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison 
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”92 
Moreover, the host country’s officials must “inform the person 
concerned without delay of his rights” under the Convention.93 
There is no dispute that Texas failed to meet this treaty 
obligation, although the State did provide Medellin with American 
counsel as required by domestic law.94 Medellin failed to raise this 
treaty claim, however, as an objection at his trial or as an appellate 
issue on direct review of his conviction. The issue appeared for the 
first time in his state habeas petition filed four years after the initial 
conviction. The state courts rejected this claim, but Medellin tried 
again in a federal habeas petition filed in 2001.95 The federal district 
court denied relief on all of Medellin’s claims, including the Vienna 
Convention argument. Because Medellin had failed to raise that 
 
 91. See Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 275–76 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 92. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 36(1)(b). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Like many habeas petitioners, Medellin argued that his appointed counsel were 
ineffective at the original trial. Space does not permit discussion of the grounds of the alleged 
ineffectiveness, but to this observer—as to the district court and the Fifth Circuit—they were 
distinctly underwhelming. See Medellin, 371 F.3d at 275–79. While concerns about the quality of 
counsel in capital cases persist, the Supreme Court has tightened up application of the Sixth 
Amendment standard considerably in recent years. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 95. For readers unfamiliar with the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., 
federal law since 1867 has provided for federal review of state criminal convictions and/or 
sentences alleged to have been imposed in violation of federal law. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 499 (1953) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.). Because treaties are the supreme law of the 
land under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, Medellin’s claim under the Vienna 
Convention was a federal one cognizable on habeas review. Such review constituted a new civil 
proceeding wholly separate, as a procedural matter, from Medellin’s trial and conviction in state 
court. It was thus also independent of, and in addition to, Medellin’s right to appeal his state 
court conviction or sentence to the U.S. Supreme Court on any alleged error of federal law. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). Habeas review is a “second bite at the apple” with few analogs in other 
legal systems. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
Many states, including Texas, provide state habeas procedure in the state courts, which 
typically takes place between the state direct appeal and the filing of the federal habeas petition. 
These state collateral review proceedings are most often of limited significance. But see infra 
notes 115–17 and accompanying text (discussing a new round of state collateral proceedings now 
pending in Medellin). 
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argument in the Texas trial court, the district court held, it was barred 
by the doctrine of “procedural default.”96 
The procedural default doctrine holds that a habeas petitioner 
must first present his federal law argument to the state courts in 
compliance with state procedural rules. Failure to do so will bar any 
attempt to present that argument to the federal courts on collateral 
review.97 A petitioner may evade this bar only by showing “cause” 
and “prejudice” for the default—that is, by stating a good reason for 
not presenting the federal claim to the state courts,98 and by showing 
that the federal error worked to the petitioner’s “actual and 
substantial disadvantage.”99 Medellin seems not to have pressed any 
argument for cause and prejudice under domestic law. 
While Medellin’s federal habeas appeal was pending in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the International Court of 
Justice rendered its holding in the Avena case. That decision 
concerned 54 Mexican nationals—of whom Medellin was one—held 
on death rows in various American states. Mexico asserted that each 
of these persons had been denied their rights of consular notification 
or consultation under the Vienna Convention, and that they were 
therefore entitled to “restitutio in integrum”—that is, to a new trial 
and exclusion of any evidence obtained by interrogation prior to 
consultation with the consulate.100 With respect to the overwhelming 
majority of the prisoners—again including Medellin—the ICJ agreed 
that the U.S. had violated the relevant treaty requirements and 
ordered that the U.S. provide “review and reconsideration” of each 
 
 96. See Medellin, 371 F.3d at 279 (describing the district court’s unpublished ruling). 
 97. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85 (1977) (discussing the rule in the 
context of admissibility of inculpatory statements). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.5.2, at 905–21 (4th ed. 2003). 
 98. The Supreme Court has interpreted “cause” narrowly. In general, a habeas petitioner 
may establish cause by showing (1) that he is relying on a “novel” constitutional claim, see, e.g., 
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12–16 (1984); but see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315–16 (1989) 
(holding that habeas petitioners may not generally rely on “new” rules of constitutional law), (2) 
that his lawyer’s failure to raise the federal issue in state court amounted to ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 
(1986), or (3) that the State created an “external impediment” to the presentation of the 
petitioner’s claim, see Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988). 
 99. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). A state court procedural default can 
also be excused in certain circumstances where the petitioner makes a strong showing of “actual 
innocence” of the underlying offence. E.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Schlup v. 
Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
 100. Avena, supra note 84, ¶ 13. “Restitutio in integrum” means, literally, “restoration to 
original condition.” WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restitutio_in_integrum. 
110305 YOUNG.DOC 12/19/2005 3:04 PM 
2005]  GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT 1167 
prisoner’s conviction and sentence in the domestic courts.101 The ICJ 
also made clear that, in its view, application of procedural default 
rules to bar the Mexican prisoners’ claims would violate the 
Convention’s requirement that domestic law “must enable full effect 
to be given” to consular rights.102 
One state governor, in Oklahoma, responded to Avena by 
commuting the capital sentence of a Mexican national to life 
imprisonment.103 Texas, however, continued to contest Medellin’s 
entitlement to relief. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin’s argument 
that Avena required it to disregard his procedural default and 
reconsider his conviction and sentence in light of the treaty 
violation.104 The court relied on a prior Supreme Court decision, 
Breard v. Greene,105 which had held a similar Vienna Convention 
 
 101. Avena, supra note 84, ¶¶ 106, 133–134, 139–141. The ICJ rejected Mexico’s argument 
that restitutio in integrum was required, directing American courts to instead consider whether 
the prisoners were actually prejudiced by the treaty violations. See id. ¶¶ 120–125. On the other 
hand, the ICJ also rejected the U.S.’s suggestion that adequate “review and reconsideration” 
could be provided through executive clemency proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 142–143. 
 102. Id. ¶¶ 108–113, 134 (citing Art. 36, ¶ 2 of the Convention). On this point, the ICJ relied 
on its earlier rejection of procedural default rules in the LaGrand case. (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001 
I.C.J. 466, 514–517 (June 27), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm. 
 103. See Press Release, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres, May 13, 
2004, at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/display_article.php?article_id=301&article_type=1. Mr. 
Torres’s case for clemency was a relatively strong one, because he was not the “trigger man” in 
the murder for which he was sentenced to die. See id. The Governor’s action came on the same 
day that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued a stay of Torres’ execution, also in 
light of the Avena ruling. See id. 
 104. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 105. 523 U.S. 371 (1998). Angel Breard was convicted of capital murder in Virginia state 
court, notwithstanding state authorities’ failure to notify him of his rights under the Vienna 
Convention. As in Medellin, Breard failed to present his treaty argument to the state trial court, 
and his federal habeas petition was accordingly barred by procedural default. Paraguay sued the 
U.S. in the ICJ, which issued a “provisional measures” order requiring the U.S. to stay Breard’s 
execution pending a final ruling by the ICJ on the merits. See Case Concerning the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9). The Supreme Court, 
however, accepted the Clinton Administration’s position that such orders were not binding and 
that the president lacked power to compel Virginia to stay the execution. See id. at 378. 
Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote a letter to Virginia Governor James 
Gilmore requesting that he postpone the execution in the interests of comity, see Letter from 
Madeleine K. Albright to James S. Gilmore III (Apr. 13, 1998), attached as Appendix F to Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97–1390, 
97–8214), Gilmore declined that request. Breard died by lethal injection on April 14, 1998. See 
Paraguayan National Executed After Appeals Fail, (Apr. 15, 1998), at 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9804/15/paraguay.execution.on/. Much of the literature 
on consular convention claims and the domestic effect of ICJ judgments addresses this earlier 
litigation. For an introduction, see Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 666 (1998). 
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claim barred by procedural default. As an alternate ground, the court 
also relied on circuit precedent holding that the Convention “does not 
create an individually enforceable right.”106 The Fifth Circuit panel 
noted that the ICJ had held to the contrary in the LaGrand case, but 
found itself bound by prior precedent.107 
The Supreme Court granted Medellin’s ensuing petition for 
certiorari in order to consider “[f]irst, whether a federal court is 
bound by the International Court of Justice’s [Avena] ruling . . . and 
second, whether a federal court should give effect, as a matter of 
judicial comity and uniform treaty interpretation, to the ICJ’s 
judgment.”108 It thus seemed likely that the Court would issue an 
important decision on some of the basic interjurisdictional questions 
that it had largely avoided in Breard.109 
In February of 2005, however, President Bush issued a 
memorandum stating that 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as 
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of 
America, that the United States will discharge its international 
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice 
in the [Avena case] by having State courts give effect to the decision 
in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 
51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.110 
Although the memorandum avoided mandatory language, the United 
States’ accompanying brief to the Supreme Court characterized the 
memo as a “binding federal rule” and stated that state procedural 
 
 106. 371 F.3d at 280 (citing United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 
2001)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (citing the original grant at 125 S. Ct. 686 
(2004)). 
 109. The key difference between the cases was that, in Breard, there was only a provisional 
order from the ICJ; in Medellin, the ICJ had issued a final judgment. See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 
2106 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the potential importance of this difference). Breard also 
raised yet another interjurisdictional question because it involved not only a habeas petition by 
the prisoner but also a separate federal civil action by Paraguay against the Commonwealth of 
Virginia. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 134 
F.3d 622, 627 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied per curiam, 521 U.S. 371, 378 (1998); Carlos Manuel 
Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d’Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-
Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 8–22 (1998). 
 110. George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Feb. 28, 2005, attached as 
Appendix 2 to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent in No. 04-
5928, Medellin v. Dretke (Feb. 2005). 
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default rules “must give way,” under the Supremacy Clause, to the 
required reconsideration of the Mexican prisoners’ claims.111 The 
Administration paired its effort to mandate compliance with the 
Avena ruling with an announcement that the U.S. was withdrawing 
from the Optional Protocol consenting to ICJ jurisdiction in Vienna 
Convention cases.112 The Avena story thus bears out the prediction 
that aggressive interference by supranational bodies with domestic 
institutional arrangements risks a domestic backlash against 
international law and institutions.113 
In light of the President’s order, a divided Supreme Court 
dismissed the writ of certiorari in Medellin as improvidently granted 
in a per curiam opinion.114 The action has now shifted to the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, where Medellin has filed a new 
application for a writ of habeas corpus under state law.115 Although 
state procedural default rules probably still bar Medellin’s petition, he 
has argued that both the ICJ’s order, of its own force, and the 
President’s memorandum override those rules.116 The State of Texas, 
on the other hand, has argued that the ICJ’s order lacks direct effect 
and that the President lacks constitutional power to mandate 
compliance by the state courts, absent some valid act of Congress 
delegating such power.117 If the Texas court rules against Medellin, the 
 
 111. Brief for the United States, supra note 110, at 42, 43. 
 112. See id. (noting that “[i]n a two-paragraph letter dated March 7, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice informed U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan that the United States ‘hereby 
withdraws’ from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”). 
 113. See, e.g., Defensible Diplomacy, WASH. POST, March 16, 2005, at A22 (approving the 
President’s decision “not to continue to submit to the jurisdiction of an international court with 
so little regard for U.S. constitutional norms and procedures”). 
 114. 125 S. Ct. at 2092. For an account of the Court’s action, see The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term—Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 169, 327 (2005). 
 115. See Order on Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. AP-75,207, June 22, 2005 
(on file with author). 
 116. Brief of Applicant Jose Ernesto Medellin on Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
No. AP-75,207 (July 29, 2005), available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/ 
MeritsBriefofPetitionerJoseErnestoMedellin.pdf. 
 117. See State’s Brief in Response, in Ex parte Jose Ernesto Medellin, No. AP-75,207, Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals (filed Aug. 31, 2005), at 21–30, 39–41. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I note that I have filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of several interested state 
governments arguing that the President’s Memorandum does not actually order state courts to 
do anything, and that if it did, it would be unconstitutional. See Brief of the States of Alabama, 
Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Ex Parte Jose 
Ernesto Medellin, No. AP-75,207, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (filed Aug. 31, 2005), 
available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/CCA%20State%20Amicus.PDF. 
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case will likely return to the Supreme Court for decision of the issues 
that were avoided the first time around.118 
B. NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Loewen and Mondev Cases 
My second example is really two cases, both decided by 
international arbitration panels under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.119 That 
chapter protects a broad class of “investments” in several distinct 
ways. Article 1102 imposes a “national treatment” obligation; it 
requires that each party, as well as states or provinces of a party, 
“accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors . . . .”120 
Article 1105, on the other hand, sets out a nonrelative, “minimum 
standard of treatment,” requiring that each party treat the others’ 
investors “in accordance with international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security.”121 Finally, 
Article 1110 generally prohibits nationalization or “expropriation” of 
investments.122 Chapter 11 is unusual among major trade treaties in 
that it provides a private right of action for investors against signatory 
governments, rather than requiring would-be plaintiffs to persuade 
their home countries to espouse their claims in a more traditional 
state vs. state action.123 Not surprisingly, this decoupling of Chapter 11 
enforcement from the political discretion of the signatory states 
themselves has given rise to considerable litigation and controversy.124 
 
 118. It is possible that the State court will reject Medellin’s petition on the ground that he 
was not prejudiced by the Consular Convention violation, without passing on the binding effect 
of the Avena judgment or the President’s memorandum. That resolution might raise difficult 
interjurisdictional problems of its own, concerning the proper standard for prejudice under the 
Convention, that the Supreme Court would still need to resolve. See The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term, supra note 114. 
 119. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 107 Stat. 2057, 
32 I.L.M. 289, 605. 
 120. Id. art. 1102(1); see also id. art. 1102(3) (imposing this obligation on states and 
provinces). 
 121. Id. art. 1105. 
 122. Id. art. 1110. Specifically, Article 1110 permits “taking” an investment only if the taking 
is “(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process 
of law and the general principles of treatment provided in Article 1105(1); and (d) upon 
payment of compensation [as set out in the treaty].” Id. art. 1110(1). See also arts. 1103 (most 
favored nation treatment), 1106 (performance requirements), and 1109 (capital transfers). 
 123. The WTO agreement, for instance, retains the traditional requirement that only states 
may initiate litigation. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 289. 
 124. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2056–57. The provision for individual rights of action 
tends to make interjurisdictional problems more urgent. See supra text accompanying notes 33–
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The Chapter 11 cases both involve what is, functionally speaking, 
appellate review of domestic state court decisions by arbitral panels 
constituted under NAFTA.125 Mondev126 concerned an urban 
redevelopment scheme gone bad in Boston’s infamous “Combat 
Zone.” Mondev International, a Canadian corporation, entered into a 
complicated agreement with the City of Boston and the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority to build a shopping mall, parking garage, 
and hotel in the area; the deal eventually foundered, however, on 
disagreement over the price for a parcel of land that the City was to 
transfer to Mondev as part of the project. Mondev sued the City and 
the Authority for breach of contract and also for tortious interference 
with Mondev’s contractual relations with Campeau Massachusetts, 
Inc., another Canadian developer to whom Mondev had eventually 
leased its rights. Although Mondev prevailed on both counts before a 
jury in state court, the trial judge entered judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict on the tort claim, holding that the Authority—a public 
entity—was immune from suit under the Massachusetts Tort Claims 
Act. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), in an opinion 
by then-Justice (now Harvard Law professor) Charles Fried, affirmed 
the lower court on the immunity question and reversed on the 
contract issue, holding that the City and Authority had not breached 
the agreement. The SJC thus rejected both of Mondev’s claims and 
entered judgment for the defendants.127 
Because the events underlying Mondev’s claim occurred prior to 
NAFTA’s entry into force on January 1, 1994, Mondev could not 
have brought its initial suit as a Chapter 11 arbitration.128 Instead, 
Mondev argued that the Massachusetts SJC’s rejection of its claims 
was itself a NAFTA violation—as the NAFTA tribunal put it, “that 
by the decisions of its courts, the United States effectively 
expropriated the value of the rights to redress arising from the failure 
 
34. That is not to deny, however, that the WTO and other trade agreements that impose broad 
obligations on signatory governments and create supranational dispute resolution mechanisms 
may raise many of the same problems. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2152 (noting that 
“GATT/WTO tribunals have exhibited at least some willingness to review national courts”). 
 125. See NAFTA, supra note 119, arts. 1115–1138 (detailing the arbitral mechanisms for 
settlement of disputes under Chapter 11). 
 126. Mondev, supra note 89. 
 127. See Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 836–37 
(Mass. 1998). For further background on the facts and legal arguments in Mondev, see Dana 
Krueger, Note, The Combat Zone: Mondev International, Ltd. v. United States and the 
Backlash Against NAFTA Chapter 11, 21 B.U. INT’L L. J. 399 (2003). 
 128. See Mondev, supra note 89, ¶¶ 57–58. 
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of the project.”129 The tribunal accepted this theory as pleading a 
“denial of justice” under Art. 1105(1)—the minimum standard of 
treatment provision—of NAFTA. “Denial of justice” is a 
longstanding but somewhat vague concept in international law.130 In 
the NAFTA context, it implicates both “improper procedures and 
unjust decisions.”131 The principle “recognizes that not only flagrant 
procedural irregularities and deficiencies may justify diplomatic 
complaint, but also gross defects in the substance of the judgment 
itself.”132 The rationale for this principle, as Renée Lettow Lerner has 
explained, is to use “the substantive injustice as indirect evidence of 
partiality . . . in the tribunal.”133 
Mondev’s NAFTA claim focused on this substantive element. 
The argument, in essence, was that the Massachusetts courts got the 
relevant state law so wrong that they denied justice to the Canadian 
investors under Art. 1105. The most important thing about the 
Mondev panel’s ruling is that it accepted this basic theory of a 
NAFTA violation. In so doing, however, the panel insisted that it was 
not conducting appellate review of the Massachusetts SJC’s decision: 
It is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary 
and another to second-guess the reasoned decisions of the highest 
courts of a State. Under NAFTA, parties have the option to seek 
local remedies. If they do so and lose on the merits, it is not the 
function of NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal.134 
This disavowal of an appellate function did not, however, prevent the 
arbitral panel from reviewing the state court’s decision on its merits. 
Instead, the tribunal asserted that it would apply a more deferential 
standard than an appellate court would ordinarily employ: 
In the end the question is whether, at an international level and 
having regard to generally accepted standards of the administration 
of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the available 
 
 129. Id. ¶ 59. 
 130. See, e.g., Charles de Visscher, Le déni de justice en droit international, 52 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 369, 369 (1935) (calling the doctrine “one of the oldest and one of the worst elucidated 
in international law”) (quoted and translated in Lerner, supra note 27, at 248 n.89); Ahdieh, 
supra note 10, at 2128–33 (surveying the development of denial of justice claims). 
 131. Lerner, supra note 27, at 251. 
 132. ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL 
OF JUSTICE 309 (1938). 
 133. Lerner, supra note 27, at 262. 
 134. Mondev, supra note 89, ¶ 126. 
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facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and 
discreditable, with the result that the investment has been subjected 
to unfair and inequitable treatment.135 
The tribunal acknowledged that this was “a somewhat open-ended 
standard,” but despaired of offering a “more precise formula . . . to 
cover the range of possibilities.”136 
Applying this standard, the tribunal ultimately found that the 
Massachusetts SJC had not breached the United States’ NAFTA 
obligations. Three aspects of the tribunal’s opinion are important for 
present purposes: First, as I have already noted, the tribunal accepted 
the basic contention that a domestic court’s decision may be so 
wrong, as a matter of domestic law, as to amount to a violation of 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11.137 Second, the tribunal engaged in what most 
lawyers would consider to be pretty searching review of the 
Massachusetts SJC’s reasoning on the contract claim.138 Despite the 
tribunal’s protestations, it is hard to see how its opinion would have 
looked much different on this point if it had forthrightly admitted that 
it was conducting an appellate review of the SJC’s decision. Finally, 
the tribunal came perilously close to holding that the state statutory 
immunity of the Redevelopment Authority—a fairly common form of 
governmental immunity in the United States139—violated NAFTA’s 
guarantee of “treatment in accordance with international law.”140 The 
tribunal rejected that conclusion only after extensive consideration of 
 
 135. Id. ¶ 127. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. ¶¶ 129–138. 
 139. A number of states have abolished the common law doctrine of municipal immunity, 
see, e.g., Jackson v. City of Florence, 320 So. 2d 68, 74 (Ala. 1975); Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 
1153, 1156–57 (Okla. 1983), but some have not, see, e.g., Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Auth., 
544 A.2d 1185, 1188–89 (Conn. 1988). One frequently sees a pattern in which state courts 
acknowledge a traditional doctrine that municipalities are immune for acts taken in the 
performance of all governmental functions, later abolish that doctrine, but then uphold 
legislative acts providing for municipal immunity in more limited contexts or for claims above a 
certain amount. See, e.g., Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 66 P.3d 44, 47–49 (Ariz. 2003) (upholding 
statute providing for immunity for recreational activities); Zimmerman ex rel. Zimmerman v. 
Village of Skokie, 697 N.E.2d 699, 706–08 (Ill. 1998) (rejecting argument for exception to the 
state Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act); Wilson v. 
Gipson ex rel. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349, 1351–53 (Okla. 1988) (upholding the state Political 
Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, which waives municipal immunities only up to certain limits). The 
immunity challenged in Mondev was one of these statutory immunities, limited only to 
intentional torts. 
 140. Mondev, supra note 89, ¶¶ 139–156. 
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European jurisprudence and other comparative sources, and it stated 
that “circumstances can be envisaged where the conferral of a general 
immunity from suit for conduct of a public authority affecting a 
NAFTA investment could amount to a breach of Article 1105(1) of 
NAFTA.”141 If a subsequent NAFTA panel were to take this next 
step, such a holding would require a fairly extensive restructuring of 
remedies against American public entities whenever the plaintiff is a 
Canadian or Mexican investor. 
The Loewen case142 likewise began life as a business tort case in 
state court. The suit involved feuding funeral homes in Mississippi. 
Loewen was a large Canadian concern that had undertaken to acquire 
funeral homes all across North America. Its expansion into the Gulf 
Coast region brought it into conflict with Jeremiah O’Keefe, Sr., 
whose family owned a much smaller group of funeral homes in the 
area. The O’Keefe clan ultimately ended up suing Loewen in state 
court for breach of contract, common law fraud, and violations of 
Mississippi antitrust law.143 
The technical term for what happened to Loewen over the 
course of a seven-week trial in Mississippi state court is “home 
cooking.” Although both parties tried to ingratiate themselves to the 
local, largely African-American judge and jury by hiring prominent 
African-American lawyers, the O’Keefes were much more effective. 
Moreover, the O’Keefes’ lawyers repeatedly appealed to the jury’s 
patriotism and antiforeign sentiment, contrasting Mr. O’Keefe’s 
American military service with Loewen’s Canadian origins. Although 
the O’Keefes had only requested $5 million in compensatory 
damages, the jury awarded them $500 million, including $75 million 
for emotional distress and $400 million in punitives. To make matters 
worse, state law required Loewen to post a bond equal to 125 percent 
of the judgment in order to stay execution pending appeal. When the 
Mississippi courts refused to reduce the appeal bond, Loewen felt 
forced to settle the case for $175 million.144 
 
 141. Id. ¶ 151. 
 142. Loewen, supra note 89. 
 143. See id. ¶¶ 30–38. The state proceedings are unreported. For a helpful discussion of the 
Loewen litigation in both the state courts and the NAFTA tribunal, see generally William S. 
Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 52 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 563 (2002). For a fascinating journalist’s account of the events and personalities 
underlying the state court trial, see Jonathan Harr, The Burial, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 
70. 
 144. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶¶ 4–7. 
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Loewen then turned to NAFTA arbitration. It did not argue that 
its investment in its Mississippi funeral homes had been expropriated 
by state executive or legislative action; rather, it challenged the state 
court proceedings as an independent NAFTA violation. Loewen 
asserted that the trial court’s allowance of anti-Canadian testimony 
violated Art. 1102’s prohibition of discrimination and Art. 1105’s 
“duty of full protection and security” for foreign investors;145 that the 
excessive verdict and the bonding requirement likewise violated Art. 
1105; and that the discriminatory conduct of the trial, the excessive 
verdict, and the bonding requirement amounted to an expropriation 
of Loewen’s investment under Art. 1110.146 Although the challenge to 
the damages verdict implicated the same substantive aspect of denial 
of justice at issue in Mondev,147 most of Loewen’s claims focused on 
the conduct of the trial and the bonding requirement. They thus 
raised the procedural aspect of denial of justice.148 Loewen claimed 
$725 million in damages from the United States.149 
The NAFTA panel, which included Judge Abner Mikva, 
formerly of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, largely accepted Loewen’s arguments on the 
merits. The panel found the O’Keefes’ trial strategy outrageous, and 
it chastised the state trial judge for failing to put a stop to O’Keefe’s 
appeals to what the tribunal saw as xenophobia and class or racial 
prejudice. “Having read the transcript and having considered the 
submissions of the parties with respect to the conduct of the trial,” the 
panel wrote, “we have reached the firm conclusion that the conduct 
of the trial by the trial judge was so flawed that it constituted a 
miscarriage of justice amounting to a manifest injustice as that 
expression is understood in international law.”150 
 
 145. The failure of Loewen’s counsel to object to most of the allegedly prejudicial 
arguments and testimony at trial meant that Loewen could probably not have sought appellate 
review of those matters in the state courts. See Dodge, supra note 143, at 565. The Loewen case 
thus raises many of the same “procedural default” issues that I discuss in connection with 
Medellin. See infra notes 168–89 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Loewen, supra note 89,  ¶¶ 39–40. 
 147. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 264–65. 
 148. See id. at 251–61. 
 149. See Notice of Claim, The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Oct. 30, 1998, at 67, at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB65/claim1.pdf. 
 150. Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 54. It is always difficult to gauge the impact of different 
arguments on a trial after the fact. Interestingly, the New Yorker account of the trial, while 
extensive in its discussion of the lawyers’ strategies, does not mention the appeals to nationalism 
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Ultimately, the United States avoided liability in Loewen, but on 
technical grounds that seem unlikely to impede future challenges to 
state court judgments in similar cases.151 Loewen’s first problem was 
that it had failed to pursue available local remedies, including a 
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.152 There was also a 
jurisdictional pitfall: Loewen had gone into bankruptcy, partly as a 
result of the Mississippi verdict, and the entity that ultimately 
emerged from bankruptcy was organized as a United States 
corporation. Finding that “there must be continuous national identity 
from the date of the events giving rise to the claim . . . through the 
date of the resolution of the claim,” the panel found that Loewen was 
no longer entitled to pursue its NAFTA remedies and accordingly 
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.153 
Notwithstanding the panel’s ultimate rejection of Loewen’s 
claims, the striking thing about the panel’s opinion is the extent to 
which it was willing not only to second-guess a state court judgment 
on state law issues but to condemn that court’s entire course of 
proceeding as a violation of international law.154 As in Mondev, the 
NAFTA tribunal began by insisting that it “cannot under the guise of 
a NAFTA claim entertain what is in substance an appeal from a 
domestic judgment.”155 But, as in Mondev, that is exactly what the 
NAFTA tribunal did. The panel’s critique of the trial proceedings 
occupies 43 pages in the opinion preceding the ultimate dismissal of 
the claim on jurisdictional grounds, making that discussion one of the 
 
and xenophobia that the NAFTA panel found so significant in the transcript. See Harr, supra 
note 143, at 86–92. 
 151. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2041 (noting that the “technical and . . . perhaps 
fortuitous nature” of the grounds of dismissal “offers little reason to believe that liability for 
U.S. judicial conduct will not be imposed in the future”). 
 152. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 149 (citing the “local remedies rule,” which “requires a 
party complaining of a breach of international law by a State to exhaust the local remedies in 
that State before the party can raise the complaint at the level of international law”). Notably, 
the NAFTA panel declined to find that a cert petition was an adequate remedy—rather, it held 
that Loewen had simply failed to carry its burden of presenting evidence explaining its business 
decision to settle the case rather than to pursue the petition. Id. ¶¶ 207–17. 
 153. Id. ¶ 225, ¶ 240. 
 154. The panel may have felt emboldened to castigate the state courts precisely because the 
panel’s ultimate resolution avoided the need to frame any relief. But the panel’s dictum now 
stands available for the next case, where jurisdictional avoidance may be more difficult. This is 
the sort of behavior one might fear from a “court” that is constituted for one case only, and thus 
relieved of the need to live tomorrow with its rulings of today. See infra notes 277–83 and 
accompanying text. 
 155. Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 51. 
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most impressive displays of dictum since Marbury v. Madison.156 And 
while one can readily share the panel’s discomfort with some aspects 
of the state court proceedings, it seems likely that losing defendants 
could make similar arguments in any number of cases—provided that 
they can qualify as foreign investors under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
John Echeverria has described NAFTA proceedings like 
Mondev and Loewen as “the biggest threat to United States judicial 
independence that no one has heard of and even fewer people 
understand.”157 Although the issues on the merits in such cases—and 
their political valences—are quite different from cases like Medellin 
and Avena, both sets of cases raise similar and fundamental questions 
about the relationship between international tribunals and domestic 
courts. I survey some of those questions in the next Part. 
III.  TAKING TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS SERIOUSLY 
Cases like Medellin, Mondev, and Loewen replicate the classic 
concerns of Federal Courts law at the supranational level. In 
Medellin, a federal court conducted collateral review of a state court 
proceeding for compliance with international law. A supranational 
court then construed the relevant treaty and issued an order seeking 
to impose its interpretation on the state and federal institutions 
involved. In Mondev and Loewen, a supranational tribunal tried to 
discern whether state courts had construed their own law in such a 
way as to violate supranational treaty rights. Each case involved 
multiple layers of both law and courts, and the potential for conflict 
and misunderstanding between these layers is obvious. 
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler famously developed the 
“Federal Courts” curriculum to deal with just these sorts of conflicts. 
The heart of the course concerns the intricate web of constitutional, 
statutory, and doctrinal rules needed to allow two parallel judicial 
systems—state and federal—to live with one another in at least 
relative harmony. Constitutional and prudential rules of justiciability, 
 
 156. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154–167 (1803) (opining that Madison illegally refused to deliver 
Marbury’s commission, and that the federal courts had power to require senior executive 
officials to perform such duties, before ultimately holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the case). 
 157. Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 18, 2004, at A20 (quoting Professor Echeverria); see Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and 
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2025 (2004) (characterizing NAFTA and WTO 
panels as a “threat to self-government”). 
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state-federal conflict of laws, the Anti-Injunction Act and abstention 
doctrines, federal deference to state courts on state law questions, and 
the intricate rules of federal habeas corpus are all designed to mediate 
a relationship between state and federal courts that is not strictly 
hierarchical.158 Both constitutional values of federalism and the 
practical realities of the system—in particular, the inability of the 
federal courts to handle even all cases raising questions of federal 
law—mandate an emphasis on preserving both sets of courts as viable 
and respected institutions. 
If we are now to graft another layer of courts onto this system—
the ICJ, NAFTA and WTO panels, perhaps an International 
Criminal Court (ICC)—then we will need to develop a comparable 
set of tools to mediate the new set of conflicts that will surely arise. 
Even a skeptic of supranational institutions cannot help but relish 
that prospect; after all, the globalization of the Federal Courts field 
seems likely to function as a full employment act for Federal Courts 
scholars. It is important for such scholars to seize this opportunity: if 
the interaction between domestic and supranational courts is left to 
specialists in international law, then the field will likely develop in 
ways that are relatively less concerned with maintaining the integrity 
of domestic structures. 
This Article does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of these 
questions. I want simply to highlight some implications of the Legal 
Process notion of institutional settlement in cases like Medellin, 
Mondev, and Loewen. I hope to provide some concrete examples of 
what a Legal Process approach to foreign affairs law might look like 
and point out some directions in which a globalized Federal Courts 
literature needs to go next. 
A. International Law and Institutional Settlement 
Institutional settlement means entrusting certain institutions to 
make particular decisions and deferring to those decisions even in 
situations in which other institutions might have decided the same 
issue differently. That deference may have—for lack of better 
terms—both substantive and procedural dimensions. The federal 
habeas statute, for example, provides that a federal court may 
overturn a state court’s application of law to fact only if the state 
 
 158. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954). 
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court’s ruling “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly 
established federal law,”159 and the Supreme Court has made clear 
“that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law.”160 This deference to the 
substance of the state court’s ruling exists alongside deference to the 
state court’s procedural arrangements under rules of exhaustion and 
procedural default.161 These rules ensure that state courts will have the 
opportunity to rule on federal issues in the first instance by providing 
that federal courts will not consider grounds for habeas relief that 
have not first been presented to the state courts in accord with state 
procedures. The effect is to “settle” in the state courts the primary 
authority to adjudicate federal defenses in state criminal prosecutions. 
The most successful supranational institutions have thrived 
because they have achieved the respect and deference inherent in this 
notion of institutional settlement. Richard Kay has said that the 
widespread acceptance of judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights “cannot be attributed to their often quite disputable 
results, nor to the sometimes uneven logic of the reasons the Court 
gives for them. Rather they are accepted now . . . simply because the 
Court has earned acceptance as the authoritative interpreter of 
binding legal rules.”162 And yet, international law—and international 
lawyers—often have little patience for the sort of rules designed to 
respect domestic institutional settlements. As Dean Slaughter has 
acknowledged, deference to domestic institutions “is a radical 
departure for most international lawyers and diplomats, who are 
accustomed to operating on the international plane as something 
apart from and presumably superior to the particularities and 
prejudices of domestic institutions.”163 
In this spirit, international lawyers have frequently reacted to 
American courts’ application of the procedural default doctrine in 
consular relations cases by insisting that domestic law may not excuse 
 
 159. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). 
 160. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000); accord Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 
(2002). 
 161. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000) (requiring exhaustion of remedies available in state 
court); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (holding that state-court procedural default 
bars federal habeas relief). 
 162. Richard S. Kay, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Authority of Law, 
8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 217, 220 (1993). 
 163. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 149–50. 
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a violation of rights under international law.164 Likewise, the NAFTA 
panels in Mondev and Loewen were relatively unwilling to defer to 
the state courts’ construction of state law in those cases.165 And in 
both the trade and human rights contexts, internationalists have 
argued for loosening the formal institutional constraints on federal 
lawmaking in order to facilitate the creation and enforcement of 
international agreements.166 I argue in this Section that each of these 
developments undermines both domestic institutional settlements and 
the attempt to develop a viable system of supranational adjudication. 
1. Domestic Law “Excuses” for International Law Violations. 
The best support for the notion that domestic law may not “excuse” 
an international law violation comes from the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. Article 27 states that “[a] party may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty.”167 That language might mean at least two different 
things, however. Doctrines like procedural default are not 
“justifications” for violations of federal law in the sense that, say, self-
defense can be a “justification” for homicide. Rather, such doctrines 
simply limit the remedies available when the federal right-holder fails 
to meet certain procedural requirements. The federal courts’ 
invocation of procedural default, in other words, was not a ruling that 
Texas officials had no obligation to notify Medellin of his treaty 
rights. The Treaties Convention thus may have no application at all to 
such doctrines; indeed, that interpretation would be consistent with 
 
 164. See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson III, The Execution of Angel Breard by the United States: 
Violating an Order of the International Court of Justice, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 121, 127 
(1998) (“It is basic that neither the United States, nor any other state, can plead the authority of 
its internal law to mitigate its international legal obligations.”); Jordan J. Paust, Breard and 
Treaty-Based Rights under the Consular Convention, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 693 (1998) (calling 
Breard’s holding that treaty compliance must respect domestic procedural rules “a miserly 
misstatement of the law of treaties”). 
 165. See supra notes 138–41, 150 and accompanying text. 
 166. See, e.g., Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 680–81 (arguing that 
executive pronouncements should have the force of law in the context of Vienna Convention 
cases); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 
cmt. e (1987) (“The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used 
as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”). 
 167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 27, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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the international norm that treaty implementation is governed by the 
procedural rules of the forum state.168 
The Court’s critics seem to read the Treaties Convention more 
broadly, however. The idea seems to be that domestic rules are 
irrelevant in determining whether a signatory nation has breached its 
obligation under international law to “comply” with the treaty.169 
Once the Houston police failed to tell Medellin that he could speak to 
the Mexican consulate, the Consular Convention obliged the United 
States to rectify this mistake. And while the U.S. could use whatever 
procedural vehicles it liked to afford redress—e.g., state court 
appeals, federal habeas corpus review, perhaps even a presidential 
stay of execution—the only way to avoid a treaty violation was if 
those vehicles in fact provided Medellin with redress. Compliance 
with local procedural rules could not itself have prevented such a 
violation of international law; treaty compliance is measured only by 
outcomes of domestic processes. 
That strikes me as an overly simplistic vision of “compliance” 
with international law in the context of a complex domestic legal 
system. Consular Convention obligations may fall on any of the over 
one million state and local law enforcement personnel in the United 
States.170 The United States cannot “guarantee” compliance by all of 
those people in the way that it might “guarantee” compliance with a 
more traditional form of agreement—say, to withdraw its armed 
 
 168. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (noting that “the Vienna Convention 
itself . . . provides that the rights expressed in the Convention ‘shall be exercised in conformity 
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,’ provided that ‘said laws and regulations 
must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this 
Article are intended’” (quoting Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T. 
at 101)). 
 169. See, e.g., Amnesty International, The Execution of Angel Breard: Apologies Are Not 
Enough, May 1, 1998, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510271998?open& 
of=ENG-392 (“[N]ational constitutional, legislative or regulatory norms cannot be invoked to 
avoid or modify the fulfillment of international obligations.”); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme 
Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 267 (2001) (“From the international community’s perspective, the 
superiority of international legal order over domestic law seemed to be less questionable than 
ever. The states could disregard or violate international obligations and rules but they could not 
appeal to their domestic regulations to justify such conduct.”). 
 170. See Brian A. Reaves & Matthew J. Hickman, Census of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 2000, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Oct. 2002, at 1. The 
overwhelming majority of U.S. law enforcement personnel work for state and (mostly) local 
governments, rather than for national agencies. See William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, 
and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 665, 665 (2002). 
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forces from a particular territory or to destroy a certain number of 
nuclear missiles. Before the ICJ, the United States asserted a quite 
modest version of “compliance,” noting programs to educate state 
and local law enforcement on the Consular Convention.171 Mexico and 
other nations have instead argued that the Convention creates rights 
enforceable by foreign nationals in the U.S. courts.172 But even the 
latter view does not necessarily—and cannot practically—entail a 
right to a new trial every time the Convention is violated. Even if the 
Convention creates enforceable individual rights, it is quite another 
thing to say that those rights must prevail even where they are not 
asserted in the way required by domestic legal processes. 
Two examples may help illustrate the point. Consider what 
would have happened to Mr. Medellin in a much simpler procedural 
system without collateral review for criminal convictions. Medellin 
completed his direct appeals in the Texas courts without mentioning 
his Consular Convention claim. In most court systems, that would be 
the end of the matter; courts generally only respond to defenses that 
are argued to them, and final judgments generally remain final. The 
procedural default doctrine arises because American judicial 
arrangements provide—somewhat unusually—for multiple layers of 
collateral review that supervise enforcement of federal criminal 
rights.173 Is the claim that all countries are required, under 
international law, to have collateral review procedures, or at least 
some means of reopening a case after final judgment, whenever 
someone later discovers a possible treaty violation? 
That may, in fact, be the argument. If it is, though, then 
international lawyers should be clear that they are asking not only for 
the basic treaty obligation of notification, but also for a procedural 
restructuring of many countries’ judicial systems. American-style 
habeas review is hardly a universal practice, and legal systems vary in 
the extent to which they will reopen criminal judgments to take 
account of new arguments.174 If such proceedings are not required, 
 
 171. Counter-Memorial of the United States (Mex. v. U.S.), (Nov. 3, 2003), at http:www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus_20031103_c-mem_06.pdf. 
 172. See, e.g., Avena, supra note 84, ¶ 126 (noting Mexico’s argument for an “exclusionary 
rule” barring use at trial of statements made by foreigners prior to consular notification). 
 173. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533–34 (1953) (noting that habeas corpus is an 
exception to ordinary rules of res judicata). 
 174. While many legal systems permit some sort of postconviction review or collateral 
attack, most of these procedures seem considerably more limited than the American habeas 
corpus regime. Several permit relief only under a “miscarriage of justice” standard. See Kent W. 
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however, then it is hard to see why the United States should be 
faulted for failing to be more generous in its treatment of Medellin’s 
claims on collateral review when it had no obligation to provide 
collateral review in the first place. In any event, the extra complexity 
of procedures for collateral attack or reopening of judgments imposes 
significant costs on a judicial system, in terms of both inefficiency and 
interjurisdictional conflict. Institutional settlements like the 
procedural default doctrine are designed to mitigate those costs while 
maintaining some of the advantages of a second bite at the apple, and 
people who wish to take that second bite—like Medellin—should 
have to follow the ordinary rules governing the procedure.175 
A second illustration would compare Medellin’s case to that of 
someone with an analogous claim under domestic law. Consider a 
habeas petitioner who claims that his murder confession has been 
beaten out of him by the police. That petitioner would state an 
extremely serious claim under the Fifth Amendment, and yet, if he 
fails to object when his confession is introduced against him at his 
state court trial, then he will have procedurally defaulted the claim; as 
a result, he will be foreclosed from raising it on federal habeas review. 
Our Fifth Amendment claimant is, in other words, in exactly the same 
 
Roach, Canada, in CRAIG W. BRADLEY, ED., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 
53, 78 (1999) (describing Canada’s system for postconviction review by the Minister of Justice); 
Eliahu Harnon & Alex Stein, Israel, in BRADLEY, supra, at 217, 236 (discussing Israeli petitions 
for a new trial). Others seem to allow relief only for errors that go to the actual innocence of the 
defendant, which a Consular Convention claim would not. See Richard S. Frase, France, in 
BRADLEY, supra, at 143, 184–85 (describing petitions in the Court of Cassation based on 
“certain post-trial events or newly discovered evidence”); Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in 
BRADLEY, supra, at 245, 281–82 (describing “requests for revision” available “only when there 
is new evidence which . . . demonstrates that the convicted person must be absolved, or the 
conviction was based on false or fabricated evidence”); Richard Volger, Spain, in BRADLEY, 
supra, at 361, 393 (describing “revision” proceedings available “[i]n the event that new evidence 
is discovered casting doubt on the conviction”); see also German Criminal Procedure Code, § 
359 StPO (Federal Ministry of Justice trans.), at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/ 
StPO.htm#359 (last visited January 26, 2005) (permitting relief only for errors going to guilt or 
for violation of the European Convention on Human Rights). Some systems have regimes that 
permit habeas review in principle but make it a “dead letter” in practice. Daniel H. Foote, “The 
Door That Never Opens?”: Capital Punishment and Postconviction Review of Death Sentences in 
the United States and Japan, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 367, 416 (1993) (describing the Japanese 
system). 
 175. Likewise, where the Supreme Court has forced reopening of criminal convictions based 
on new evidence, it has adopted a standard of review very deferential to the judgment. See 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (suggesting that federal habeas relief would be 
available where the petitioner could show new evidence indicating his innocence and the state 
provided no avenue for the claim, but that the threshold for such claims would be 
“extraordinarily high”). 
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procedural boat as Mr. Medellin.176 The debate over Consular 
Convention claims often overlooks that they are treated precisely the 
same in our system as claims by U.S. nationals raised under our 
fundamental law. 
What I am suggesting would be something like “national 
treatment” for treaty rights—that is, a treaty signatory must afford 
equivalent procedural protections and remedies for rights asserted 
under a treaty as it does for similar rights protected under domestic 
law. In many areas, the fundamental aspiration of international law 
has been to be incorporated directly into domestic legal systems. 
Debate currently rages, for example, over whether customary 
international norms have direct effect in American courts,177 and 
similar disputes have arisen about the self-executing effect of 
treaties.178 It is more than a little odd in the Consular Convention 
context, then, to hear international lawyers argue that treaty norms 
should not be treated similarly to other well-established norms of 
federal law. 
This gets back to what we should take to be a violation of a treaty 
norm. I want to distinguish between whether the Houston police 
“violated” the Convention and whether the United States can be said 
to be “in violation” of the treaty on the international plane. There is 
little question that the first sort of violation occurred, but did the 
second? Suppose, for example, that the United States conceded that 
the Consular Convention creates rights enforceable by private 
individuals and provided that those rights should be treated by 
domestic courts in exactly the same manner that those courts would 
 
 176. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (observing that “although treaties are 
recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of 
provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default apply”). 
 177. Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997) 
(arguing that customary international law is not directly effective as federal law and may not be 
applied by courts without legislative authorization), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International 
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1827 (1998) (defending the conventional 
wisdom among American international lawyers that customary international law is federal law). 
For my own entry, see Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International 
Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 369 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Customary International Law] 
(arguing that customary law is not federal law but that courts may sometimes give it effect even 
without specific legislative authorization). 
 178. Compare, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961 (1999) (arguing 
against self-execution), with Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
2154, 2154–55 (1999) (arguing for self-execution). 
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treat violations of the Fifth Amendment or other basic constitutional 
rights. Does it make sense to require more than that?179 
In answering this question, it may help to distinguish between 
two different goals in crafting remedies for violations of treaty rights. 
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer—Federal Courts scholars writing 
in the Legal Process tradition—have distinguished between Marbury 
v. Madison’s principle of an individual remedy for every right180 and 
“[a]nother principle, whose focus is more structural, [that] demands a 
system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government 
generally within the bounds of law.”181 The former principle demands 
justice in each individual case, but it is often compromised by 
sovereign immunity, jurisdictional limits, and the like. The latter 
principle “is more unyielding in its own terms, but can tolerate the 
denial of particular remedies, and sometimes of individual redress.”182 
One way to approach treaty obligations like the Consular Convention 
might be to say that although the Houston police “violated” Mr. 
Medellin’s treaty right, the U.S. is not “in violation” of the treaty so 
long as it provides a general system of remedies that is adequate to 
ensure reasonable compliance with international law. One might then 
sketch a division of labor between national and supranational courts, 
such that national courts would be responsible for providing remedies 
in individual cases, while the ICJ would determine the structural 
adequacy of the remedial system provided by national law. 
Providing “national treatment” for treaty rights will not always 
satisfy this structural standard. A totalitarian regime might sign on to 
the Consular Convention, then forbid any claims under it in the 
regime’s own courts on the ground that those courts respect no rights 
under domestic law, either. Under my proposed division of labor, 
these sorts of structural inadequacies would remain a proper concern 
for supranational courts. And, in fact, the problem in cases like Avena 
 
 179. In fact, I wonder if the Constitution would permit more than that. If the Consular 
Convention were treated as a “super right” not subject to procedural default on habeas review, I 
would think that the American citizen in the cell next door to Medellin’s on Texas’s death row, 
who might well have had a federal constitutional claim that failed on procedural default 
grounds, would have a very interesting equal protection claim. 
 180. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States has been 
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”). 
 181. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778–79 (1991). 
 182. Id. at 1779. 
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may lie not with the requirement that persons raising treaty rights 
comply with local procedural rules, but rather with the specific 
procedural rules in question. The procedural default doctrine has 
gone through different iterations over the years,183 and many 
American scholars believe that current law on the subject is fairly 
harsh.184 That judgment seems implicit in the ICJ’s ruling in Avena 
that the default doctrine prevents U.S. courts from giving full effect to 
the Consular Convention;185 after all, it was the very nature of the 
treaty violation by local authorities that the breach deprived the 
foreign defendants of information about their legal options, so that 
those defendants may not have been aware of their rights. 
One may or may not find the ICJ’s analysis of procedural default 
persuasive.186 For present purposes, I want to make three broader 
points. The first is that once we acknowledge any notion of 
procedural default—that is, the strict version applied by the Fifth 
Circuit in Medellin or a more liberalized one—at the international 
level, we have considerably undercut the broad principle that 
domestic rules are irrelevant in determining whether a signatory 
nation has breached its obligation to “comply” with the treaty. 
Although the ICJ’s discussion suggests an intention to police the basic 
adequacy of domestic remedies, it nonetheless also seems to 
acknowledge that domestic rules are critical in the following way: a 
treaty “violation” in the basic sense (Texas’s failure to read Medellin 
his consular rights) may nonetheless not lead to a “violation” in the 
broader sense (that the U.S. would be out of compliance with the 
Convention) if the treaty right-holder fails to comply with domestic 
 
 183. Compare, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 487 (1953) (“A failure to use a state’s 
available remedy, in the absence of some interference or incapacity . . . bars federal habeas 
corpus.”), with Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 
U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (excusing state court procedural defaults absent a showing that the petitioner 
“deliberately bypassed” state court procedures), with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 
(1977) (state court procedural default bars habeas review absent a showing of “cause” and 
“prejudice” for the default). See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal 
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128 (1986). 
 184. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1652 (2003) 
(complaining of “the extraordinarily harsh doctrinal framework of habeas ‘procedural 
default’”). I take no position here on whether the current rules for overcoming such defaults are 
unfair; the important point is simply that some doctrine of procedural default is essential to a 
viable dual system. 
 185. See Avena, supra note 84, ¶ 113. 
 186. One may legitimately ask whether ICJ judges—most of whom have been trained in 
unitary legal systems lacking collateral review—have any particular expertise on the question. 
Certainly their conclusory pronouncements do not display any serious analysis of the issue. 
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procedural and remedial rules. Acknowledging that principle, in 
itself, would be an important step. 
The second point is that the need for a procedural default 
doctrine arises chiefly from the effect that not having one has on the 
judicial system being reviewed. The Supreme Court has observed that 
liberal default rules for federal habeas review undermine the finality 
of state court judgments and encourage state courts to disregard their 
own procedural rules in the first instance.187 After all, if a state court 
knows that the federal courts will review a defendant’s claim on 
collateral attack notwithstanding a procedural waiver in state court, 
the state tribunal has a strong incentive to go ahead and hear the 
claim; otherwise, its resolution of the other issues in the case may 
become irrelevant. Collateral review by the ICJ of both state and 
federal courts in cases like Medellin seems likely to have similar 
effects. In fact, the mechanism is considerably simpler: the ICJ’s 
Avena decision simply ordered the U.S. courts to ignore the violations 
of state procedural rules in Consular Convention cases.188 If the U.S. 
courts comply, they may face pressure to “level the playing field” by 
ignoring procedural defaults in cases involving American nationals 
with wholly domestic claims. 
Finally, there is the question whether the procedural default 
rules and similar principles governing review of domestic courts by 
international tribunals should themselves be established as a matter 
of international or domestic law. I focus on this question at greater 
length in Section C, but the argument can be stated briefly here: 
doctrines like procedural default are calibrated to an assessment of 
the relative institutional competences of the reviewing and reviewed 
courts. Hence, debates about the scope of federal habeas corpus 
review of state court criminal convictions have been centrally 
concerned with the issue of “parity” between state and federal courts: 
to what extent do we trust state courts to be the front-line enforcers 
of certain federal rights?189 Consular Convention claims confront a 
similar question of parity: to the extent that we trust domestic courts 
 
 187. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747–51 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 
107, 126–29 (1982); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 188. Likewise, the Justice Department interpreted the President’s memorandum as ordering 
the state courts to ignore their own procedural rules and grant new hearings. See supra note 111. 
 189. Many forests have perished over parity. For a sampling of the debate, see HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 322–26; Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1105 (1977); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and 
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983). 
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as generally competent and fair institutions, we will be willing to 
establish rules of review that are generally deferential. If we don’t 
trust domestic courts in this way—as the ICJ apparently did not trust 
the American courts—then we will be inclined to disregard domestic 
procedures and the like. My point, however, is that our trust level 
may well vary from one domestic legal system to another. If so, then it 
will be hard to establish the rules of deference as a matter of uniform 
international law. While some sort of international law floor may be 
desirable, most doctrines governing the relationship between 
domestic and international tribunals will likely have to be worked out 
as part of the foreign affairs law of individual nations. 
The view that internal law and structures are irrelevant to the 
application of international law seems rooted in the fiction that states 
are monolithic entities.190 One need not go all the way with Dean 
Slaughter’s notion of “disaggregated” sovereignty—that is, the notion 
that “individual national government institutions could become 
bearers of the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty in the global 
arena”191—to think that international law must increasingly take 
account of internal domestic structures. After all, it is precisely the 
operation of those internal institutions agreements like the Consular 
Convention regulate. As I have already suggested, the U.S.’s recent 
decision to withdraw consent to ICJ jurisdiction in Consular 
Convention cases after Avena demonstrates that, if supranational 
institutions show no inclination to respect domestic institutional 
settlements, domestic actors are likely to reciprocate. 
2. Second-Guessing Domestic Courts on Domestic Law. 
Mondev and Loewen raise a different problem. Domestic law is not 
irrelevant to the international law issue in those cases—indeed, it is 
the alleged misconstruction of domestic law or the procedural 
inadequacies of domestic proceedings that is the basis of the treaty 
violation. The whole notion of denial-of-justice claims in these sorts 
of cases is that the complaining party has been denied—presumably 
because it is a foreigner—rights that are substantively provided by 
domestic law. In Mondev and Loewen, that meant that the state 
 
 190. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 13 (insisting that this fiction entails the “willful 
adoption of analytical blinders”). 
 191. See id. at 34; see also Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) 
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 649, 652–53 (2002) (arguing that “exclusion of state governments 
from foreign relations activity . . . should be reexamined in globalization’s wake”). 
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courts were alleged to have erred so badly in the application of state 
law as to trigger the treaty’s protections. 
For present purposes, I want to focus on the substantive aspects 
of the denial-of-justice claims. We have no precise analogue to such 
claims in American law, but we do have a principle that state courts 
may not manipulate state law so as to “deny” a federal right. The 
issue arises in a wide variety of situations in which vindication of a 
federal right may depend, at least in part, on how a state court 
answers a question of state law. The question then arises to what 
extent the U.S. Supreme Court—which is supreme only on federal 
questions and generally lacks power to authoritatively interpret state 
law192—may second-guess a state court’s construction of the state-law 
predicate to a federal claim.193 
A leading early example is Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee,194 
which involved federal rights under the treaties that ended the 
Revolutionary War. Land belonging to Denny Martin Fairfax, a 
British subject, was seized during the war by the State of Virginia and 
ultimately granted to Hunter. The treaties ending the war provided 
that seizures before a certain date would be honored but that seizures 
after the effective date would not. Fairfax’s right to the land, a federal 
right under the treaty, thus depended on the effective date of the 
seizure, a question of state law.195 Although the decision of a state’s 
highest court is ordinarily conclusive on state law questions, there was 
some reason to fear that the Virginia Court of Appeals was hostile to 
the federal peace treaties and might manipulate the state law question 
to avoid vindicating federal treaty rights.196 In this sort of situation, the 
Hart & Wechsler authors argue, “some review of the basis for the 
state court’s determination of the state-law question is essential if the 
federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination.”197 
 
 192. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
 193. For two recent treatments, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State 
Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003); 
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law 
Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002). 
 194. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). 
 195. See id. at 617–20. 
 196. See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 39 (4th ed. 2005) 
(noting that the Virginia Court of Appeals “was headed by Spencer Roane, an ardent states’ 
righter and bitter foe of [John] Marshall”). 
 197. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 493; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and Logistics of Direct Review, 34 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977) (“[T]he state court does not speak the final word on 
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Hence, in Fairfax’s Devisee, the Supreme Court reviewed—and 
reversed—the Virginia Court of Appeals’ determination, as a matter 
of state law, that title to the land had vested in Virginia prior to the 
treaties’ effective date.198 
Similar problems have arisen in more recent cases. Under the 
Contracts Clause, for instance, a state legislature may not “impair[] 
the Obligation of Contracts”;199 whether a contract exists at all, 
however, is generally a question of state law. The Court has thus 
occasionally reviewed a state court’s decision that no contract existed 
in order to ensure that federal law rights under the Contracts Clause 
are not evaded.200 Similarly, a claim that the State has deprived 
someone of liberty or property without due process of law in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, or taken their property without just 
compensation, depends on liberty and property interests typically 
created and defined by state law,201 and the Court could review state 
court determinations of such interests. Most recently, the 
controversial decision in Bush v. Gore202 involved a claim that the 
Florida courts had altered state election law in a way forbidden by 
Article II of the Federal Constitution, which provides that rules for 
choosing presidential electors must be made by the state legislature.203 
 
the state question” where the “existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns 
on the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law.”). 
 198. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 627–28. The Virginia Court of Appeals then defied that ruling, 
arguing that the statutory provision giving the U.S. Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over 
state court rulings was unconstitutional. That dispute was resolved by the Court’s well-known 
ruling in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816). Justice Story’s opinion in 
Martin defended the Court’s earlier review of the Virginia land title issue in Fairfax’s Devisee. 
See id. at 358 (“From the very necessity of the case, there must be a preliminary inquiry into the 
existence and structure of the title.”); see also Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 305 
(1810) (defending the Court’s independent review of state law in another treaty case on the 
ground that “[t]he construction of [state] laws . . . is only a step in the cause leading to the 
construction and meaning of this article of the treaty”). 
 199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 200. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938): 
[I]n order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are 
bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms and 
conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired it obligation. This 
involves an appraisal of the statutes of the State and the decisions of its courts. 
See generally Monaghan, supra note 193, at 1976–83. 
 201. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992) (takings); Bd. of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972) (due process); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 
n.7 (1972) (same). 
 202. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 203. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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The concurring justices who relied on this ground thus had to 
consider whether the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state 
election law had departed so greatly from the “correct” interpretation 
of those statutory rules as to amount to forbidden judicial 
lawmaking.204 
This sort of review is quite controversial. When the U.S. 
Supreme Court reverses a state court on state law grounds, it 
threatens the supremacy of state courts over state law. That principle, 
most clearly established in the Reconstruction-era case of Murdock v. 
Memphis,205 is one of the pillars of our federalism. Martha Field has 
explained that if the federal Supreme Court were allowed to 
substitute its own view of state law for that of the highest state court, 
“it would not be possible to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’ It 
is thus because of Murdock that the whole concept of state law as 
distinct from federal law is a meaningful one.”206 
The trick, then, is to allow enough federal oversight to foreclose 
hostile state courts from manipulating state law to thwart federal 
rights, but not so much federal second-guessing as to eliminate state 
court supremacy over state law. The Supreme Court has walked this 
line by according substantial deference to state court interpretations 
of state law, even when the state law question is antecedent to a 
federal right. Hence the Court said in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. 
Brand that “we accord respectful consideration and great weight to 
 
 204. See 531 U.S. at 112–20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Monaghan, supra note 
193, at 1928–34 (framing the review of state law issue in Bush v. Gore). For additional cases 
reviewing state-court determinations of state law, see Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 
354 (1964) (reviewing a state court’s determination that, contrary to state precedent, a state 
trespass law applied to black sit-in demonstrators); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 466–67 (1958) (reviewing the Alabama Supreme Court on a point of state appellate 
procedure, in a case involving a contempt judgment entered against the NAACP for civil rights 
activities). Both Bouie and Patterson are surely best explained by the Court’s warranted 
skepticism that state courts in the South during the Civil Rights Movement would give a fair 
hearing to black protesters. 
 205. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Murdock interpreted the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
statute generally to permit review only of federal issues in cases on direct appeal from the state 
supreme courts, leaving the state issues as settled by the state courts’ opinions. The Court 
offered this interpretation in part to avoid the constitutional question that would have been 
presented by a statutory attempt to extend the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to cover 
all state law issues in a case. Id. at 633. Whether Murdock is a statutory or constitutional 
principle, however, it has become “such a fundamental part of our way of thinking about the 
boundary between state and federal power that many of our suppositions, constitutional and 
otherwise, are built upon it.” Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common 
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 920 (1986). 
 206. Field, supra note 205, at 922. 
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the views of the State’s highest court” on state law questions.207 One 
leading case described the Court’s inquiry as limited to determining 
whether the state court’s construction of state law had “fair support”: 
Even though the constitutional protection invoked be denied on 
non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire 
whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or 
substantial basis . . . But if there is no evasion of the constitutional 
issue, and the nonfederal ground of decision has fair support, . . . this 
Court will not inquire whether the rule applied by the state court is 
right or wrong, or substitute its own view of what should be deemed 
the better rule, for that of the state court.208 
This “fair support” standard has been challenged, and it seems likely 
that the precise level of deference may vary depending on the 
situation and the nature of the underlying federal right at issue.209 But 
 
 207. 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938). 
 208. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944) (quoting Broad River 
Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930)). 
 209. Henry Monaghan has argued that “the fair support rule should be viewed as a rule of 
practice only,” and that “the Court possesses ancillary jurisdiction independently to determine 
the content of state law whenever the Federal Constitution directly constrains its operation or 
incorporates it.” Monaghan, supra note 193, at 1964. Although Professor Monaghan has found 
instances of such independent review, the predominant weight of case law seems to 
acknowledge some obligation of deference. Monaghan’s argument is particularly inapplicable to 
denial-of-justice claims under international law for several reasons. First, Monaghan discusses a 
relatively narrow class of situations in which some specific norm of federal constitutional law 
implicates or incorporates a state law question. A less deferential standard might be tolerable in 
this limited range of cases, but denial of justice applies to any application of state law, so long as 
a foreigner is involved. Second, one important argument for Monaghan’s position is that 
independent review of state law questions would avoid the need for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
attribute “bad faith” or “intellectual incompetence” to state judges in order to reverse them; 
instead, the Court could simply invoke honest disagreement on the merits. See id. at 1965. But 
the denial-of-justice principle always requires the imputation of bad faith, with an additional 
patina of xenophobia thrown in for good measure. Third, in the context of supranational review 
of the decisions of state courts or the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court itself stands 
available as an alternate forum to review the application of state law to foreigners. To the extent 
that current jurisdictional arrangements foreclose such review, they could be amended if a more 
rigorous inquiry into “denial of justice” claims really seems necessary. Such review would be 
preferable to (and more acceptable politically than) nondeferential review by alien tribunals. In 
any event, Monaghan acknowledges that “‘fair support’ or deference review . . . should mark the 
ordinary measure of the [Supreme] Court’s appellate review,” id. at 1926, and I doubt he would 
disagree that it likewise should be the standard for denial-of-justice claims before supranational 
courts—if such claims are to be permitted at all. 
The more compelling argument against “fair support” as an across-the-board standard is 
that the cases in fact reflect different degrees of deference in different situations. The Bush v. 
Gore concurrence, for example, was less deferential, suggesting that the Court should 
“undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law,” 531 U.S. 98, 114 
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more important than the language used to describe the standard is the 
rarity of its application. State law questions are antecedent to federal 
ones in a vast range of cases; indeed, the application of the adequate 
and independent state grounds doctrine to block U.S. Supreme Court 
review of a federal claim on appeal from the state courts depends on 
this antecedent relationship. And yet the Supreme Court refuses to 
accept state court interpretations of state law as binding in only a 
small fraction of cases.210 
The NAFTA decisions in Mondev or Loewen replicated this 
pattern and raise similar concerns.211 The legitimate fear from the 
international perspective is that domestic courts may manipulate 
domestic law—the rules of contract or municipal immunity in 
Mondev, the rules of trial and appellate procedure in Loewen—so as 
to deny the treaty rights of foreigners to fair and equal treatment. For 
that reason, supranational tribunals have inquired into the correctness 
of domestic court constructions of domestic law, in the same way that 
the U.S. Supreme Court might probe the plausibility of state court 
interpretations of state law in cases like Fairfax’s Devisee. But the 
risks are also similar. Too much supranational review of domestic 
 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), but suggested that this lesser deference was necessary to protect 
“the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures. To attach definitive weight to the 
pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has 
actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce 
the explicit requirements of Article II.” Id. at 115. The key points for present purposes, 
however, are that reduced deference in such cases is generally occasioned by some specific 
constitutional constraint on state law in a particular area, e.g., law governing presidential 
elections, and that nearly all the cases command some level of deference to state court 
interpretations. 
 210. The adequate and independent grounds doctrine nowadays is enforced primarily at the 
stage when the Supreme Court decides to grant or deny certiorari; thus, when the Court 
determines that a state law ground blocks review of a federal issue, the ordinary result is an 
unexplained denial of certiorari rather than an opinion construing the adequate and 
independent state grounds doctrine or affirming the plausibility of the state court’s 
interpretation of state law. See generally ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, & STEPHEN 
M. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 170 (6th ed. 1986). For that reason, the criteria by 
which the Court decides, in the unusual case, to review an antecedent state law question remain 
somewhat opaque. And because the Court only takes the cases in which it has decided not to 
respect the antecedent state law ground, simply reading the reported decisions like Fairfax’s 
Devisee or Brand or Bush v. Gore could create the impression that the Court routinely reverses 
state courts on state law questions. But that is hardly the case. 
 211. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2059–62 (demonstrating the extent to which NAFTA 
panels exercise power over domestic courts and noting strong similarities to appellate review). 
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court decisions on domestic law would threaten domestic courts’ 
control over the content of their own law.212 
It is worth noting that, although both Mondev and Loewen 
involved supranational review of state court decisions, federal court 
rulings are equally vulnerable. One can imagine, for example, 
NAFTA panel review of a federal court’s ruling that a Mexican or 
Canadian company was liable to an American plaintiff under the 
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)213 or some 
similar federal statute.214 Supranational review thus threatens not only 
the control of state courts over state law, but also the control of 
federal courts over federal law. There is no reason in principle why a 
NAFTA panel could not consider a denial-of-justice claim involving 
even a federal-law decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
One obvious objection is that Mondev and Loewen are only two 
cases, and cases that the U.S. won at that. It is not obvious that this 
sort of supranational review will ever become sufficiently frequent to 
threaten the integrity of domestic law. I am not all that reassured by 
this for two reasons. The first is that Supreme Court review of state 
court decisions is also relatively rare: the Court grants certiorari in a 
relatively small fraction of the cases in which review is sought, and 
those cases in turn reflect only a fraction of the cases in which review 
could be sought.215 And yet the threat of Supreme Court revision of 
state-law interpretations by state courts has been thought sufficiently 
serious to warrant relatively strong rules of deference. 
The second point is that the additional bite at the apple afforded 
by denial-of-justice claims seems like an incredibly attractive option 
 
 212. The risks actually seem greater in the supranational context. As Jed Rubenfeld has 
noted, American courts “remain interwoven with the nation’s processes of democratic self-
governance” in a variety of ways. Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 1997–98. Those processes, 
however, hold little sway over supranational tribunals. 
 213. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2000). Although the RICO statute was originally created to 
combat organized crime, it has become a frequent weapon in commercial disputes. See, e.g., 
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 402–03 (2003) (featuring RICO claims in 
a suit over managed health-care reimbursements). 
 214. Indeed, since the same diversity of citizenship that is a predicate for NAFTA 
jurisdiction will generally permit federal court jurisdiction even over cases involving state law 
claims, one would expect to see many of the same sorts of state-law contract and tort claims 
considered in Mondev and Loewen initially adjudicated in the federal courts. 
 215. In the October 2002 Term of Court, for example, the Court granted review in 91 cases 
out of 8340 requests, for a grant rate of 1.1 percent. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: The 
Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 487 (2003). The grant rate was identical in the 2001 Term. See 
The Supreme Court 2001 Term: The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 460 (2002). 
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for litigants who can meet the jurisdictional requirements of 
NAFTA.216 If a Canadian or Mexican plaintiff thought it had a 
sufficiently plausible claim under domestic law to bring suit in the first 
place, or a defendant thought it had a sufficiently plausible defense to 
file a domestic appeal, why not pursue those arguments one 
procedural stage further—especially under a trade regime designed to 
protect the interests of foreigners and under which the judges are 
likely to have more concern for free trade than for local substantive 
or procedural rules?217 William Dodge has suggested, moreover, that 
“because Chapter 11 review is less determinate and less accountable 
than domestic court review, it is likely to be most attractive to those 
foreign investors with the weakest claims.”218 To be sure, NAFTA 
litigation will involve considerable trouble and expense, but that may 
often be a plus for parties with greater resources than the opposition. 
I suspect that the chief reason we do not currently see considerably 
more cases like Mondev and Loewen is that the availability of 
supranational remedies has yet to fully penetrate the legal 
consciousness.219 
If I am right, then we need to think hard about the viability of 
denial-of-justice theories and the appropriate standards of review. 
Two problems are especially salient: the lack of a screening process 
for claims and NAFTA panels’ insufficient deference to domestic 
courts. In the American system, the Supreme Court screens out most 
cases in which parties seek review of state law questions antecedent to 
federal rights by simply denying certiorari; the Court may take a quick 
look at the state law issue based on the cert petition and opposition, 
but if it finds the state court’s decision plausible it will simply get rid 
 
 216. Because the volume of Canadian and Mexican trade with and investment in the United 
States is so high—and NAFTA is intended to increase it—this is a nontrivial category of 
litigants. 
 217. Article 1121(1)(b) ordinarily requires parties to challenge a domestic measure either in 
a domestic proceeding or in a NAFTA proceeding; initiating the latter requires a waiver of the 
former. But the Loewen panel gutted this requirement by accepting the argument that denial-of-
justice claims challenge the domestic adjudication itself, counting that adjudication as a new 
NAFTA violation. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶ 164. It thus should be possible in most 
instances to litigate the initial claim in domestic court, then—if unsuccessful—challenge the 
domestic court’s adverse decision as a denial of justice under NAFTA. 
 218. Dodge, supra note 143, at 575. 
 219. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2141 (suggesting that “the limited volume of Chapter 11 
review of national courts can largely be ascribed to the relative youth of Chapter 11 and limited 
awareness of its potential application to judicial conduct”); see also id., at 2041–43 (giving 
reasons why such claims “are likely to proliferate” in the future). 
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of the case without further comment. The NAFTA process, on the 
other hand, seems to lack such a screening mechanism. Instead, the 
unilateral decision of a party may invoke a full-dress arbitration 
proceeding with a panel constituted solely for the purpose of hearing 
that case.220 Not only is the mere convening of a panel likely to have 
distorting effects on domestic litigation, but the perspective of a panel 
devoted to the particular dispute is quite different from that of a busy 
court trying to allocate its limited time among many different cases 
that compete for its attention. The latter perspective is more likely to 
take a screening function seriously; by contrast, it is hardly surprising 
that the conscientious NAFTA panel members convened to hear 
Mondev and Loewen were reluctant to simply dismiss the claims out 
of hand.221 
The apparent standard of review applied in those cases is 
likewise troubling. Although both panels denied that they were 
engaged in appellate review of the state court decisions in question, it 
is hard to read the opinions as anything other than that—and not very 
deferential appellate review, for that matter. Loewen actually found a 
denial of justice based on the Mississippi court’s conduct of the trial; 
only technical failures averted a substantial award against the United 
States.222 And although Mondev ultimately affirmed the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s construction of state contract 
law, its discussion of the issues strikes this reader, at least, as 
relatively searching.223 This may be attributable to an understandable 
wish of panelists convened to decide only a single case to do a 
thorough job, but that is part of my point: a court existing for only 
one case will likely be biased toward getting the “right answer” in that 
case, rather than toward deferring to a plausible answer advanced by 
 
 220. NAFTA, supra note 119, art. 2008, 32 I.L.M. at 695; see also David A. Gantz, 
Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA’s Chapter 20: A Commentary on 
the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 481, 491 (2000) (“If the Free Trade Commission is not able 
to assist in resolving the dispute within thirty days, the aggrieved party may issue a written 
request to the Commission for the establishment of an arbitral panel; once the request is made, 
the Commission ‘shall establish an arbitral panel.’”). 
 221. See Ray C. Jones, Notes & Comments, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute 
Resolution: A Shield to be Embraced or a Sword to be Feared? 2002 BYU. L. REV. 527, 546 
(advocating a screening mechanism for Chapter 11 cases). 
 222. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 223. Accord Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2116 (pointing to “[t]he Mondev tribunal’s seeming 
willingness to police, albeit at the margins, the lawmaking of common law courts”). 
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the domestic court. The systemic concerns that counsel deference 
seem likely to be felt more strongly by repeat players.224 
3. Supranational Adjudication and Domestic Lawmaking. 
Finally, supranational adjudication may put pressure on nonjudicial 
domestic institutional settlements. President Bush has reacted to the 
ICJ’s Avena ruling by ordering the state courts to provide “review and 
reconsideration” of the Mexican prisoners’ treaty claims.225 That order 
ignores our Constitution’s settlement of legislative authority in 
Congress; indeed, it flies in the face of Congress’s earlier codification 
of the rule of procedural default in habeas cases.226 Similarly, when a 
virtually identical Consular Convention claim arose in the Breard 
case, Louis Henkin insisted that a letter from Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright to Governor James Gilmore of Virginia, 
requesting a stay of execution, was itself an expression of supreme 
federal law that bound the State to comply.227 That Secretary 
 
 224. Many NAFTA panelists will be repeat players if they are called upon to arbitrate in 
future cases. But it is not clear how often this occurs in fact, and the likelihood of such a call 
may well be a function of how sympathetic they are to the interests of foreign investors. More 
importantly, the panel itself lacks any form of institutional continuity; it is not a court with a 
continuing existence that must take account of its relationship to other courts. 
 225. See supra text accompanying note 111. As I have suggested, the President’s action may 
be interpreted as nonmandatory. 
 226. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the 
framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed 
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”). In Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998), the 
Supreme Court construed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (2000), as codifying the rule of procedural default for habeas petitions like 
Medellin’s, and the President lacks power to overturn that measure unilaterally. See 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . .”). 
 227. Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 681. Secretary Albright stressed that 
the United States had “vigorously defended Virginia’s right to go forward with the sentence 
imposed,” and that the ICJ’s order was “non-binding”; she went only so far as to “request that 
you exercise your powers as Governor and stay Mr. Breard’s execution.” Albright Letter, supra 
note 105 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding Secretary Albright’s clear indication that she did 
not think Governor Gilmore would be bound, however, Professor Henkin claimed that “the 
Secretary’s letter was a clear expression of U.S. foreign policy . . . [and] the state of Virginia was 
bound to give it effect.” Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 681. 
Even if the Secretary had such power, she could not have exercised it by way of ordering 
Governor Gilmore himself to issue the stay, as opposed to issuing a direct federal order 
prohibiting the execution. Requiring the Governor of a state to exercise his clemency or 
prosecutorial powers in such a way as to implement federal policy would be a clear violation of 
the anticommandeering doctrine. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–27 (1997). Of 
course, international lawyers have little patience for Printz either. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, 
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Albright’s action was just a letter made no difference at all; according 
to Professor Henkin, “[t]he states are bound by U.S. foreign policy 
decisions even if they do not take any formal form.”228 
Our domestic institutional settlements, however, care a great 
deal about “formal form.” Federal law is supreme by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause, which provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made . . . under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”229 That Clause says nothing 
about letters or general statements of foreign policy. It refers to three 
particular forms of lawmaking—the Constitution, laws, and treaties—
and each of these forms comes with a specific and quite rigorous 
process of formation set forth in the Constitution itself. Those 
processes are designed to preserve the institutional balances of 
separation of powers and federalism, which are in turn designed to 
preserve liberty.230 Such “formal” requirements as the rule that a 
measure must secure the support of a majority of both houses of 
Congress and either presidential assent or a supermajority override in 
order to become law, or that treaties must be ratified by two-thirds of 
the Senate, are not simply details to be disregarded and replaced by 
statements of policy by executive officials.231 
To be sure, we have recognized alternative forms, such as 
Executive agreements, administrative regulations, and judge-made 
 
Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. “States’ Rights” in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1277, 1301–02 (1999). 
 228. Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 681; see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 683, 685 n.15 (1995) (asserting, with regard to a hypothetical presidential 
order to the Virginia governor demanding postponement of the execution, that “a letter would 
have differed from an executive order in form only, and I do not think anything in the 
constitutional analysis would turn on this difference”). Professor Henkin and others would go 
further and treat the ICJ’s orders as binding on both state and federal officials, rather than 
simply as providing a basis for federal power to issue an order to the state of Virginia. See 
Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 680–81. Professor Bradley has suggested that 
treating the ICJ’s order in this way would raise serious constitutional questions involving the 
delegation of legislative authority. See Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 32, at 1572. 
 229. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 230. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1403 (2001). 
 231. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998) (“The procedures 
governing the enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the 
great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself . . . . [T]he power to enact 
statutes may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure.’” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))). 
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federal common law, as likewise binding the states under the 
Supremacy Clause.232 But to recognize these exceptions is hardly to 
say that form doesn’t matter. Most of them come with built-in checks 
of their own, either statutory or doctrinal in nature.233 The less 
constrained vehicles—such as executive agreements—at least require 
the Executive to take political responsibility for his policy through an 
explicit and public act; that is often the point of formal requirements. 
And while vehicles like the executive agreement have undoubtedly 
acquired some legitimate scope, if only through some sort of 
constitutional adverse possession, their legitimacy is hardly so clear 
and uncontested as to make them a secure base from which to argue 
for the further erosion of institutional checks on executive 
lawmaking.234 In any event, the point for present purposes is that a 
Legal Process approach to supranational adjudication needs to 
consider not only the relationship of supranational decisionmakers to 
domestic courts, but also to the law-making and enforcement 
institutions at the domestic level. 
 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (executive agreements); 
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630–32 (1959) (federal 
common law); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) 
(administrative regulations). 
 233. The Administrative Procedure Act constrains agency rulemaking in a myriad of ways, 
as does whatever remains of the nondelegation doctrine. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation 
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 320–21 (2000) (arguing that nondelegation has not died, but 
instead now informs various rules of statutory construction). Executive agreements are less 
constrained, but they are at least monitored by Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act. See 1 
U.S.C. § 112b (amended 2004). 
 234. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (arguing that the congressional-executive agreement procedure 
under which the NAFTA and WTO were approved is legitimate, but only because of an 
“informal” constitutional amendment that took place in the 1940’s), with Laurence H. Tribe, 
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1229 (1995) (rejecting both the legitimacy of 
congressional-executive agreements and the “informal” approach to constitutional amendment). 
These articles debate the legitimacy of congressional-executive agreements, which at least 
follow the prescribed constitutional forms for statutes. The Court has also ascribed preemptive 
effect to “sole” Executive agreements, which have no congressional involvement at all. See, e.g., 
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222–25 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–
33 (1937). But the Court’s most recent venture into this area was deeply controversial. See Am. 
Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (featuring a sharp, 5–4 debate about the 
preemptive impact of executive agreements). And, in any event, recognizing an additional form 
is hardly the same as saying form doesn’t matter. 
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B. The Problem of Substantive Overlap 
One reason to expect more and more clashes between domestic 
and supranational courts is that international law increasingly 
replicates rights protected under domestic law. Investment treaties 
include antiexpropriation provisions that overlap with the domestic 
Takings Clause, for example, and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) purports to limit the death penalty in 
ways similar to the Eighth Amendment. Similar instances of overlap 
will occur in foreign legal systems that protect fundamental rights at 
the domestic level. Such overlap gives unsuccessful litigants in 
domestic courts an incentive to seek a second bite at the apple by 
claiming a violation of the international standard in a supranational 
court. And even where international law does not provide a 
supranational forum to adjudicate international-law rights, 
substantive overlap threatens to undermine the application and effect 
of domestic law.235 
Similar issues arise domestically in our federal system. Federal 
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions, for example, gives 
criminal defendants a second opportunity to contest the result of their 
state court trials; as Justice Jackson observed, “[c]onflict with state 
courts is the inevitable result of giving the convict a virtual new trial 
before a federal court.”236 One way to minimize these conflicts is by 
limiting the scope of the substantive overlap between habeas review 
and the initial state trial. For instance, the Supreme Court has made 
clear that the basic issue of a state criminal defendant’s factual guilt 
or innocence is a state law issue that should not be relitigated in 
federal court.237 There is leakage around the edges of this principle: a 
state petitioner may argue that the state court jury misapplied the 
federal “no reasonable doubt” standard to the facts of his case,238 or 
he may use a claim of “actual innocence” to overcome a procedural 
default or other impediment to presenting other federal claims.239 But 
 
 235. See, e.g., Young, Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 381–84 (discussing 
arguments that customary international law preempts state law). 
 236. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 237. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 429 (1993). The Court did “assume, for the sake of 
argument . . . that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’” would 
be cognizable on habeas “if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Id. at 417. 
But the Court said the standard for such a claim would be “extraordinarily high,” id., and no 
subsequent case has found it to be satisfied. 
 238. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979). 
 239. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301 (1995) (considering a claim of innocence of the 
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these exceptions have been applied exceedingly narrowly based on 
concerns that it is disruptive in a parallel judicial system to have both 
sets of courts litigating the same issues.240 
Another example arises from federal claims that a state or a state 
official has deprived someone of liberty or property without due 
process of law. These claims have broad potential to replicate rights 
under state law; virtually any breach of contract or tort by a state 
actor, for example, may be said to deprive someone of liberty or 
property. The problem is distinct from habeas in that there is no 
“second bite at the apple”; ordinary res judicata rules will generally 
not allow a plaintiff to sue first under state tort law in state court, then 
bring a federal court action under the Due Process Clause if the state 
suit fails.241 Rather, due process claims raise the possibility that 
plaintiffs will bypass the substance of state tort or contract law by 
relying on federal constitutional law, even if the federal claim is 
brought—as it often is—in state court.242 If state and local officials 
confront federal due process claims every time they do something 
that affects a private liberty or property interest, then they must 
structure their conduct according to federal standards rather than 
state law. 
Federal law has sought to mitigate this problem in three ways. 
First, courts have been reluctant to recognize certain sorts of interests 
as protected liberty or property for constitutional purposes, where to 
do so would effectively federalize ordinary state-law contract or tort 
claims.243 Second, the Supreme Court has required that due process 
violations be intentional, ruling out overlap with state claims 
 
underlying crime); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (considering a claim of 
innocence of any aggravating factors supporting a capital sentence). 
 240. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (recognizing “the very disruptive effect that entertaining 
claims of actual innocence would have on finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that 
having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States”). 
 241. Compare, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (“A final 
judgment on the merits . . . precludes the parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or could 
have been raised in that action.”), with Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs. Agency, 
458 U.S. 502, 512 (1982) (“[H]abeas corpus is a major exception to the doctrine of res judicata, 
as it allows relitigation of a final state-court judgment disposing of precisely the same claims.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 383, 415 (1991) (reporting on an empirical study of § 1983 claims in state courts). 
 243. See, e.g., Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(refusing to recognize a liberty interest in “an employee’s right to a safe workplace” because 
“section 1983 must not be used to duplicate state tort law on the federal level”). 
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requiring some lesser degree of intent.244 Finally, the Court has held 
that there is no deprivation of liberty or property without due process 
of law where the state provides adequate “post-deprivation 
remedies,” at least in cases of random or unauthorized actions by 
state officers that it would have been difficult for the state to 
anticipate beforehand.245 Such postdeprivation remedies generally 
consist simply of the opportunity to bring a state-law tort action in 
state court. The doctrine thus tends to foreclose litigation of federal 
claims with clear state-law analogs, reserving federal law for 
situations that raise uniquely federal problems. 
Developments in international law raise both the “second bite at 
the apple” problem and the substantive replacement problem. 
Denial-of-justice claims in NAFTA cases purport to recognize a right 
distinct from those protected under domestic law—that is, the right of 
foreigners to equal treatment in the domestic judicial system. But the 
Canadian investor’s complaints in Loewen about prejudicial appeals 
to the jury, excessive punitive damages, and even elected judges all 
implicated rights recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Compare, for example, the NAFTA right to equal justice with 
protections from discrimination against out-of-staters under domestic 
law. These domestic protections arise primarily from the Commerce 
Clause,246 which both empowers Congress to regulate such commerce 
and (implicitly) restricts the States from regulating commerce in ways 
that discriminate against out-of-state interests.247 The Commerce 
Clause thus permits out-of-staters to challenge discriminatory laws 
and practices; creating a parallel right on the international plane, 
however, facilitates collateral attack when the domestic claim fails. 
The international law standard barring nondiscriminatory regulation 
that “burdens” foreign commerce, moreover, may be more rigorous 
than its domestic analog.248 
Loewen’s challenge to the damages award and the appeal bond 
likewise had established domestic analogs. The Supreme Court has 
 
 244. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986). 
 245. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 135–38 (1990); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 
543–44 (1981). 
 246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 247. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978). 
 248. The Court has occasionally invalidated nondiscriminatory laws on the ground that they 
imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways 
Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981). But this approach has been much more controversial and, 
arguably, less successful than the antidiscrimination principle. 
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recognized both substantive and procedural due process rights against 
excessive or inadequately constrained punitive damages awards.249 
American courts have also considered challenges to appeal bond 
requirements under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.250 
In both instances, it may well be that Loewen would not have 
prevailed under domestic constitutional law.251 But permitting 
collateral attack in a supranational arbitration proceeding plainly 
undermines the ability of the domestic courts to resolve these 
questions. The concerns of international law completely overlap with 
those of domestic law in denial-of-justice situations, and NAFTA’s 
separate enforcement mechanism provides the second bite at the 
apple that domestic law denies. 
Recent trends in death penalty litigation illustrate the potential 
for replacing domestic standards with international ones. In this 
country, challenges to capital punishment have generally been 
brought under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishments.” Despite the prevalence of capital punishment 
at the Founding, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment to embody “evolving standards of decency”;252 under this 
standard, the Court has imposed extensive substantive and procedural 
limitations on capital punishment.253 But the Court has stopped well 
short of outlawing capital punishment altogether, and for many years 
the Court refused to narrow it by forbidding execution of persons 
who committed their crimes as minors.254 Death penalty opponents 
have thus turned to international law,255 sometimes to argue that 
 
 249. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (conducting substantive due 
process review for excessiveness); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994) 
(reviewing the procedures used in arriving at a punitive damages award). 
 250. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 27, at 271–72 (collecting cases). 
 251. See id. at 269–73 (reaching this conclusion). 
 252. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (“A claim that punishment is 
excessive is judged not by the standards that prevailed . . . when the Bill of Rights was adopted, 
but rather by . . . ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))). 
 253. See, e.g., id. at 321 (holding that a state may not execute a mentally retarded person); 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (“[A] capital sentencing scheme must ‘genuinely 
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of 
murder.’” (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983))). 
 254. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 385–86 (1989). 
 255. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death 
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1086–87 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, World Opinion] (urging 
that American courts look to international law and abolish the death penalty); William A. 
110305 YOUNG.DOC 12/19/2005 3:04 PM 
1204 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1143 
capital punishment is illegal generally and more often to claim that 
juvenile offenders may not be executed. These arguments sometimes 
claim that international law preempts state death penalty rules 
outright; more modestly, they have invoked both international law 
and foreign domestic practice as persuasive authority for interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment.256 
No American court has accepted the preemption argument, but 
the Supreme Court did recently invoke foreign practice in 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment to bar the juvenile death 
penalty.257 I have addressed both preemption and persuasion in other 
work.258 The important point for present purposes is that these claims 
under international law do not arise because domestic law lacks 
individual rights provisions bearing on the subject of capital 
punishment. Rather, the turn to international law results simply from 
dissatisfaction with the content of domestic law and hope for a 
“better” result under international principles.259 Likewise, as I discuss 
further in the next Section, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 seems to offer 
greater protection for property rights than would be available under 
parallel provisions of domestic law, such as the Takings and Due 
Process Clauses.260 And the denial-of-justice claim may provide an 
avenue for rearranging the law on tort awards and judicial elections in 
 
Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 
799 (1998) (“While it is still premature to declare the death penalty prohibited by customary 
international law, it is clear that we are somewhere in the midst of such a process, indeed 
considerably close to the goal.”). 
 256. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of 
International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 322–26 (arguing that customary international law 
preempts state laws permitting execution of juvenile offenders); Koh, World Opinion, supra 
note 255, at 1128 (arguing that foreign law should be used—as it in fact was in Atkins—to 
establish a “consensus” against the execution of the mentally retarded). 
 257. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198–1200 (2005). 
 258. See Ernest A. Young, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Comment: Foreign Law and the 
Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV.  148 (2005) (contending that cases like Roper give 
authoritative, not persuasive, weight to foreign law); Young, Customary International Law, 
supra note 177, at 462–63, 474–77 (arguing that customary norms of international law cannot 
trump state capital punishment laws). 
 259. According to a practicing civil rights lawyer, “The attraction of international human 
rights law to me is simple: international human rights law promises more for my clients than 
U.S. domestic legal standards in many instances.” Paul L. Hoffman, The “Blank Stare 
Phenomenon”: Proving Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
181, 181 (1995–96). 
 260. See infra notes 284–89 and accompanying text. 
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ways that neither American courts nor legislatures have been willing 
to undertake.261 
The greater the overlap between domestic and international law, 
the greater the potential for such arguments. And if this overlap 
expands without development of doctrines designed to mitigate the 
conflict,262 we should expect increasing controversy over the very 
legitimacy of international norms. We already see conflict over use of 
such norms as persuasive authority; for instance, the House and 
Senate have considered multiple resolutions condemning the 
Supreme Court’s citations to international sources in recent decisions 
on gay rights and capital punishment.263 A holding that international 
law binds domestic courts to supersede domestic law in important 
areas is likely to escalate such controversy rather dramatically. 
The source of these overlaps between domestic law and 
international law is both obvious and commendable. In parts of the 
world, international law may provide the only meaningful guarantees 
of human rights; international protection of basic rules of free trade 
may likewise provide needed stability for investments in countries 
where domestic protections have been insufficiently reliable. These 
situations create pressure for international law to offer a “complete” 
system of rights rather than a set of interstitial supplements to 
domestic norms.264 What we need is a way to enable international law 
to continue its civilizing project in areas where domestic law fails to 
offer adequate protections, without disrupting other domestic systems 
that turned their attention to basic human and economic rights long 
before international law did.265 That may mean that international law 
 
 261. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 267 (noting that NAFTA can be used to pursue these 
ends, but arguing that domestic-based reform is a better alternative). 
 262. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (holding that a plaintiff may not bring a 
federal due process claim for deprivation of liberty or property where state law provides an 
adequate postdeprivation remedy). 
 263. See S. Res. 92, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 20, 2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Feb. 15, 2005); H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 17, 2004); Tom Curry, A Flap 
Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court: House Members Protest Use of Non-U.S. Rulings in 
Big Cases, MSNBC, March 11, 2004, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232. 
 264. See, e.g., Donoho, supra note 27, at 428 (“Even a casual observer of the international 
human rights system will discover a plethora of generally stated, abstract norms covering most 
aspects of human behavior.”); see also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 273, 337–41 (1999) (discussing the difference between “complete” and interstitial rule 
systems). 
 265. Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 1988–90 (observing that Americans pushed 
international human rights norms after World War II to bring the rest of the world up to 
American standards—not to change American domestic law). 
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must abandon the claim to impose identical obligations on all 
societies—a point that I develop in the next Section. 
C. Comparative Institutional Competence 
I have already discussed the Legal Process school’s pervasive 
concern with institutional competence.266 The basic idea is to assess 
the strengths and weaknesses that varied institutions—e.g., courts, 
legislatures, executive agencies, private markets—bring to a task, and 
then to “settle” primary authority over that task in the appropriate 
place. This emphasis prefigured what Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule have described as the “institutional turn” in recent 
American constitutional law scholarship.267 That concern can usefully 
be applied to problems arising from supranational adjudication, and 
this Article is hardly the first to do so. I want to make two points in 
this regard: The first is a relatively conventional point about the 
institutional weaknesses of many of our current supranational 
institutions. These weaknesses counsel caution in assigning new 
responsibilities to those institutions and deference by those bodies to 
domestic institutions. 
The second point may be somewhat less familiar. Many 
practitioners of institutional analysis have insisted that such analysis 
must always be comparative in nature. That is, it does little good to 
say that this or that institution may be good or bad at a particular 
task; rather, the real question is always whether that institution would 
be better at it than the alternatives.268 The problem in international 
affairs is that we must compare supranational institutions to domestic 
ones that vary wildly in their competences and capacities. One may 
think that the International Court of Justice compares rather poorly 
to the European Court of Justice, for example, but that it looks pretty 
good compared to local judicial institutions in Rwanda. This suggests 
that it will be hard to have a uniform set of rules prescribing the 
amount of deference that even a single particular supranational 
 
 266. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
 267. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885, 886 (2003); see also id. at 937–38 (describing recent work in this vein). 
 268. As Neil Komesar has observed, “[i]ssues at which an institution, in the abstract, may be 
good may not need that institution because one of the alternative institutions may be even 
better. In turn, tasks that strain the abilities of an institution may wisely be assigned to it anyway 
if the alternatives are even worse.” NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1994). 
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adjudicatory body must pay to domestic legal systems; instead, it may 
be necessary to tailor those rules to the capacities of the domestic 
system in question or, perhaps, simply allow those rules to be made as 
part of each nation’s own domestic law of foreign affairs. 
1. Institutional Capacities of Supranational Tribunals. This is not 
the place for a comprehensive institutional analysis of particular 
supranational judicial bodies. I do, however, want to offer a brief 
sketch of the likely advantages and disadvantages that can be 
expected in assigning responsibilities to such bodies. My purpose is to 
illustrate the sorts of factors that should be considered in developing 
doctrine to govern the relationship between supranational 
adjudication and domestic judicial systems. 
Supranational tribunals enjoy two obvious advantages over 
domestic courts. The first is simply the legitimacy attributable to the 
fact that they are not domestic courts. Mexico is much more likely to 
accept an unsuccessful outcome in the case of its national, Mr. 
Medellin, if it comes from the International Court of Justice than if 
the same outcome issues from a domestic court in the United States. 
Although the unwillingness of domestic judges to decide against their 
own governments can be exaggerated,269 the international community 
is likely to accord greater legitimacy to the decisions of tribunals not 
beholden to one of the nations interested in the case. 
The second advantage is expertise in the particular international 
rules to be adjudicated. Supranational tribunals are often (but not 
always) specialized bodies with expertise in international trade law, 
for example, or international human rights.270 Given the oft-lamented 
unfamiliarity of American judges with international law and the 
relative lack of emphasis on international law in the traditional 
American legal education, supranational tribunals are likely to enjoy 
 
 269. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004) (rejecting the Bush 
Administration’s position that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant could not seek judicial 
review of his detention); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 910 (1996) (holding the 
U.S. liable in a multibillion dollar contracts case). 
 270. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2109 (“Chapter 11 panels include arbitrators from 
different countries, with expertise in international law and international trade; areas in which 
most domestic judges lack training.”). Some courts may develop special expertise in some areas 
while remaining more generalist in others. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, Remedies and the 
International Court of Justice: An Introduction, in REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 1, 7 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998) (touting the ICJ’s expertise in 
boundary disputes, while acknowledging that “[t]he International Court is not a human rights 
court” notwithstanding its “long involvement in human rights”). 
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a marked advantage in dealing with international sources over U.S. 
domestic courts. 
Neither legitimacy nor expertise cut in only one direction, 
however. The outward legitimacy advantages of supranational 
courts—that is, the comparative legitimacy advantage that such 
bodies may enjoy in the eyes of the international community—is 
likely to be matched by an inward legitimacy deficit in the eyes of the 
affected nation that is asked to set aside its own laws or policies in 
favor of international principles. In the Breard case, for example, the 
Governor of Virginia suggested that his State would accept as 
legitimate an order from the U.S. Supreme Court setting aside Mr. 
Breard’s death sentence but not a comparable order from the ICJ.271 
Domestic political forces obviously play a much greater role in the 
appointment and confirmation (and, in the case of many state courts, 
election) of domestic judges, and they often possess tools to hold 
those judges accountable through political control of jurisdiction, 
budgets, and the like.272 And to the extent we are often also choosing 
between the application of international and domestic law, the latter 
is likely to enjoy significant legitimacy due to its greater 
comprehensibility to domestic audiences and the possibility, in many 
cases, of democratic override.273 
A sort of democratic override for international rules exists 
through the “last in time” rule—that is, Congress generally may 
override a rule of international law by passing a contrary statute.274 
 
 271. See Frank Green, Inmate’s Lawyers File Appeal; Treaty Rights Hearing is Sought in 
U.S., RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, April 11, 1998, at A-1 (“Mark A. Miner, a [Governor] 
Gilmore spokesman, reiterated yesterday that Gilmore is not looking toward the State 
Department or the international court for guidance on Tuesday’s scheduled execution—only the 
U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
 272. See, e.g., McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and 
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1648–49 (1995) (discussing political-branch checks on 
judicial decisionmaking). 
 273. See, e.g., Young, Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 398–400 (sketching 
the democratic case against customary international law). 
 274. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Some internationalists deny 
even this. Critics of Breard, for instance, have equated each ICJ decision with a new treaty for 
“last in time” purposes. See Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions 
on Municipal Courts in the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 27, 63 (1999). Others have asserted that treaty rights are “primary” to statutory rules. 
Paust, supra note 164, at 692 & n.13. Still others claim that customary international law is 
continuously “re-enacted” through practice, and therefore always later in time than a statute. 
See Ludwikowski, supra note 169, at 275–76. These ingenious devices for making limits on 
international law disappear seem to reflect a basic contempt for such limits. See, e.g., Thomas M. 
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But the international rule remains binding on the international plane, 
and I want to insist that this remaining force is critical. We should 
strive for a regime of international rules that we can live with without 
having to abrogate their domestic force. That may mean working to 
make the development of rules on the international plane itself more 
responsive to concerns of democratic legitimacy. 
The expertise of international tribunals likewise has a downside. 
That expertise flows from specialization; although one occasionally 
sees generalist jurists on supranational tribunals—retired judge 
Abner Mikva of the D.C. Circuit participated on the Loewen panel, 
for example—such tribunals often seek to maximize particularized 
expertise. The problem is that many of the most contentious 
international disputes arise at the intersection between different sorts 
of law. Where free trade law comes into conflict with environmental 
measures, for example, a panel composed of trade-law specialists will 
likely show a natural bias toward privileging the trade rules over 
environmental concerns.275 The American judiciary has long resisted 
specialization,276 and one need not presume that supranational courts 
should always follow American models to say that the considerations 
that have militated against specialized courts in this country may well 
be relevant to the establishment of specialized adjudicatory bodies at 
the international level. 
The structure of some supranational institutions creates 
additional liabilities. Others have commented on lack of transparency 
and broad participation rights in trade arbitration, as well as potential 
bias problems arising from the appointment of the arbitrators by the 
parties.277 The chief problem is that panel members are not necessarily 
 
Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic Comment on Harold Koh’s Optimism, 35 
HOUS. L. REV. 683, 688 (1998) (“[B]y inventing such doctrines such [sic] as the ‘non-self-
execution’ of treaties and the ‘last in time’ doctrine, courts have made Swiss cheese of the notion 
that international law is part of the law of the United States.”). 
 275. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
5, 22 (2002) (“The natural inclination of WTO personnel might be to favor the norms 
underlying the liberal trading regime (since that is their primary mandate) [over other concerns, 
such as environmental policy] and to lean toward results that would prohibit trade barriers.”). 
 276. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 147–60 
(1985) (opposing proposals for specialized federal courts). 
 277. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 27, at 282–86. Ironically, when Loewen challenged the 
Mississippi courts on the grounds that they were elected and potentially biased by the indirect 
effect of campaign contributions, it did so before a panel which the parties had actually chosen 
themselves. Likewise, Loewen challenged the appeal bond as unduly constraining its right to 
appeal in the state courts, but the NAFTA procedure itself provides no appeal right. See id. at 
286–88. 
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repeat players: “From claim to claim,” as Robert Ahdieh has noted, 
“independent and distinct panels are formed and disbanded, with 
little by way of structure, or even precedent, to link them together.”278 
This problem compounds difficulties arising from the generally less-
binding nature of judicial precedent in international law.279 Even a 
judge who is not formally “bound” by prior precedent may be 
disciplined by the knowledge that she is a participant in an ongoing 
project of defining and elaborating the law. Such a judge must ask 
whether a principle that appeals to her in the present case (perhaps 
because it achieves the “right” result) will be a rule that she can live 
with in the next case—perhaps one whose facts engage her sympathies 
in a different direction.280 It would be a mistake to assume that this 
obligation of forward-looking prudence derives solely from the 
likelihood that the particular judge deciding today’s case will also 
have to decide tomorrow’s. Nonetheless, that obligation is likely to be 
felt considerably less strongly by a panel constituted solely to decide a 
particular case. 
This ephemerality is troubling for two distinct reasons. The first 
is that it may incline supranational judges to judicial “activism.”281 A 
supranational judge may be more inclined to reach out and declare 
invalid a domestic regulatory regime based on its perceived unfairness 
in a particular case if she need not wrestle with the need for a limiting 
 
 278. Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2141; see also id. at 2099 (arguing that “repeat players” are 
essential if NAFTA panels are to work out a viable relationship with domestic courts). The 
particular arbitration procedures for NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes do not establish any 
permanent set of arbitrators; panel members are chosen primarily by the parties. See NAFTA, 
supra note 119, art. 1123; see also Gantz, supra note 220, at 492 (noting that even under Chapter 
20, which does envision a permanent roster of arbitrators for state-to-state disputes, “as of 
December 2001, no roster members . . . had been formally designated by the three governments, 
presumably because of difficulties in agreeing upon individuals”). 
 279. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2100 (observing that “[i]n Chapter 11, as in international 
law generally, there is no provision for binding precedent,” but that “[t]he function of precedent 
as a mechanism of control . . . is essential to the legitimacy of any legal system”); see generally 
BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 19 (stating that “[j]udicial decisions are not strictly speaking a 
formal source” of international law, although “in some instances at least they are regarded as 
authoritative evidence of the state of the law”). 
 280. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
 281. “Activism” is, of course, a contested and sometimes maligned term. I use it here very 
broadly to encompass judicial behaviors that tend to maximize the institutional role of the court 
vis-à-vis other institutional actors. See generally Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and 
Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Judicial Activism]. 
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principle that can discipline future results.282 Second, and perhaps 
more important, one-time-only adjudicators are unlikely to build up 
the web of doctrine necessary to mediate the complicated 
relationships between supranational and domestic courts. On the 
domestic level, such doctrines as justiciability, abstention, and 
standards of review have developed slowly and incrementally over 
time.283 Panels constituted for a single dispute will have a hard time 
participating in this ongoing project. 
The last point, which again applies most directly to trade 
tribunals, is that the substantive law to be applied bears remarkable 
similarities to principles that, in American history, have painfully 
revealed the limits of judicial competence. The open-ended 
expropriation provisions of NAFTA’s chapter 11 seem to forbid “too 
much” regulation of foreign investments. In the early twentieth 
century, the Due Process Clause of the American Constitution was 
interpreted similarly to bar “unreasonable” regulation of the free 
market.284 More recently, the “dormant” Commerce Clause has been 
construed to forbid state regulation imposing excessive burdens on 
interstate commerce, even where the regulation in question does not 
distinguish between in-staters and out-of-staters.285 And the Takings 
Clause has occasionally been interpreted to bar “regulatory 
takings”—that is, regulation that diminishes the value of private 
property interests even without appropriating those interests 
directly.286 The American experience here, however, ought to serve 
 
 282. One recurrent criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000), has been that the opinion seems targeted to achieving a particular result in the instant 
case without binding the Court to similar holdings in similar circumstances in the future. See, 
e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, When Freedom Isn’t Free: The Costs of Judicial Independence in Bush v. 
Gore, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 265, 281–82 (2003). 
 283. The incremental development of the Younger abstention doctrine, which forecloses 
federal courts from enjoining state enforcement proceedings, is an example. See, e.g., Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971) (stating the basic rule that federal courts may not enjoin 
state criminal proceedings); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (limiting the doctrine 
to pending state criminal proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611–12 (1975) 
(extending the doctrine to certain state civil proceedings); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 
U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (clarifying that Younger abstention only applies to claims for equitable 
relief). 
 284. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down New York’s 
regulation of wages and hours for bakers). 
 285. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (1981) 
(striking down Iowa’s restriction on the length of trucks on state roads). 
 286. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), 415–16 (holding that a 
state regulation barring removal of some coal from a mine amounted to a taking). 
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not as a model but as a cautionary tale. Each of these lines of cases 
has been criticized as an illegitimate cover for judicial hostility to 
regulation.287 Absent some way to define excessive regulation in a 
determinate and apolitical way—a formula that the American courts 
that grappled with the issue never found288—judicial activity in this 
area is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the free trade regime 
and, possibly, supranational adjudication in general.289 
2. The Problem of Comparison. I have argued that the role of 
supranational adjudication ought to be defined in large part by the 
relative institutional competence of supranational adjudicators vis-à-
vis domestic legal and political institutions. The obvious problem is 
there is no uniform class of either “supranational adjudicators” or 
“domestic legal and political institutions.” A recent overview 
observed that the “staggering diversity” of international judicial 
bodies “tends to deter comparison across institutions”: 
To begin with, they differ in the number of member States, ranging 
from universal scope to extremely narrow membership (as in the 
case of the Benelux Court of Justice). Some bodies give standing 
only to States, whereas others are, to varying degrees, open to other 
entities. Likewise, the kind of jurisdiction they exercise is extremely 
diverse. . . . Furthermore, differences in size of the staff, budget and 
caseload are enormous. Some bodies, like the ECJ, adjudicate 
 
 287. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for imposing their own views of proper economic theory through the Due Process 
Clause); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 517 (1997) (stating that “the Lochner era Court read the economic doctrine 
of laissez-faire into the Constitution”); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected 
through the Takings Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 ENVTL. L. 155, 155–60 (1995). 
Although revisionist historians have done much to undercut traditional interpretations of the 
Lochner era, see, e.g., Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
221, 223–24 (1999), nothing in their account detracts from the central point here: It is simply 
very difficult to develop a coherent and persuasive jurisprudence to determine what amounts to 
excessive or unreasonable regulation. 
 288. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 7 (1998) (recounting the doctrinal disintegration, over 
time, of the Court’s freedom of contract jurisprudence). 
 289. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s 
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” 
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003) (criticizing use of NAFTA to replicate Takings doctrine); 
Steve Louthan, Note, A Brave New Lochner Era? The Constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 11, 
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1443, 1445 (2001) (calling NAFTA’s Chapter 11 “the most 
significant evisceration of state police power since the Supreme Court freed the states from 
Lochner’s shackles in 1937”). 
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perhaps 100 cases each year; others barely hear one each per 
decade. Finally, most are active, some are dormant (e.g., the Court 
of Justice of the Arab Maghreb Union) and others are emerging 
(e.g., the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights or the 
International Criminal Court).290 
These differences make categorical comparisons between domestic 
and supranational courts difficult: the ICJ has quite different 
institutional capacities and limitations, after all, than a NAFTA 
arbitration panel.291 As a result, we see not one but many models of 
the deference that U.S. courts afford to supranational adjudicators.292 
The problem of institutional diversity gets much more complex, 
moreover, when one turns to the domestic side of the comparison. As 
William Burke-White has observed, “the quality of justice in local 
courts differs dramatically.”293 The domestic judicial system of the 
United Kingdom obviously has highly dissimilar competences and 
capacities than the domestic institutions of Afghanistan or Liberia. 
These differences may be more limited when dealing with aspects of 
international law that lack universal scope; institutions such as the 
International Court of Justice or the World Trade Organization, for 
example, need interact only with the institutions of signatory 
countries. But even within such a narrowly limited regime as 
NAFTA, supranational adjudicatory bodies must interact with 
domestic institutions that vary rather widely in their capacities and 
principles of operation. 
This problem makes the establishment of doctrines governing the 
interface between domestic and supranational institutions far more 
difficult than the development of such doctrines for the state and 
federal courts in the American system. The U.S. federal courts are 
relatively homogeneous in character, with specialized institutions only 
for relatively narrow areas like patents or bankruptcy or government 
contracts.294 On the state side, one can identify important variations 
among the 50 state court systems: some elect their judges while some 
 
 290. ROMANO, supra note 12; see also Alford, supra note 11, at 679–82 (noting the wide 
variety of international courts). 
 291. For instance, the ICJ has a permanent existence but can hear relatively few cases; the 
NAFTA system relies on one-time-only panels but seems, for that reason, more scalable to hear 
many more cases than it currently does if the need should arise. 
 292. See generally Alford, supra note 11. 
 293. William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International 
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2002). 
 294. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 41–43. 
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appoint them; some have a greater reputation for professionalism 
than others; and some have different histories of respect or antipathy 
for federal rights. To some extent, the rules of interjurisdictional 
relations have tried to take these differences into account.295 But by 
and large the divergence among state judicial systems has been 
sufficiently minor to allow debates about jurisdictional relations to 
speak of “state courts” as a relatively homogeneous class of 
institutions.296 And much of the Federal Courts canon—the 
willingness of federal courts to abstain in favor of state proceedings, 
the intrusiveness of federal habeas corpus review of state convictions, 
the frequency with which the Supreme Court reviews state law 
questions that are antecedent to federal ones, even the scope of 
federal question jurisdiction in civil cases—has been built around 
explicit or implicit assumptions about the relative institutional 
“parity” (or lack thereof) between state and federal courts.297 
The generalizations that have made these debates and doctrines 
possible in American federal courts jurisprudence are simply 
unavailable in contemporary international law. As Roger Alford has 
observed, “[C]omparative analysis is unusually difficult, because a 
variety of international tribunals should be examined across a variety 
of national jurisdictions. While the questions may be the same across 
jurisdictions, the answers will be fluid, and will depend on the 
particular country involved.”298 Because neither side of the 
comparison can be held constant, it is hard to know even how to 
begin developing a set of interjurisdictional doctrines to allocate 
decisional authority between supranational courts and domestic 
 
 295. The 1996 federal habeas reform statute, for example, offered to accord greater 
deference to the decisions of state courts in capital cases where the state in question had 
adopted certain reforms pertaining to the representation of capital defendants. Inmates in such 
states must file their petitions under an extremely strict 180 day statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2263 (2000). No state has yet been found to meet the requirements of the Act. 
 296. Perhaps the period of greatest divergence involved the unwillingness of state courts in 
the South to enforce federal rights during the period of the Civil Rights Movement. This 
deficiency was thought to be sufficiently serious to motivate a substantial expansion of federal 
court review over state court convictions and, under the Voting Rights Act, nonjudicial review 
of state and local political arrangements by the national Department of Justice. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(2000). Significantly, however, the difficulty was not so much in the capacity of the southern 
state courts as institutions but rather in those courts’ lack of respect for uniform national 
standards. In any event, the important point is that these sorts of divergences have almost never 
been thought to require different interjurisdictional rules for different state judicial systems. 
 297. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal 
Judiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 233, 233–35 (1988). 
 298. Alford, supra note 11, at 795. 
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institutions. This difficulty strongly suggests that interjurisdictional 
doctrine must be flexible enough to take account of varying 
institutional capacities at both domestic and supranational levels in 
different contexts. It also suggests that the rules cannot be uniform 
across supranational regimes and domestic legal systems. I develop 
these suggestions further in the next Part. 
IV.  THE ARCHITECTURE OF  
SUPRANATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION 
It is far easier to criticize current approaches to the 
interjurisdictional problem in foreign affairs than to say where we 
need to go from here. In this last Part, I hope at least to identify the 
most salient considerations, from a Legal Process standpoint, and to 
advance a few suggestions about how they might be addressed. The 
first question, addressed in Section A, is whether interjurisdictional 
problems should be addressed as a matter of each nation’s foreign 
affairs law or as a matter of international law. My own view is that a 
proper solution must contain elements of both—that is, some issues 
should be resolved on the international plane, but nations should 
reserve others for resolution as a matter of their own law. 
Section B develops, in a very general way, possible relations 
between international law and courts and their domestic counterparts. 
I organize the discussion around two key questions: First, should 
jurisdiction to consider and apply international law be concurrent 
between domestic and international courts, or should it be restricted 
to international courts only? Second, if we opt for concurrent 
jurisdiction, should international courts have the last word on 
international law questions or should the views of domestic courts get 
equal weight? Section C then turns to the more general question 
whether international rules governing these matters need to be 
uniform, despite the varying institutional capacities of different 
supranational institutions and domestic legal systems. Section D 
briefly considers some ways in which current supranational 
institutions might be reformed. 
Although a primary thesis of this Article is that international law 
has not focused adequately on these sorts of issues, it would be a 
profound mistake to think they have been entirely ignored. Section E 
thus considers some doctrinal resources already extant in 
international law for promoting the notion of institutional settlement. 
I focus, in particular, on the European Court of Human Rights’ 
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doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” and the principle of 
“complementarity” in the statute creating the International Criminal 
Court. Finally, Section F offers some observations on the politics of 
judicial globalization. 
Two caveats are necessary. First, some of the questions I pose in 
this Part may, in at least some contexts, have relatively firm answers 
as a matter of international law. Nonetheless, it seems to me that we 
are at an early enough stage of judicial globalization to treat these 
questions as ones of institutional design.299 To the extent that 
suggestions here cut against settled understandings of international or 
foreign affairs law, they can be taken as proposals for reform. Second, 
it bears repeating that I do not presume to propose anything 
approaching a comprehensive approach. The web of accommodations 
that mediate the relationship between state and federal courts in the 
U.S. has developed incrementally over time, with contributions from 
multiple actors—not only courts, but legislatures, executive actors, 
and even private litigants. All the usual disclaimers thus apply with 
unusual force when we contemplate efforts to forge similar sorts of 
accommodations at the even more complex level of supranational 
institutions. I mean only to sketch some directions for future inquiry. 
A. Foreign Affairs Law or International Law? 
Before asking what kinds of interjurisdictional rules should 
govern the interface between supranational and domestic courts, one 
must consider whether those rules should exist as a matter of foreign 
affairs law or international law. The American Law Institute defines 
the “foreign relations law of the United States” somewhat unhelpfully 
as “international law as it applies to the United States” and “domestic 
law that has substantial significance for the foreign relations of the 
United States or has other substantial international consequences.”300 
It is more useful to sever the two parts of this definition. I thus use the 
term “foreign affairs law” to signify the domestic law of each nation 
governing how that nation interacts with the rest of the world. The 
domestic rules governing the effect of international law in domestic 
 
 299. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 147 (suggesting that “the architects of the next 
generation of international institutions should focus on how best to structure the relations 
between a supranational entity and its domestic counterpart”). 
 300. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED  
STATES § 1 (1987). 
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courts, or allocating the power to declare war within the institutions 
of the national government, are good examples of foreign affairs law. 
It follows that each nation has its own foreign affairs law, 
whereas there is, at least in theory, only one international law.301 If we 
agree that some (perhaps reformed) doctrine of procedural default is 
proper in consular relations cases, for example, we must still ask at 
which level to formulate that doctrine. The International Court of 
Justice could formulate its own standard for such defaults, perhaps as 
an interpretation of the Convention on Consular Relations itself, and 
apply it to cases arising in all domestic legal systems. But the doctrine 
might instead be formulated by the various national courts for 
application in cases arising within their respective domestic 
jurisdictions, perhaps as part of a set of rules for determining when 
ICJ judgments will be honored. This Section offers some observations 
about what is at stake in this choice. 
The most obvious issues involve control over the force of 
international norms. Nations seeking to maximize their own freedom 
of action will likely prefer interjurisdictional rules to be a matter of 
their own foreign affairs law; in this way, such rules can be used to 
limit the impact of international norms as a constraint on national 
action. At the same time, nations have strong interests in ensuring 
that other nations abide by the commitments that all have entered 
into. These interests will often favor fixing interjurisdictional rules at 
the international level, so that they can be designed for rigorous 
enforcement of the underlying norms. Critics of strong domestic 
procedural default rules in the consular relations cases, for example, 
have suggested that such rules encourage similar substantive breaches 
by other nations that may endanger Americans abroad.302 
It is equally plain that the choice to make interjurisdictional rules 
at the national or supranational level will bear on those rules’ 
legitimacy. No matter how reasonable the U.S. rule of procedural 
default is, some observers will view it as an attempt to evade the 
underlying treaty obligation; that reaction seems considerably less 
likely, however, if the ICJ itself were to acknowledge a comparable 
 
 301. There are, of course, any number of treaty-based regimes that bind only the signatories. 
See infra text accompanying note 311. The point, however, is that it is rare for any international 
norm to take different forms within the scope of its applicability. 
 302. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, When American States Execute Citizens of Foreign Countries: 
The Case of Gerardo Valdez, FindLaw’s Writ (July 24, 2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
dorf/20010724.html. 
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rule of default. On the other hand, parties disadvantaged by the 
application of international rules—say, uncompetitive domestic 
industries hurt by trade liberalization—are more likely to perceive 
remedies for international violations as legitimate if those remedies 
are controlled by domestic institutions.303 
To these straightforward dynamics, however, I want to add one 
less obvious consideration: unless international law first carves out a 
place for national rules on interjurisdictional questions, there is likely 
always to be a significant legitimacy cost to casting such rules at the 
national level. National rules of deference, abstention, etc., generally 
cannot keep a particular action from being a breach on the 
international plane. The U.S. procedural default rule may be right as 
rain, but we will still suffer a ruling of noncompliance with the Vienna 
Convention unless international law acknowledges that rule. To the 
extent that institutional settlement is a legitimate value, then, there 
are reasons to incorporate that value at the international level—that 
is, in the definition of what international law requires—rather than 
simply at the stage where domestic institutions determine what to do 
about a breach of international law.304 
Another set of considerations stems from the relationship 
between interjurisdictional rules and underlying substantive 
obligations. By hypothesis, we deal with the enforcement of 
substantive international rules; the question is whether the 
enforceability of those rules should be constrained and tempered by 
national or international rules. I want to suggest that there is some 
advantage to enabling judicial institutions to consider both 
substantive and interjurisdictional issues together, as part of the same 
body of law. Concerns about remedies, for example, may encourage 
courts to temper the substantive definition of norms or encourage 
them to defer to the judgments of political actors.305 The opportunity 
for this interplay is lost, however, where the entities that define 
substantive norms are not charged with developing rules for their 
 
 303. This is probably why the NAFTA and WTO implementation acts deny any direct effect 
to WTO and NAFTA panel rulings. See infra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra Section III.A. 
 305. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (rejecting interdistrict 
remedies for school desegregation based on a determination that the constitutional violation 
was confined to the central city school district); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218–20 (1978) (noting 
that institutional concerns informed the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez). 
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enforcement. Since the underlying norms here are international, that 
may favor resolving at least some interjurisdictional questions at the 
international level. 
The choice of foreign affairs or international law is most 
naturally thought of as a matter of vertical separation of powers, 
allocating authority between the international community as a whole 
and individual nations. But it has horizontal separation of powers 
implications as well. In international criminal law, for instance, the 
primary actors at the international level are courts;306 likewise, in the 
trade area, the “legislative” arm of the WTO can act only with great 
difficulty, leaving much of the work of fleshing out trade agreements 
to arbitral panels.307 Supranational arrangements frequently feature 
institutional components that have recognizable analogs within 
domestic separation of powers schemes, but that exist on the 
international plane without being enmeshed in a correspondingly 
complete system of checks and balances. One of the most telling 
objections to the International Criminal Court, for example, is that its 
prosecutor is isolated from the web of institutional interrelationships 
that ordinarily ensure that such officials are accountable.308 
To be sure, national executives and legislatures also act on the 
international plane. But it seems fair to say that it is more difficult for 
executive and legislative actors to produce law on an ongoing basis on 
that plane; inertial barriers to amendment or new treaty making, each 
of which requires agreement of many states with divergent interests 
and agendas, are simply too great. As a result, assigning 
interjurisdictional rules to the international plane likely means that 
such rules will be made by courts, with relatively little input from 
other sorts of actors. This has some advantages: it suggests, for 
instance, that the rules will be made incrementally, case-by-case, and 
that seems sensible in light of the complexity of the relevant 
questions.309 On the other hand, such rules will have all the usual 
 
 306. See Burke-White, supra note 293, at 95. 
 307. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 451, 467 
(2001) (“WTO lawmaking follows the GATT tradition of ‘rounds,’ complex multilateral 
negotiations that resemble constitutional conventions more than ordinary legislation.”). 
 308. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 
Remarks to the Federalist Society in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/ 
t/us/rm/15158.htm (commenting on the dangers of an “unaccountable Prosecutor”). 
 309. See Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 281, at 1182, 1206–07 (arguing in favor of 
incremental decisionmaking by courts). 
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countermajoritarian liabilities traditionally associated with judicial 
rulemaking. 
Finally, I want to identify two issues that I think are not at stake 
in choosing the level at which to make interjurisdictional rules. The 
first is the uniformity or diversity of interjurisdictional doctrine. I 
have already suggested that, if interjurisdictional rules are to respond 
to the variations in institutional capacity both among supranational 
institutions and among domestic legal systems, those rules must be 
variable.310 But I do not think that means that the rules must exist as 
part of each nation’s domestic law of foreign affairs. Although we 
often speak of “one” international law for all nations, in reality 
international law is pervasively multifarious. Some countries join a 
particular multilateral treaty, others do not. Some signatories impose 
conditions and reservations on their assent that significantly alter 
their obligations. Customary international law means one thing to 
most countries, but something else to those who have “persistently 
objected” to the development of a particular rule. The same is true of 
international rules of procedure and jurisdiction: the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ, for instance, is generally limited to those countries that have 
consented to be bound by its rulings.311 Fixing particular 
interjurisdictional rules at the international level will create some 
degree of pressure to make those rules uniform, but uniformity is not 
a necessary consequence of that decision. 
The other issue is the relative authority of supranational or 
national courts. Nations may prefer to fix interjurisdictional rules in 
their own foreign affairs law as a means of controlling the impact of 
international norms on their actions. But deciding to set at least some 
interjurisdictional rules as a matter of international law need not 
mean that they must be authoritatively determined and interpreted by 
supranational courts. The next section considers a variety of 
relationships between supranational and domestic courts with respect 
to interpreting and applying international law. Although domestic 
courts may sometimes be subordinate to supranational ones with 
respect to international norms, this need not be the case. Nations 
ceding control of interjurisdictional rules by allowing them to be fixed 
in international law may regain some of that control to the extent that 
their domestic courts retain authority to interpret international law. 
 
 310. See supra text accompanying note 298. I discuss the issue of variability further in 
Section IV.C, infra. 
 311. See BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 680–82. 
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B. The Authority to Interpret and Apply International Law 
The central interjurisdictional issue concerns the allocation 
between supranational and domestic courts of authority to interpret 
and apply international law. Two issues are critical: First, should 
domestic courts have concurrent authority to decide questions of 
international law, or should those questions be vested exclusively in 
supranational institutions? To the extent that we choose some form of 
concurrent jurisdiction, a second question arises: Should the system 
have a hierarchy of interpretive authority, so that supranational 
interpretations of international law bind domestic courts? Or should 
it place domestic and supranational interpretations on a level plane? 
1. Concurrent or Exclusive Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of 
domestic courts to apply and interpret international law is often 
caught up in a debate over whether treaties should be considered 
“self-executing” and, more generally, over “monistic” and “dualistic” 
theories of international law.312 These questions determine whether 
international law applies within the domestic judicial system of its 
own force, or whether the national political branches must take some 
further action in order to make international law available for judicial 
application. I want to sidestep these questions, however. The 
arguments for concurrent jurisdiction here can be taken either as 
arguments for self-execution or monism, or as arguments that 
national political institutions should take the necessary steps to create 
such jurisdiction under a dualist system. I want to focus on the 
functional effects of concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction, not the 
mechanisms or theory necessary to create one or the other system. 
Skeptics of international law in this country have traditionally 
resisted the notion that domestic courts should generally be 
empowered to apply international rules of decision to the cases that 
come before them. The preference has been for domestic political 
institutions—chiefly Congress and the President, although 
occasionally state-level political institutions as well—to serve as 
gatekeepers, so that courts may not apply any given principle of 
international law until that principle has first been incorporated into 
 
 312. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 
1985) (stating that treaties “do not provide the basis for a private lawsuit unless they are 
intended to be self-executing”); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the 
Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999). 
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domestic law by statute or executive action. That preference 
motivates the position, most prominently associated with Professors 
Bradley and Goldsmith, that domestic courts should not apply 
customary international law unless expressly authorized to do so by 
the political branches.313 
The same preference for presumptively excluding international 
law from the domestic courts seems to undergird the structure of 
trade regimes like NAFTA and the WTO. These regimes seek to 
protect the domestic legal system by denying to supranational 
decisions any direct domestic effect. The American statute 
implementing NAFTA, for example, provides that NAFTA panel 
decisions have no direct effect absent implementing measures by the 
U.S. political branches.314 Failure to take such measures might leave 
the U.S. in violation of NAFTA as a matter of international law, but 
national political institutions control the extent to which 
supranational actors can intervene in domestic law.315 
These sorts of arrangements seek to “wall off” the domestic 
sphere from the impact of international rules. In so doing, they confer 
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply international law on 
supranational tribunals. It is not at all clear, however, that this 
approach will be effective in protecting the integrity of domestic 
 
 313. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of 
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2260 (1998) (“CIL should not be a source of law for 
courts in the United States unless the appropriate sovereign—the federal political branches or 
the appropriate state entity—makes it so.”). For a critique of this position, see Young, 
Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 369–70. 
 314. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2000) (“No State law, or the application thereof, may 
be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or 
application is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action brought by the United States 
for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.”). The WTO agreement has been 
implemented similarly. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000) (“No provision of any of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, 
that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”); id. § 3512(c)(1)(B) 
(prohibiting challenges to government conduct on the ground that the conduct violates WTO 
obligations). 
 315. See, e.g., Samuel C. Straight, Note, Gatt and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute 
Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 250–53 (1995); see also 
William H. Lash III, The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and Investment, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1011, 1013–16 (1996) (dismissing sovereignty concerns about the WTO as 
“childish and simplistic” based on the same argument); William R. Sprance, The World Trade 
Organization and United States’ Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the 
System, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1225, 1232–33 (1998) (arguing that the WTO does not threaten 
U.S. sovereignty because, under the implementing legislation, domestic institutions must act 
before WTO tribunal decisions can effect changes in U.S. law). 
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institutions. I have argued elsewhere against the assumption that a 
supranational ruling that is not binding on internal actors has no 
effect on domestic political arrangements.316 
Consider, for example, the Mississippi state court practices at 
issue in Loewen. Congress periodically considers tort reform 
proposals to change such practices, perhaps by capping punitive 
damages or regulating the procedures by which such cases are heard. 
When these proposals fail, it is more likely out of political respect for 
state autonomy rather than any lack of constitutional power on 
Congress’s part to regulate the practices in question.317 The essence of 
federalism in most cases, in other words, lies in political dynamics 
rather than legal constraints.318 But now consider how those dynamics 
change if a NAFTA tribunal orders the United States to pay $725 
million on account of Mississippi’s transgression. Although the 
NAFTA order does not itself change Mississippi law, the balance of 
political forces against federal regulation of state court procedures 
may well shift substantially. The instrument of change will be a 
federal statute, but its proximate cause will be an order of a 
supranational court.319 
This is just one example of why it is mistaken to expect that 
international law will have no “bite” on the domestic legal system 
simply because it lacks direct effect. If international law is “law” at 
all, then it should matter domestically if a particular practice is 
declared invalid by a supranational court, even if that court depends 
on possibly recalcitrant domestic actors for implementation. It would 
have been perfectly proper for Governor James Gilmore to have 
stayed Angel Breard’s execution out of respect for the ICJ’s order 
 
 316. See Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
527, 535 (2003). 
 317. The failure of such tort reform proposals also has a great deal to do with the strength of 
the trial lawyers’ lobby. But I have argued elsewhere that the Framers expected such alliances of 
convenience between the self-interest of particular interest groups and the institutional interests 
of state governments to be an important mechanism for protecting federalism. Ernest A. Young, 
Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1308–10 (2004). 
 318. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) (preferring 
political and institutional checks on national power rather than judicial review); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558–60 (1954) (same). 
 319. For discussion of ways the national government might respond to a NAFTA judgment 
occasioned by state conduct, see Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2103–04; Lerner, supra note 27, at 
279–81. 
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even if everyone agreed that both the ICJ and the U.S. president 
lacked authority to force him to do so.320 Even in a case like that, 
where supranational bodies depend on the persuasive force of their 
rulings for domestic implementation, those rulings are likely to 
change the domestic debate in important ways.321 Indeed, Professor 
Helfer and Dean Slaughter define the ability of supranational courts 
to “convince[] domestic government institutions to exercise power on 
their behalf,” notwithstanding a “lack of direct coercive power,” as 
“the hallmark of ‘effective’ supranational adjudication.”322 If 
supranational courts can be effective in this way—and there is every 
reason to believe that they can323—then we need to worry about 
whether those courts’ rulings incorporate proper deference to 
domestic procedures and decisionmakers in the first instance, and not 
simply to rely on the lack of direct effect to shield our domestic 
arrangements. 
If international law retains both practical and normative force 
despite lacking direct effect, then giving supranational courts 
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret it seems counterproductive from the 
standpoint of national autonomy. American law takes the opposite 
approach by presuming that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
to hear claims arising under federal law absent a clear statement of 
Congress’s intent to make federal jurisdiction exclusive.324 The Court 
has emphasized that the state courts’ power to adjudicate federal 
claims is an element of state sovereignty.325 Although state courts are 
bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law, the 
 
 320. See supra note 105 (discussing the events of the Breard case). The issue is more 
complex in Medellin for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, whose discretion to grant relief is 
sharply restricted by statute. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071, § 5. 
 321. See Martinez, supra note 8, at 432 (“Compliance with the decisions of international 
courts is not perfect, to be sure, but the reputational and other consequences of noncompliance 
are factors that political actors cannot simply ignore.”). 
 322. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 387. 
 323. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in 
Regional Integration, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 478 (1998) (“Notwithstanding reservations on the 
part of Congress, the [U.S.] executive branch has shown its readiness to comply with adverse 
WTO rulings.”). 
 324. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990). 
 325. See id. at 458 (observing that “under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty 
concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the 
Supremacy Clause,” and that “we have consistently held that state courts have inherent 
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of 
the United States”). 
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opportunity to participate in the construction and application of 
federal law gives states an important voice.326 
At the international level, Abram and Antonia Chayes have 
stressed that the ability to participate in international legal regimes is 
an element of sovereignty, not a restriction upon it.327 In both the 
domestic and the international context, the power to apply another 
jurisdiction’s law is the power to participate in the shaping of that law. 
Federal courts explicitly empowered to decide human rights cases 
under the Torture Victims Protection Act,328 for example, can 
contribute to ongoing international efforts to define what counts as 
“torture.” Domestic courts have no role, by contrast, in construing the 
NAFTA and WTO agreements; as a result, they have no opportunity 
to shape the interpretation of those provisions in ways that are 
respectful of domestic law and institutions. This sort of exclusion 
seems particularly damaging in situations where the law is left to be 
construed by a specialist supranational body with a built-in 
institutional bias favoring broad application of particular 
international norms. Finally, supranational courts themselves seem 
more likely to respect the domestic legal system when that system has 
itself made room for the application of international norms. 
My own view is that, at least in the short term, the greater threat 
to domestic institutions comes not from the application of 
international law by domestic courts but from the exalted status that 
international lawyers often claim for it in that setting. Advocates for 
the domestic incorporation of customary international law, for 
example, have not helped their cause by claiming that customary law 
trumps state law,329 federal statutes,330 or even the Constitution in 
 
 326. See, e.g., Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102–04 (1962) (holding that state 
courts with concurrent jurisdiction over federal labor law claims have the authority and 
obligation to formulate rules of federal common law to govern such cases). 
 327. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 81, at 27. But see Anderson, supra note 19, at 1300 
(noting the limitations of this definition). 
 328. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). The TVPA explicitly establishes a federal 
cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing, see id. § 2(a)(1) & (2), and it is settled that 
the creation of a federal cause of action confers federal question jurisdiction on the federal 
courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 
257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”). 
 329. E.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
1555, 1561 (1984) [hereinafter Henkin, International Law]; Brilmayer, supra note 256, at 295–99. 
 330. See, e.g., Henkin, International Law, supra note 329, at 1563–67 (suggesting that 
customary norms should trump federal statutes or treaties where the customary norms develop 
later in time). 
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some cases.331 But one need not insist that customary international law 
is equivalent to supreme federal law to suggest that domestic courts 
should ordinarily have power to apply it; as I and others have 
suggested elsewhere,332 there are various ways for domestic courts to 
recognize international norms without accepting internationalist 
assertions about those norms’ position in the legal food chain. There 
is a large excluded middle between the “international law trumps 
everything” and the “keep international law out of domestic courts” 
positions. And the development of mediating doctrines that limit the 
disruption of domestic institutions is most likely when international 
law is applied in domestic courts. 
This nationalist argument for concurrent domestic jurisdiction 
over international law may suggest why internationalists might prefer 
exclusive jurisdiction in supranational courts.333 Such exclusivity might 
take a different form than the NAFTA implementation act; for 
instance, internationalists might prefer a system in which domestic 
courts applied international law directly but were required to refer 
disputed questions to supranational tribunals. That system might 
draw upon the European Union’s “preliminary reference” procedure, 
whereby questions of Community law are referred from national 
courts to the European Court of Justice,334 or the occasional American 
practice of certifying questions of state law arising in federal court to 
the state supreme courts for resolution.335 This model would not be 
 
 331. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign 
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1090–92 (1985); Ludwikowski, supra note 
169, at 276 (suggesting that “any amendment or interpretation of the Constitution, bringing it in 
conflict with customary international law . . . would have to be recognized as unconstitutional 
itself”). 
 332. See Young, Customary International Law, supra note 177, at 467–83; Michael D. 
Ramsey, International Law as Non-preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 555, 555–58 
(2002). 
 333. See e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 51 (2004) (“International law scholars often assume that the best way to enforce 
human rights is by establishing strong international institutions that develop the law 
progressively and enforce it independently.”). 
 334. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme 
Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 421, 423 (1996) (discussing the “preliminary reference” procedure as outlined in the 
Treaty of Rome). 
 335. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75–80 (1997) 
(discussing the virtues of the certification procedure); Burke-White, supra note 293, at 94–95 
(suggesting that national courts refer questions of international criminal law to the International 
Criminal Court). But see Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 
SUFFOLK L. REV. 677, 691 (1995) (criticizing certification procedures on the domestic plane). 
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truly “exclusive” in the sense that national courts would be 
empowered to apply international law when its content was 
uncontroverted, and determining when a question of law is worth 
referring to the supranational court might itself involve the domestic 
court in construing international law. Nonetheless, the autonomy of 
the domestic courts with respect to international law would be 
minimal in such a system. 
I want to argue against this sort of model, and not just for the 
nationalist reason that domestic courts should have power to shape 
international law to accommodate national institutions and 
preferences. One problem is that many disputes will involve issues of 
both domestic and international law, and it may distort decisions to 
consider them in isolation from one another. A national court 
confronted with an ambiguous domestic statute and a claim under 
international law may construe domestic law to avoid the 
international issue;336 the potential for such avoidance, for example, is 
one reason why American abstention doctrine requires federal claims 
to be presented to state courts in conjunction with state claims.337 This 
problem may be mitigated by presenting the international issues to 
the domestic court and then referring them to supranational 
decisionmakers, but consider the converse situation, in which 
international law may be construed to accommodate domestic 
arrangements. Under the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, for 
instance, the European Court of Human Rights accords a certain 
leeway to national governments for implementing international 
human rights in ways that accommodate national priorities and 
institutions.338 A national court that has both domestic and 
international law issues before it may have an easier time applying 
this doctrine than a supranational court with authority to decide only 
the international question. 
The more important arguments from the internationalist 
standpoint, however, have to do with securing international law’s 
acceptance, integration, and enforcement within the domestic legal 
 
 336. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) 
(recognizing a canon of construction of federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law). 
 337. See Gov’t & Civic Employees Org. Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957). 
 338. See generally HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); 
Carozza, supra note 31, at 61 (defining the “margin of appreciation” as “the breadth of 
deference or error the [ECHR] will allow national bodies before it will declare a violation of . . . 
the Convention”). 
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system. Domestic forces skeptical of international law may be more 
willing to accept it when it is interpreted and applied by domestic 
courts. Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction provides an opportunity for 
supranational tribunals to build relationships with domestic courts 
that may enhance the power of both sets of institutions. Many 
observers have remarked, for example, that the European Court of 
Justice solidified its institutional position by enlisting national courts 
in the development of European law.339 And others have suggested 
that the true measure of success for an international tribunal is the 
extent to which it can encourage domestic courts to enforce the 
international norm on their own initiative.340 
For a variety of reasons, national courts will often offer the best 
prospects for vigorous enforcement of international law. Professor 
Burke-White has noted, with respect to international criminal law, 
that national courts are both ubiquitous and “often have the best 
access to information, evidence, and testimony about the alleged 
events”; international institutions like the ICC, by contrast, labor 
under severe capacity constraints.341 Likewise, the ICJ—which 
decided only ninety-nine contentious cases between 1946 and 
2001342—cannot hope to police enforcement of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations; that is why controversy in cases 
like Avena and Breard focuses on the obligation of national courts to 
enforce the treaty themselves. If international law is truly to be law in 
the sense of regular application and enforcement touching not only 
states but private actors, it must be interpreted and enforced beyond 
the bounds of a few specialized tribunals at the supranational level. 
This last point suggests a final caution about the nationalist 
argument for concurrent jurisdiction that I sketched earlier. 
Concurrent jurisdiction is a double-edged sword, simultaneously 
strengthening the place of international norms in our legal order 
while offering domestic courts an opportunity to moderate and shape 
their content. Hard-line nationalists may prefer to eschew this 
 
 339. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 290–93. 
 340. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic 
Courts, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 123 (2001); Turner, supra note 333, at 22; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240, 246 (2000) (“[A]—if 
not the—primary function of public international law is . . . to influence and improve the 
functioning of domestic institutions.”). 
 341. Burke-White, supra note 293, at 15; see also Carozza, supra note 31, at 72–73 (giving 
reasons why national courts may be better at enforcing human rights). 
 342. BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 693. 
110305 YOUNG.DOC 12/19/2005 3:04 PM 
2005]  GLOBAL INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT 1229 
compromise, accepting the risk that supranational institutions will 
construe international norms in ways unsympathetic to American 
institutions in order to deny those norms any more of a domestic 
foothold than they already enjoy.343 It seems to me, however, that the 
hour is growing late for such a strategy. We have embraced 
international law on too many fronts to “wall off” our domestic 
institutions from its influence. Better to participate, in hopes that 
domestic courts can shape international law in ways that 
accommodate our domestic arrangements. 
2. Supremacy or Shared Law. If national and supranational 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over international law questions, 
then the system needs a rule governing the respective interpretive 
authority of those courts. In the American system, federal and state 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over questions of federal law, but 
state courts are bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s constructions of 
that law. The federal courts—more precisely, the supreme federal 
court—thus exercises interpretive supremacy over federal law.344 
Although this aspect of the system was once contested,345 it is no 
longer disputed today. 
The American system offers two distinct models for 
implementing interpretive supremacy. The norm is an appellate 
model, whereby state court decisions interpreting federal law can be 
appealed from the highest state court to the U.S. Supreme Court.346 
The Court employs this jurisdiction to enforce the supremacy of 
federal law against sometimes recalcitrant state courts and, more 
often, to promote the uniformity of that law by resolving conflicting 
 
 343. Cf. Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2145 (observing that, by exercising restraint in their 
infancy, the ECJ and the ECHR were able to undertake much more aggressive assertions of 
power later on). Nationalists may well prefer to avoid a similar risk in this country. 
 344. State courts generally respect the views of federal district and circuit courts on federal 
law questions, but they are bound only by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Likewise, 
all federal courts—including the Supreme Court—are bound to follow the highest state court 
when exercising their concurrent jurisdiction over state law questions. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. 
Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1956) (referring to cases decided by the 
Supreme Court of Vermont in determining how to interpret Vermont law). 
 345. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 340–43 (1816) (rejecting the 
Virginia Court of Appeals’ argument that, while the Supremacy Clause makes federal law 
supreme, the state courts enjoyed equal power to interpret that law); HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 15, at 479–81 (describing attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s authority before and 
after Martin). 
 346. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 
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interpretations. The effectiveness of the appellate model is limited, 
however, by the Court’s capacity to hear less than one hundred cases 
a year out of thousands of petitions for review.347 
The Court’s limited capacity to police state courts creates 
pressure for a different model of supremacy in areas where state 
compliance with federal norms is suspect. The primary alternative in 
our system is collateral review, exemplified by federal habeas corpus 
review of state criminal convictions.348 Collateral review allows 
persons who feel that the state courts have failed to vindicate their 
federal rights to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal trial courts, 
which obviously can process a great many more cases than the 
Supreme Court alone.349 Review takes place as a separate lawsuit 
focused on the alleged violation of federal law, rather than an appeal 
of the original judgment. And in the U.S. system, strong rules of 
deference limit the federal courts’ ability to second-guess state court 
decisions, even on questions of federal law.350 
Many internationalists will be tempted by some version of 
supremacy for supranational interpretations of international law. But 
it is difficult to see how either model would work in theory or 
 
 347. Moreover, only a relatively small proportion of these cases come from the state courts. 
See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 
35 IND. L. REV. 335, 353 tbl.1 (2002) (noting that, between 1997 and 1999, the Court heard only 
ten to twelve cases a year from the state courts). For a discussion of the Court’s limited docket 
as a constraint on its power, see McNollgast, supra note 272, at 1641. 
 348. It is no surprise that the federal courts first acquired jurisdiction to hear collateral 
attacks on state convictions during Reconstruction, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 
when Congress did not trust southern state courts to mete out equal justice to African 
Americans. For a somewhat different take on the habeas analogy to supranational adjudication, 
see Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2068–72. 
 349. But see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 545 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting 
significant limits on the capacity of the lower federal courts to oversee state courts through the 
habeas system). 
 350. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000): 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant 
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 
the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States . . . . 
See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000) (interpreting the standard of review in  
§ 2254(d)(1) as “a command that a federal court not issue the habeas writ unless the state court 
was wrong as a matter of law or unreasonable in its application of law in a given case”). When 
hearing direct appeals from state courts on issues of federal law, by contrast, the Supreme Court 
reviews the legal issues de novo. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (conducting 
de novo review of a state court’s application of federal law to the facts). 
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practice. Perhaps because of civil law influences or simply the relative 
dearth of supranational tribunals, international law has not tended to 
accord the decisions of such tribunals the same binding authority that 
one finds in many domestic legal systems. Article 38 of the statute of 
the International Court of Justice, which is generally taken to be an 
authoritative statement of the sources of international law, puts 
judicial decisions on the same level as “highly qualified publicists” as 
“subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”351 Decisions 
of the ICJ, moreover, bind the parties on a contractual theory similar 
to agreements to be bound by arbitration, rather than as authoritative 
statements binding on all other interpreters.352 It would be odd for 
supranational decisions construing international law to bind national 
courts when international law is itself so ambivalent about the force 
of those decisions. To say that American courts are bound by the 
ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention in the Avena case (as 
opposed to its judgment as to the particular prisoners involved), 
would seem to directly contradict the ICJ statute. 
A supremacy-based regime of either appellate or collateral 
review would also be difficult to structure. Supranational institutions 
like the ICJ or the ICC face similar capacity constraints in policing 
international law decisions by national courts to those that the U.S. 
Supremes confront in supervising the state courts. The generally 
obscure means by which supranational courts are constituted might 
likewise come under intense scrutiny and pressure if those courts 
were empowered to reverse or vacate decisions by national courts. 
After all, how many Americans can name a judge of the ICJ, much 
less explain the manner by which she came to have that position? 
Finally, in our own system, there are constitutional difficulties with 
permitting the decisions of federal courts to be reviewed by tribunals 
outside the national judicial system.353 
 
 351. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, sec. d, 59 
Stat. 1031, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 19 (“Judicial 
decisions are not strictly speaking a formal source [of international law], but in some instances 
at least they are regarded as authoritative evidence of the state of the law . . . .”). 
 352. See ICJ Statute, supra note 351, art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force 
except as between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); see also BROWNLIE, supra 
note 26, at 21 (“Strictly speaking, the Court does not observe a doctrine of precedent.”). 
 353. Article III generally requires that the judgments of federal courts not be subject to 
revision by actors outside the judicial branch. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409–14 
(1792); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding that Congress 
could not require federal courts to reopen final judgments); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, 
at 96–107 (discussing Article III’s finality requirement). An appellate model, in which a 
110305 YOUNG.DOC 12/19/2005 3:04 PM 
1232 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1143 
The alternative to a regime of supranational interpretive 
supremacy is what we might call a system of “shared law.” Perhaps 
the best example is the “law merchant,” a form of private customary 
international law recognized by the Supreme Court in Swift v. 
Tyson.354 In that case, Justice Story observed that “[t]he law respecting 
negotiable instruments” was “not the law of a single country only, but 
of the commercial world.”355 As William Fletcher has shown, that law 
was shared among the courts of many nations and, within the United 
States, among the federal and state courts.356 No single court had 
interpretive supremacy over any other, so that just as the federal 
courts were not obliged to follow the New York Court of Appeal’s 
view of the general commercial law governing negotiable instruments, 
neither were the state courts of New York required to accept the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s.357 This “general law” regime will seem unfamiliar 
and problematic to American readers who cut their jurisprudential 
teeth on Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.358 But shared law persists in our 
system. A more familiar example is the Uniform Commercial Code, 
which is adopted separately by multiple state jurisdictions, but which 
nonetheless purports to describe a fairly uniform body of law. The 
courts of different states aim to maintain a common set of commercial 
 
supranational tribunal reviews federal court judgments on international questions, would almost 
surely run afoul of this principle. A collateral review model that accorded significant deference 
to the prior federal ruling, on the other hand, might be less problematic. See, e.g., Tutun v. 
United States, 270 U.S. 568, 580 (1926) (rejecting an Article III challenge to the procedure for 
petitions for naturalization, which accorded such petitions only a limited res judicata effect in 
future litigation). And a form of collateral review that does not attack the original judgment 
would probably avoid these problems entirely. The denial-of-justice claim in Loewen, for 
instance, did nothing to the judgment obtained by the O’Keeffes in state court; rather, it sought 
a penalty against the U.S. This sort of procedure has other liabilities, of course, and it is unclear 
whether it could achieve the objective of binding, uniform interpretations of law. In any event, a 
complete parsing of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 354. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law 
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2354 (1991) (“[T]hroughout the early nineteenth century, 
American courts regularly construed and applied the unwritten law of nations as part of the 
‘general common law,’ particularly to resolve commercial disputes, without regard to whether it 
should be characterized as federal or state.”). 
 355. Swift, 41 U.S. at 19. 
 356. William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517–21 (1984). 
 357. Id. at 1538–39. See also TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND 
ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 40 (1981) (“[N]o one imagined that federal judges 
possessed authority over state courts [in cases under the general common law], any more than 
state judges had the power to instruct their brothers on the federal bench.”). 
 358. 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (overruling Swift and holding that federal courts must apply 
state law in diversity suits). 
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rules, despite the fact that none can exercise interpretive supremacy 
over the others. 
Regimes of shared law are even easier to find on the 
international plane. In most cases where two nations make a treaty 
that imposes obligations but creates no supranational institutions—
that is, most treaties—it will fall to the courts of the two nations to 
interpret and enforce the treaty within their respective jurisdictions. 
Neither will exercise interpretive supremacy over the other, and there 
generally will be no third tribunal to which the two states can appeal 
to resolve conflicting interpretations. But notions of reciprocity will 
provide powerful incentives for the two nations to interpret the treaty 
similarly.359 The treaty’s provisions will thus be shared law between 
the two legal systems. 
Despite recent proliferation of multilateral regimes enforced by 
supranational tribunals, then, the shared law model should be a 
relatively familiar alternative to interpretive supremacy. Paolo 
Carozza has observed, for example, that “in most contexts, there are 
no definitive international interpreters of the normative content of 
human rights.”360 Likewise, the ICJ statute recognizes not only the 
decisions of supranational tribunals but also national court decisions 
as evidence of international law.361 The question is whether shared law 
regimes are a normatively attractive alternative to interpretive 
supremacy. To assess that question, it may help to consider Judge 
Fletcher’s account of why the shared law regime of Swift v. Tyson 
worked relatively well for many decades, as well as the reasons that 
the system ultimately broke down at the end of the nineteenth 
century.362 
Judge Fletcher argued that the general commercial law retained 
a relatively high degree of legitimacy and uniformity, despite the lack 
of either legislative adoption or a supreme judicial interpreter, for 
three primary reasons. First, because that law dealt with commercial 
 
 359. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660–61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that American courts should look to interpretations of a treaty by other signatories’ 
courts to maintain uniform meaning). 
 360. Carozza, supra note 31, at 62. 
 361. See ICJ Statute, supra note 351, art. 38, para. 1, § d; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 26, 
at 22. 
 362. I have discussed the rise and fall of the law merchant in more detail elsewhere, in the 
context of inquiring whether state and federal courts might successfully “share” customary 
international law in the U.S. as a form of general common law. See Young, Customary 
International Law, supra note 177, at 499–503. 
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transactions among relatively sophisticated parties that put a 
premium on predictability, most actors thought it more important 
that issues be settled than that they be settled right.363 Second, 
American courts inherited a consolidated corpus of the law merchant 
from English jurisprudence.364 And third, although each state 
jurisdiction was in theory the equal of the U.S. Supreme Court on 
commercial law questions, in practice a few courts—the state supreme 
courts of jurisdictions like New York, and especially the U.S. 
Supreme Court—played leading and coordinating roles.365 
The reasons that the Swift regime broke down are equally 
significant. One problem arose from the broadening of the general 
common law’s scope: whereas the Swift regime covered only 
commercial matters in its early days, by the end of the nineteenth 
century it had spread to engage virtually all the common law subjects, 
such as torts and noncommercial contracts.366 Likewise, as Lawrence 
Lessig has pointed out, the general common law became increasingly 
normative in its content; rather than reflecting the customary 
practices of merchants, it came to impose a particular normative 
vision held by the federal courts but often not shared by the state 
jurisdictions in which they operated.367 
This history suggests reasons to worry about international law as 
a system of shared law. International law is increasingly pervasive in 
scope and normative in content; the latter point is illustrated by the 
shift in the sources of customary international law from primary 
reliance on customary practice to more normative statements of 
opinio juris.368 Many of the issues now embraced by international 
 
 363. Fletcher, supra note 356, at 1562–63. 
 364. Id. at 1565–66. 
 365. Id. at 1566, 1575. 
 366. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in 
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1792 (1997); FREYER, supra note 357, at 58. 
 367. See Lessig, supra note 366 (observing that the “federal general common law” under 
Swift “was less the practice of gap-filling for parties to a commercial transaction, and more a 
practice of norm-enforcement, covering a substantial scope of sovereign authority. The common 
law was no longer reflective, or mirroring of private understandings; it had become directive, or 
normative over those private understandings”); see also FREYER, supra note 357, at xii–xiii 
(arguing that the general common law became a tool for imposing preferences for laissez faire 
government, shared by large national business interests, on state governments); EDWARD 
PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, 
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 65–67 
(2000) (same). 
 368. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89–90 (1992). 
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law—a state’s respect for the human rights of its citizens, for 
instance—are not the sort of things that many will regard as more 
important to be settled than settled right.369 Moreover, much of this 
law seems in relatively early stages of development, rather than 
amounting to a settled corpus like the “law merchant” principles that 
American courts inherited from their English predecessors. As a 
result, divergence among jurisdictions seems likely in the absence of 
some central authority with power and capacity to enforce uniform 
interpretations. 
Fortunately, the Swift experience may also suggest ways to 
facilitate the sharing of international law among national and 
supranational courts in a nonhierarchical system. First, it seems 
important to minimize the intrusion of international law into areas of 
normative disagreement, either by simply not “internationalizing” 
certain areas, or by articulating international norms at a very high 
level of generality and leaving more specific development of those 
norms to national courts. The latter approach is consistent, for 
example, with the framing of many extant human rights conventions 
in very general terms.370 It may also be possible to secure somewhat 
more agreement on interjurisdictional rules, because such rules 
implicate normative disagreements only indirectly. 
The second point is that supranational tribunals may play an 
important coordinating role. As Judge Fletcher has noted, the volume 
of cases on commercial law decided by the Supreme Court, the 
prestige of its justices, and its position atop the federal hierarchy 
made it “primus inter pares.”371 One might expect supranational 
institutions like the ICJ, the ICC, and the WTO appellate body to 
perform a similar coordinating function even if national courts enjoy 
concurrent jurisdiction and even if the supranational bodies lack 
interpretive supremacy. National political actors can likewise increase 
the odds for consistent interpretations in such a regime by specifying 
 
 369. This may be less true in the area of international trade, which still puts a high premium 
on stability, uniformity, and predictability. But the problem in trade law increasingly concerns 
its overlap with areas, like environmental law, in which people hold strong normative 
preferences. 
 370. See Carozza, supra note 31, at 58 (“[I]nternational human rights law has been 
characterized by a certain normative thinness—an incapacity to specify in sufficiently 
determinate ways the content of its requirements—and by mechanisms of supervision and 
compliance that leave great latitude to states to implement and enforce the norms as they see 
fit.”). 
 371. Fletcher, supra note 356, at 1575. 
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the meaning of particular aspects of international law through treaty 
making, or by codifying their understandings of the relevant norms in 
domestic legislation.372 
This discussion hardly answers all the questions posed by a 
system of concurrent jurisdiction over international law questions in 
which no central authority enjoys interpretive supremacy. Many other 
questions of judicial architecture are also likely to arise in either a 
supremacy or shared law system. For instance, I have said little about 
rules of abstention, which encourage some courts to defer decisions so 
that other institutions may take the first crack at a question, or 
remedies, which may be limited and framed in ways that mitigate the 
disruptive impact of international law on domestic institutions. The 
point of this Article, however, is to mark out an agenda for future 
discussion, not to flesh out what a system of international judicial 
cooperation ought to look like. 
C. Uniformity or “Double Standards” in International 
Interjurisdictional Rules 
This Section takes up the question, raised in Part III, whether 
interjurisdictional rules governing the relationship between 
supranational and domestic courts should be uniform.373 The 
judgments involved are analogous to the “parity” question in Federal 
Courts law—that is, the degree of deference and finality accorded to 
state judicial institutions has depended on our confidence in the state 
system’s competence in comparison with the federal courts.374 Rules 
embodying similar parity judgments at the interface between 
domestic and supranational judicial institutions should be approached 
with due regard for the difficulty of comparing institutional 
competence at that level.375 The problem with building “wholesale” 
parity judgments into the structure of the supranational rules is that 
different domestic systems differ wildly in their comparative 
competence vis-à-vis the supranational body. And the problem with 
making such parity judgments applicable to a broad range of 
supranational institutions is that those institutions are likewise highly 
 
 372. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992) (codifying a definition of torture pursuant to Congress’s power to “define and punish” 
violations of the law of nations). 
 373. See supra Section III.C.2. 
 374. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra Section III.C.2. 
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variable in their structure and competence.376 These two difficulties 
can be defined, respectively, as the “vertical” and “horizontal” 
dimensions of the parity problem. 
If rules of complementarity and deference are to reflect the 
variable competence of different domestic legal systems, they will 
almost surely have to be made retail rather than wholesale. In other 
words, the rules will have to treat different supranational institutions, 
and particularly different nations’ legal systems, differently. That 
conclusion runs head-on into a deeply entrenched reluctance among 
international lawyers to embrace “double standards.” Dean Koh, for 
example, has denounced double standards—defined as “when the 
United States proposes that a different rule should apply to itself than 
applies to the rest of the world”—as the most pernicious form of 
“American exceptionalism.”377 This aversion to treating different 
nations differently has deep theoretical roots in the doctrine of the 
sovereign equality of states.378 For the same reason that Guyana and 
the United States have the same number of votes in the United 
Nations General Assembly, it is hard for international lawyers to 
contemplate rules that give different weight to the determinations of 
each country’s domestic judicial system. 
One attempt to avoid double standards has been to frame 
substantive international norms in a way that sets a uniform but 
relatively minimal floor. This sort of approach, which we might call a 
“worst case” strategy, would design the interaction between 
international and domestic institutions so as to facilitate the 
imposition of basic international norms—e.g., of human rights or free 
trade—on the countries that are least likely to respect them without 
external pressure. This view seems to undergird the pressure to 
develop international law into a comprehensive code of human rights; 
in some countries, after all, international human rights will be the 
only human rights that people have. Likewise, the expropriation 
 
 376. See Alford, supra note 11, at 792 (suggesting that because international tribunals have 
different institutional characteristics, there should be a “continuum of deference” paid by 
domestic courts in different circumstances). 
 377. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1485–86 
(2003) [hereinafter Koh, Exceptionalism]. 
 378. See Burley, supra note 5, at 226 (observing that international law has refused “to 
differentiate between different types of state on the basis of domestic regime type . . . since 
Grotius,” and that this view “is grounded in the very concept of ‘sovereign states’ as the equal 
and identical subjects of international law, and buttressed by the affirmative norms of sovereign 
equality and nonintervention”). 
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provisions of NAFTA and many bilateral investment treaties seem to 
have been designed with a view toward preventing nationalization of 
investments by countries without a sufficiently protective (in the eyes 
of potential investors) notion of property rights.379 In each instance, 
the worst case perspective counsels that supranational adjudicators 
should accord relatively little deference to domestic legal institutions. 
And because it is politically difficult to defer to one country’s 
domestic institutions but not another’s based on a qualitative 
judgment that one country’s domestic courts are “better,” the lack of 
deference becomes universal.380 
The “worst case” approach purports to finesse the 
interjurisdictional problem by framing the substantive norms in such a 
way that they (hopefully) will only rarely require interference with 
the domestic legal system. This strategy assumes that international 
norms are largely duplicative of the rights protected in a well-
established constitutional democracy like the United States: it is third 
world dictatorships that run afoul of the ICCPR, not the United 
States, and we can therefore expect, as a practical matter, relatively 
little international interference in domestic legal affairs.381 Likewise, 
the expropriation provisions of NAFTA and various other investment 
treaties are designed to thwart socialist-style nationalizations, not to 
interfere with American regulation. 
Recent experience suggests, however, that these assumptions 
have been too optimistic in expecting that international norms would 
simply mirror American principles. In some areas, like the death 
penalty, international norms have been more “progressive” than the 
American people;382 in others, where rights such as free speech and 
 
 379. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 244–45. 
 380. One might think, for instance, that the procedural default bar to Consular Convention 
arguments is more acceptable in a country like the United States, which provides domestic 
counsel to indigent defendants regardless of their nationality, than in a country in which it is 
either consular assistance or nothing. But it is politically difficult to say that Convention 
violations should be treated differently depending on the violating country. 
 381. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 1988–89 (observing that Americans have viewed 
“the fundamental rights guaranteed by international law” as “rights already enshrined in the 
United States Constitution,” but “emphatically resisted” the notion “that international law 
could be a means of changing internal or domestic U.S. law”). 
 382. I am skeptical that the abandonment of the death penalty in many other industrialized 
countries represents “progress” rather than simply a different conclusion on a contestable moral 
question. One cannot simply assume that political change is in the direction of improvement 
rather than decline. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future 
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freedom from racial oppression may trade off with one another, 
international and American law have simply made different choices.383 
Many observers in the trade area have been surprised to see 
expropriation provisions such as NAFTA’s Chapter 11 brought to 
bear on traditional forms of American regulation.384 In any event, it is 
clear that if international law is to be enforced without deference to 
domestic legal institutions, American political arrangements and 
practices will have to change just like everyone else’s. 
Nor is it obvious that international law ought to content itself 
with least-common-denominator standards. International law might 
demand a relatively high standard of procedural due process for 
accused criminals, for example, while recognizing that many quite 
different procedural regimes might meet that standard. Indeed, the 
international law objective may be met more effectively where the 
means can be tailored to local customs, preferences, and 
innovations.385 The important point, however, is that even “worst 
case” standards may well spark conflicts between international law 
and domestic arrangements in systems with well-developed legal 
systems. Nondeferential interjurisdictional rules cannot be justified 
on the assumption that supranational courts will be dealing only with 
undeveloped or low-capacity national court systems. 
Fortunately, “double standards” are neither as unusual nor as 
troubling as they have sometimes been made out to be. The common 
practice of ratifying treaties with reservations creates significant 
disuniformities in the international law that applies to different 
 
Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 163, 172–73 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 383. See, e.g., Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech—The United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53 
ME L. REV. 487, 493–97 (2001). 
 384. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear 
and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 51 (2001) (observing that the U.S. government expected 
Chapter 11 “to provide a depoliciticized method of protecting U.S. investors against the 
arbitrary conduct of Mexican officials,” but that “the promiscuous use of Chapter 11 to 
challenge public regulatory laws in Canada and the U.S. has thrust it into the center of a highly 
politicized debate”); Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 489, 498–99 (2003) (noting that private 
enforcement under NAFTA Chapter 11 has gone further than any of the signatory states seem 
to have expected). 
 385. See Carozza, supra note 31, at 76 (“Transnational unification of law has its price as well, 
such as the dampening of potential innovation and the possible severance of the social and 
historical roots of the law.”); cf. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 77–78 (1995) 
(collecting arguments that local autonomy improves the implementation of central policy goals). 
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states,386 and the international regime tolerates these disuniformities 
subject only to the notion that reservations contrary to the “object 
and purpose” of a treaty are void.387 Some treaty regimes, moreover, 
include express limitations and derogations clauses, which allow 
signatories to depart from treaty norms in certain exigencies or in the 
interest of certain values.388 Most fundamentally, many crucial 
international regimes are not universal; the trade rules applicable to 
non-WTO members, for instance, obviously differ from those that 
apply to members of the club. 
As I discuss in Section E, international law has developed 
doctrines designed to accommodate these disuniformities. In 
particular, the principle of complementarity, most prominent in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,389 is designed to 
impose an international solution only where the domestic legal system 
cannot meet the goal of the international regime. This is surely a 
“double standard”—international law intervenes in some domestic 
legal systems, but leaves others to their own devices—and yet it 
carries none of the negative connotations that Dean Koh associates 
with such differential treatment. There is thus nothing inherently 
American or obnoxious about saying that supranational bodies 
should defer more to well-developed domestic judicial systems with 
extensive competence to decide international law questions than they 
should to domestic institutions that lack resources, experience, 
adequate procedural safeguards, or guarantees against political bias. 
Likewise, at least some American courts have been willing to 
evaluate the comparative institutional competence of domestic courts 
in different legal systems—even at the risk of offending international 
comity. In upholding an antisuit injunction by a federal district court 
against parallel proceedings before a French court, for example, 
Judge Posner found that because of “the institutional differences 
 
 386. See Carozza, supra note 31, at 60 (arguing that reservations “make[] a certain amount 
of state discretion over . . . treaty norms central” and create “the necessity for interpretive 
pluralism”). 
 387. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 167, arts. 20–23, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 337–38. 
 388. See, e.g., ICCPR Art. 22(2) (stating that treaty rights may be restricted as “necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order . . . the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedom of others”); see 
also Carozza, supra note 31, at 61 (noting that such provisions entail “greater deference to local 
authorities”). 
 389. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at http://www.un.org/law/ 
icc/statute/romefra.htm. 
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between a federal district court and the Commercial Court of Lille, 
the district court provides a more appropriate forum for the 
resolution of the parties’ dispute.”390 The court was unmoved by 
generic comity considerations, in the absence of specific evidence of 
harm to international relations.391 As Anne-Marie Slaughter has 
pointed out, similar instances of “adequate forum analysis” occur in a 
wide range of transnational cases heard by domestic courts.392 This 
willingness to examine the institutional competences of foreign 
tribunals, she argues, does not indicate an attempt to wall off the 
domestic legal system; rather, it is evidence that courts are taking 
legal integration seriously. If courts start from the notion that “the 
foreign legal system is not separate and entitled to sovereign 
deference, but is rather part of an emerging transnational litigation 
space in which litigants move freely and choose different national 
courts to resolve their disputes,” then different courts will “scrutinize 
each other according to the same criteria that they would apply to 
other domestic tribunals in the same circumstances.”393 We will see, in 
other words, “judges judging judges.”394 
The law should likewise take into account the comparative 
institutional competence of supranational tribunals vis-à-vis domestic 
courts in different domestic systems. “Sovereign equality” is a fiction, 
and while fictions often serve useful purposes, there are also times 
when they should not be allowed to eclipse reality. Refusal by 
supranational tribunals to defer in many cases to the considered 
judgment of sophisticated domestic judicial institutions risks pushing 
those institutions toward questioning the legitimacy of international 
norms;395 on the other hand, deferring to all domestic judicial actors, 
 
 390. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 1993). Judge 
Posner emphasized that “[a]lthough called a ‘court,’ [the Commercial Court of Lille] is 
actually . . . composed of businessmen who devote part time to arbitrating.” Id. at 429. Hence, 
“the members of the Commercial Court do not have masters, magistrates, law clerks, externs, or 
other staff that might enable them to assimilate the voluminous materials that have been 
collected in the district court.” Id. Judge Posner was quick to emphasize that “[t]his conclusion 
has nothing to do with the relative merits of the French and American procedural systems” in 
general, and suggested that in some cases—for instance, where U.S. law would require 
arbitration while French law would provide “professional judges,” an antisuit injunction against 
the U.S. proceeding would be equally appropriate. Id. at 430. 
 391. See id. at 431. 
 392. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 92–93 (collecting examples). 
 393. Id. at 94. 
 394. Id. at 91. 
 395. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
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even institutions that are rudimentary or without guarantees of 
political independence, risks significant damage to the efficacy of 
international law. Treating different domestic judicial establishments 
differently may be the only way to steer between these dangers. 
Obviously such “double standards” will be less offensive if they 
do not divide the United States from the rest of the world, although 
any set of rules stressing the domestic system’s state of development, 
sophistication, and institutional independence is likely to implicate 
tensions between developing and developed countries, not to mention 
between democratic and nondemocratic societies.396 It may help to 
state, in advance, the characteristics of a domestic legal system that 
will trigger greater supranational deference. This is the approach of 
the 1996 habeas statute, which provided certain procedural 
advantages to state governments that upgraded their provision of 
legal counsel to criminal defendants in state court.397 Such conditions 
might have the salutary side-effect of encouraging reform of domestic 
legal systems more generally.398 
The horizontal problem of varying institutional competence 
among different tribunals at the supranational level does not raise the 
same concerns about “double standards” and sovereign equality. As 
Roger Alford has demonstrated, American law already treats 
different supranational and foreign courts differently for a variety of 
reasons.399 Here, the best domestic law analogy may be to 
administrative law, in which courts accord different degrees of 
deference to different administrative agencies in different situations, 
depending on the nature of the agency action, the agency’s relation to 
the statute it is enforcing, and the agency’s institutional character.400 
 
 396. See, e.g., Donoho, supra note 27, at 463–65 (suggesting that the “margin of 
appreciation” accorded by supranational courts to domestic interpretations of human rights law 
may vary across societies with varying commitments to democracy). 
 397. See 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b) (2000) (providing that states appointing counsel for indigent 
prisoners under sentence of death in state postconviction relief proceedings qualify for certain 
advantages: (1) a 180 day, rather than 1 year, statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions; 
(2) deadlines for federal habeas courts to rule; and (3) limits on federal stays of execution). 
 398. See Turner, supra note 333, at 8 (“[T]he complementarity provisions of the [Rome] 
Statute have prodded signatory countries to incorporate prohibitions on genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity into their criminal statutes.”). 
 399. See Alford, supra note 11. 
 400. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair measure of 
deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with 
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, 
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”) 
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Developing similar doctrines for the interface between supranational 
and domestic courts may be a task of considerable complexity, but it 
does not seem insuperable in principle. 
The differing institutional capacities of different supranational 
courts does suggest caution toward proposals for a common approach 
to interjurisdictional problems that would be developed and shared 
across the jurisdictional boundaries of different supranational 
regimes.401 These proposals have a strong intuitive appeal. For one 
thing, the lack of developed case law within each supranational 
jurisdiction’s own jurisprudence creates strong incentives to borrow 
principles and practices from the experience of other institutions. To 
some extent, no doubt, this is salutary. But I want to argue for a very 
cautious approach to the development of a general “supranational 
common law” addressing the relationships between supranational and 
domestic institutions.402 Just as domestic legal systems vary wildly in 
their competence and sophistication, so, too, supranational 
institutions are not all created equal. All the frequently invoked 
cautions about transplanting legal rules from one domestic system to 
another403 would seem to be equally compelling in the context of 
different supranational institutions embedded in different 
international legal regimes. 
D. Improving Existing Supranational Courts 
The same institutional considerations that shape new 
interjurisdictional doctrines and arrangements may also suggest 
avenues for reforming existing supranational bodies. Specific 
proposals for reform should, of course, be developed and evaluated in 
the context of specific studies of the particular institutions involved. 
All I can hope to do here is to suggest some problematic 
characteristics of the current supranational legal system and, once 
again, point some directions for further inquiry. 
 
(footnotes and citations omitted); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944) 
(determining the degree of deference owed to an agency’s determination based on 
considerations of institutional competence). 
 401. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 8, at 443–44. 
 402. See Donoho, supra note 27, at 338 (suggesting that international human rights 
institutions which are still in the process of maturing will best be served by incremental 
jurisprudence that will over time build both credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of 
governments). 
 403. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L. J. 223, 263–71 (2001). 
110305 YOUNG.DOC 12/19/2005 3:04 PM 
1244 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1143 
It is no great insight to say that institutional design is shaped by 
expectations about the authority that the institution is likely to wield. 
The one-country, one-vote principle of the U.N. General Assembly 
makes some sense if the main concern is to provide voice to the 
different nations of the world. If that body were to exercise 
meaningful coercive authority, on the other hand, such a voting rule 
would be considerably more troubling. Likewise, the role of the 
relatively unknown and unaccountable experts at the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee in interpreting the ICCPR will be less 
controversial if those interpretations are merely advisory than if they 
were to become binding. And if the validity of domestic regulation 
were to turn on interpretation of the NAFTA or WTO agreements by 
supranational arbitral panels, one would expect a loud outcry for the 
restructuring of those institutions. Internationalists should thus 
recognize the increasing scrutiny that all these supranational 
institutions have encountered recently as evidence that international 
law increasingly is taken seriously. 
Several aspects of our putative supranational legal system 
deserve consideration as that system grows in importance. The first is 
the sheer proliferation of bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions. The interjurisdictional doctrine of American law is 
extremely complex, despite the relatively homogeneous nature of the 
federal court system. How much more complex must the 
supranational counterpart of the doctrine be to accommodate 
institutions as disparate as NAFTA tribunals, the International Court 
of Justice, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee? Supranational 
bodies are also more likely to be perceived as legitimate to the extent 
that the peoples subject to their jurisdiction can understand what they 
do and how they work; the present hodgepodge, however, is so 
variegated that few international scholars seem expert on the 
workings of more than a few of the different bodies. Workable and 
legitimate interjurisdictional rules are more likely to develop if some 
of these various tribunals can be consolidated. 
The proliferation of supranational bodies has also given rise to 
concerns of excessive specialization. Specialists in particular areas of 
international law may have idiosyncratic views that diverge from 
strong preferences at the domestic level.404 Moreover, the most 
 
 404. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 333, at 23 n.129 (noting that “[a]n overwhelming majority 
of international lawyers” oppose the death penalty, while “[o]utside the narrow circle of 
international lawyers, . . . many jurists and nonlegal scholars”—as well as domestic 
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difficult questions will likely arise at the intersection of different fields 
of legal regulation.405 Much controversy over the free trade regime, for 
instance, stems from its impact on environmental protection measures 
that impose burdens on business.406 Generalist domestic courts will 
often be better positioned to balance these competing policy 
concerns, and if supranational bodies are to review those sorts of 
decisions, then they would do well to be more generalist in character 
themselves. Generalist supranational judges may also gain more 
legitimacy to the extent that they are not identified with particular 
social interests, such as multinational corporations engaged in 
international trade. 
Some supranational institutions—particularly in the free trade 
area—seem likely to need more permanence if they are to develop a 
viable set of interjurisdictional rules. NAFTA tribunals as presently 
constituted write tickets for this day and train only; they have no need 
to contemplate how they will apply today rules to tomorrow’s cases, 
and they have at best an abstract interest in developing a working 
relationship with domestic courts.407 One need not prescribe the life 
tenure of the American federal judiciary to urge greater continuity 
for these bodies; indeed, NAFTA itself provides for a standing group 
of arbitrators for arbitrations conducted under the state-to-state 
provisions of Chapter 20.408 Appointments for more than a single case 
would also take the appointments process out of the hands of the 
parties to litigation, which would not only offer an opportunity for 
greater political accountability but also should reorient the tribunals’ 
sense of mission away from purely private dispute resolution and 
 
populations—continue to support it). Professor Turner goes on to observe that, “[a]t the 
International Criminal Court, . . . debates about the death penalty have been foreclosed because 
of the solid consensus among international judges on the issue.” Id. 
 405. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 406. See, e.g., William Greider, The Right and U.S. Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century, 
THE NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 21 available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml 
?i=20011015&s=greider) (arguing that NAFTA Chapter 11 and similar provisions represent an 
attack on environmental and other regulatory laws); Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 2025; Public 
Citizen, supra note 14. 
 407. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2099 (describing the lack of “‘institutional’ continuity” 
under NAFTA Chapter 11 as “the weakest element of the institutional design”). 
 408. NAFTA ch. 20, art. 2008, 2009. According to Professor Brownlie, similar concerns 
about the oddly named “Permanent Court of Arbitration”—which was not a standing court and 
“could not develop a jurisprudence”—ultimately led to the creation of the ICJ. BROWNLIE, 
supra note 26, at 677. For recent proposals to create a permanent appellate body for Chapter 11-
style trade regimes, see Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2142. 
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toward greater concern for the public values that are often implicated 
in the cases. 
Finally, many supranational tribunals lack adequate guarantees 
of transparency and accountability.409 These two concerns dovetail to 
a large extent: one of the principal constraints on judicial action is the 
need to write a reasoned opinion justifying the result and responding 
to counterarguments.410 Supranational opinions, however, are often 
not readily available and, in many instances, suppress dissenting 
opinions and offer only cursory reasons. More important, 
supranational bodies tend to lack the accountability fostered by 
public and contested appointments on the front end, as well as 
mechanisms such as statutory override, jurisdiction-stripping, 
budgetary controls, and even impeachment in response to particular 
rulings.411 All of these mechanisms become far more difficult to utilize 
as means of political control when multiple nations—often many 
nations—must concur.412 Ironically, a freestanding court that is not 
accountable to anyone may be less powerful, in the end, than a 
tribunal whose rulings are legitimized by the existence of democratic 
checks on its authority. 
The last point is that we already have a bewildering variety of 
supranational legal institutions with widely varying characteristics, 
and it is inevitable that some will inspire a great deal more confidence 
in their institutional competence than others. It may be possible to 
reform some of the weaker bodies, and efforts to do so deserve 
careful consideration and support. But the possibility—even the 
probability—remains that, at the end of the day, responsible national 
 
 409. See generally Anderson, supra note 19, at 1301 (concluding that Dean Slaughter’s vision 
of global governance through government networks—which includes strong reliance on 
supranational courts—“tends to erode the respect for democracy and democratic accountability 
with which it began”); Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 2017–18 (“The existing international 
governance organizations are famous for their undemocratic opacity, remoteness from popular 
or representative politics, elitism, and unaccountability.”). 
 410. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374–75 (1995) (“[T]he true test [of a decision] comes when 
the writing judge reasons it out on paper,” and that “[i]t is not so unusual to modulate, transfer, 
or even switch an originally intended rationale or result in midstream because ‘it just won’t 
write.’”). 
 411. On the many mechanisms available to the national political branches for responding to 
federal court decisions, see generally McNollgast, supra note 272. 
 412. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 333, at 21 (“Given the limited opportunities available to an 
individual state or even a group of states to sanction an international institution acting outside 
its delegated powers, national communities have no meaningful ‘voice’ in the oversight of 
international institutions.”). 
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policymakers will have insufficient confidence in some supranational 
institutions to cede to them any measure of authority over our 
domestic judicial institutions. Likewise, national courts may well 
confront situations in which deferring to a supranational tribunal 
seems either extremely unwise or, possibly, simply impermissible 
under domestic law. The problem is that in the climate of our present 
discourse about international law, any refusal to go along with almost 
any supranational proposal is held up as a sign of national disrespect 
for international law in general.413 
That view, like many of the views I have criticized here, seems to 
me not to take international law seriously enough. It is easy to go 
along with poorly constructed or conceived international rules or 
institutions when one thinks that the subject matter does not matter 
or that the enforcement mechanisms will be ineffectual; as Dean Koh 
has observed, “[m]any countries adopt a strategy of ratification [of 
international agreements] without compliance.”414 Supranational 
judicial institutions are designed to put an end to that strategy; their 
purpose is to force states that are parties to international agreements 
to take international law seriously.415 To the extent that they succeed, 
we will have graduated from the period in which it was more 
important to convince nations to adhere to the international rule of 
law than to worry overmuch about the content of that law. It should 
no longer be an independent argument against a particular legal 
result that it “did not strengthen the place of international law in the 
law of the United States.”416 The question ought to be the same Legal 
 
 413. Dean Koh, for example, denounces as equally blameworthy American refusals to defer 
to international actors on 
[S]uch diverse issues as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change, executing juvenile offenders or persons with mental disabilities, 
declining to implement orders of the International Court of Justice with regard to the 
death penalty, or claiming a Second Amendment exclusion from a proposed global 
ban on the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons . . . holding Taliban 
detainees on Guantanamo without Geneva Convention hearings, and asserting a right 
to use force in preemptive self-defense. 
Koh, Exceptionalism, supra note 377, at 1486. These examples raise a wide variety of issues, 
many of them confined to the specific context of each action. I do not mean to defend any of 
these American actions here—although I think many are defensible—but I do insist that they 
must be evaluated on their individual merits and that little can be gained by lumping them 
together as signifying some general disrespect for international law and institutions. 
 414. Id. at 1484. 
 415. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2088–89 (noting that NAFTA’s arbitration arrangements 
are meant to exert “power” over the signatory nations). 
 416. Henkin, Provisional Measures, supra note 57, at 683 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Breard). 
110305 YOUNG.DOC 12/19/2005 3:04 PM 
1248 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1143 
Process question asked of any other legal result, that is, whether it 
reflects a sensible allocation of authority among the various legal 
institutions in the system. 
E. Doctrinal Resources within International Law 
International law has not completely ignored the notion of 
institutional settlement, even if it does not generally speak in those 
terms. A variety of doctrines and practices reflect the imperative to 
defer to national institutions. The problem, rather, is that these 
doctrines and practices are both scattered and controversial. They are 
often seen as unfortunate but necessary compromises rather than 
essential features of the system.417 I want to suggest that these settling 
doctrines and practices should be preserved and expanded, and that 
they should be explored more systematically as instantiations of a 
common principle. 
One of the most important ways in which international law 
“settles” authority to interpret with national institutions arises simply 
from the generality—and thus indeterminacy—of its norms. 
Instruments like the ICCPR, for example, define rights in highly 
abstract terms. As Professor Carozza has observed, 
[D]espite all of the normative developments of international human 
rights law over the last half century, it is still characterized less by a 
fully articulated normative content than by the interpretive 
discretion that it leaves to states through the open-ended nature of 
its language, the legal doctrines supporting it, and the political 
context of the culturally pluralistic world to which it is intended to 
apply.418 
The general lack of strong institutional enforcement at the 
international level plays a similar role.419 I want to argue that these 
aspects of international law, although frequently decried as 
weaknesses or immaturities in the legal order, are in fact beneficial to 
the extent that they force respect for national institutions and 
autonomy. They are not “bugs,” but rather “features,” of the system. 
 
 417. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 
31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999) (observing that international human rights 
decisions by supranational bodies “carr[y] the promise of setting universal standards for the 
protection and promotion of human rights,” but that “[t]hese universal aspirations are, to a 
large extent, compromised by the doctrine of margin of appreciation”). 
 418. Carozza, supra note 31, at 62. 
 419. See id. 
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This Section canvasses more specific doctrines of international 
law that facilitate the settlement of questions in national institutions. I 
focus on two examples: the margin of appreciation doctrine 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights and the principle 
of complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Rather than attempt a comprehensive account of these 
doctrines, I explore how they fit into the broader paradigm of 
institutional settlement that I have already discussed. 
1. The Margin of Appreciation. The European Court of Human 
Rights originally developed its “margin of appreciation” doctrine in 
connection with Article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,420 which provides for derogations from Convention obligations 
“in time of war or other public emergency.”421 Although the concept 
began as a means to assess permissible derogations, the ECHR has 
come to apply the doctrine more broadly, outside the context of 
Article 15.422 The Commission has since explained that the margin of 
appreciation applies also to national interpretations of the more 
open-ended rights provisions in the Convention, as well as to the 
choice of “appropriate means to guarantee a [protected] right.”423 The 
discretion accorded national governments is not unlimited, however. 
The ECHR has explained that “[t]he domestic margin of appreciation 
thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision,” and it remains 
for the Court to make the final judgment on whether the permissible 
margin has been exceeded in a particular case.424 
The margin of appreciation doctrine fits well with the 
institutional settlement idea that I have been pushing here. 
Obviously, this is not the place for a comprehensive account of the 
doctrine. Rather, I want to make two points about it: First, the values 
associated with institutional settlement provide a defense against 
charges that the doctrine undermines the universality of human rights 
and also justify the doctrine’s expansion beyond the relatively narrow 
contexts in which it presently operates. Second, the principle of 
 
 420. European Convention on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 15. 
 421. See, e.g., Greece v. United Kingdom, 1958–59 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 174, 174 (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R.) (applying for the first time the doctrine of margin of appreciation). 
 422. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 429–32 (1984). 
 423. Belgian Linguistic Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 4, 28 (1967). 
 424. Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5, 23 (1976). 
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deference behind the doctrine ought to be extended not simply to the 
substantive definition of rights but also to various forms of 
interjurisdictional doctrine. 
Although the margin of appreciation may strike American 
observers as a relatively modest form of deference,425 the doctrine is 
nonetheless controversial. The ECHR has been criticized as being too 
generous to national authorities in defining the permissible margin, 
and the doctrine has been criticized more generally for undermining 
the universality of human rights.426 Eyal Benvenisti, for example, has 
worried that the margin of appreciation could seriously undermine 
“the promise of international enforcement of human rights that 
overcomes national policies . . . [and] compromise the credibility” of 
supranational courts that adopt “double standards” and “lead 
national institutions to resist external review altogether.”427 The 
values associated with institutional settlement, however, counsel that 
the doctrine should be strengthened rather than narrowed. As the 
ECHR has noted, the margin of appreciation rests on an assessment 
of the comparative institutional competence of national and 
supranational authorities to assess the necessity for departure from 
international norms or to give concrete definition to those norms 
within a particular domestic cultural and legal context.428 The 
 
 425. Consider, for example, the following statement of the American “rational basis” test 
for government action that does not implicate fundamental rights or a suspect classification: 
On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute . . . comes to us bearing a strong 
presumption of validity, . . . and those attacking the rationality of the legislative 
classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might 
support it . . . . Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its 
reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes 
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the 
legislature . . . . In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-
finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or 
empirical data. 
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 426. See, e.g., VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 422, at 445–46 (criticizing the ECHR’s 
jurisprudence); Benvenisti, supra note 417, at 843–45 (criticizing the doctrine more generally). 
But see Carozza, supra note 31, at 73 (arguing that the doctrine “merely recognizes that the 
specification of general principles of human dignity in concrete political and social situations will 
very often require a complex and uncertain balance of values,” and that this balance should be 
“taken at the closest level to the affected person as is effectively possible”). 
 427. Benvenisti, supra note 417, at 844. 
 428. See, e.g., Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 569 
(1993) (“By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the 
moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international 
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competence advantage of national authorities may result not only 
from their closeness to the situation but also from the thinness of 
consensus on certain international principles, such as some of the 
more open-ended principles of human rights law.429 
It is harder to find examples of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine outside the case law of the ECHR.430 One critic of the 
doctrine notes that “[o]ther international human rights organizations 
wisely have avoided this approach thus far,” and urges that “[t]hey 
must continue to caution themselves against being drawn to this way 
of analyzing the issues they face.”431 This view—which seems to 
presume that in the absence of a margin, supranational courts will be 
able to impose an effective and universal vision of human rights—
strikes me as short-sighted. The deference entailed by the margin of 
appreciation is precisely the kind of accommodation necessary to 
incorporate international law into domestic legal systems as operative 
law, rather than as a set of universal aspirations. As Douglas Donoho 
has noted, “the margin of appreciation doctrine may well provide 
international institutions with the flexibility necessary for their long-
term development as credible and authoritative decisionmakers.”432 
I do want to argue, however, that the margin of appreciation 
focuses on the substance of rights while neglecting fruitful avenues of 
deference grounded in interjurisdictional doctrine. Professor Donoho, 
for example, compares it to “levels of scrutiny” analysis in American 
constitutional law.433 The point of that analysis is to balance 
governmental interests in order, morality, and the like with individual 
liberty, and the analysis goes to the substantive question whether a 
right has been violated in a given situation. These substantive 
questions are certainly important, and I have already argued that 
international law has sometimes adopted substantive standards that 
 
judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of 
derogations necessary to avert it.”); see also Donoho, supra note 27, at 452. 
 429. See Donoho, supra note 27, at 458–59; see also id. at 466 (offering the margin of 
appreciation doctrine as a tool for bridging disputes between the value of universal human 
rights and the need to accommodate diverse cultural traditions). 
 430. See id. at 440 n.140 (“Thus far, international human rights institutions, with the 
exception of the E.C.H.R., have made no serious attempt to develop a jurisprudence to deal 
with the issues of diversity, multiculturalism and self-governance in the implementation of 
rights.”). 
 431. Benvenisti, supra note 417, at 853. 
 432. Donoho, supra note 27, at 465. 
 433. See id. at 447–49. 
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are insufficiently deferential to national policymakers.434 One of the 
principal insights of the Hart and Wechsler tradition in Federal 
Courts scholarship, however, is the importance of interjurisdictional 
rules in implementing constitutional values.435 As Dan Meltzer has 
observed, “many of the most important questions of American 
constitutional law pertain to the jurisdictional, remedial, and 
procedural doctrines that together create a framework for the 
vindication of rights.”436 This tradition suggests that a “margin of 
appreciation” for national institutions charged with implementing 
international law may best be achieved through interjurisdictional 
doctrines settling the authority to interpret and apply international 
law in domestic courts. 
2. Complementarity. The most promising interjurisdictional 
counterpart to the margin of appreciation is the principle of 
complementarity. Unlike the margin of appreciation, 
complementarity focuses not on the substantive standards applied by 
supranational institutions but rather on when those institutions will 
decide disputes themselves and when they will allow domestic 
institutions to decide. The most prominent example appears in the 
statute of the International Criminal Court, which provides that the 
ICC will step in only where the domestic legal system concerned is 
unwilling or unable to prosecute.437 One might generalize this 
principle by stating that supranational institutions should not attempt 
to replicate tasks that the domestic legal system is willing and able to 
perform; as Dean Slaughter has noted, complementarity “recognizes 
national government institutions as a first choice to exercise power 
and responsibility even in the design of an international system of 
governance.”438 In this sense, complementarity is a principle of 
institutional settlement. 
 
 434. See supra notes 284–89 and accompanying text. 
 435. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 436. Daniel J. Meltzer, Member State Liability in Europe and the United States, 4 INT’L. J. 
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 437. See Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 389, art. 17–18 (articulating 
the principle of “complementarity”). See generally Turner, supra note 333. Professor Burke-
White notes that “[t]he principle of complementarity has a history dating back to the Treaty of 
Versailles” and to “the first proposals for an international criminal court in 1943.” Burke-White, 
supra note 293, at 8–9. 
 438. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 149. 
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As I have already suggested,439 complementarity effectively 
creates “double standards” by deferring to some domestic judicial 
systems but not others, depending on the willingness and capacity of 
each local system to proceed on its own. Indeed, the obvious 
advantage of such a principle is that it is scalable to the particular 
capacities of whatever domestic system is involved in a given case. If 
the domestic system is capable of applying the relevant international 
principle (or its domestic analog), then there may be little role for the 
supranational court. On the other hand, in domestic systems that lack 
the needed capacity the supranational court may play a greater role. 
On this view, the supranational tribunal plays a “complementary” 
role to whatever judicial system exists at the national level. 
Complementarity thus seems a promising response to the disparate 
capacities of different domestic legal systems. 
The complementarity principle might be strengthened, from the 
standpoint of settling authority in domestic courts, by adding two 
elements. First, litigants could be required to exhaust their domestic 
remedies before appealing to a supranational tribunal. Customary 
international law already imposes such a requirement, in at least some 
cases, under the “local remedies rule.”440 One can imagine a workable 
system without this requirement: in the American system, for 
instance, there is no presumption that most federal claims should be 
brought in federal rather than state court or (where diversity of 
citizenship exists) vice versa; rather, the parties retain a great deal of 
freedom to choose the forum.441 But there are advantages to a 
presumption in favor of domestic jurisdiction. Encouraging domestic 
courts to hear cases under international law will encourage the 
domestic legal regime to internalize international legal principles.442 
As claims raising those principles become more commonplace, 
moreover, exclusive or preferred jurisdiction in supranational bodies 
will strain the decisional resources of those tribunals. And domestic 
courts are probably better situated to incorporate international law in 
ways that minimize disruption to surrounding domestic legal 
arrangements and maximize domestic legitimacy. 
 
 439. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. 
 440. See Loewen, supra note 89, ¶¶ 143–57, at 41–45. 
 441. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 427. 
 442. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2651 (1997) (book review). 
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Second, decisions by domestic courts on issues of international 
law could be given preclusive effect in future litigation in 
supranational tribunals. Institutional settlement holds that, in at least 
some cases, the decision of the body with primary jurisdiction to 
decide must be treated as settled, even though other bodies might 
have decided the question differently.443 This is not to say that there 
can be no review of such decisions—only that there should be some 
measure of deference to the domestic outcome. There is little 
“settlement,” after all, without some level of preclusive effect on 
future litigation. Neither the parties nor the domestic forum itself will 
have much incentive to take the international law issues in a case 
seriously if they know that those issues are likely to be fully 
relitigated at a later stage in an international forum.444 
Although the complementarity idea has much to recommend it, 
the principle is not without difficulty in application. There is, for 
example, the latent ambiguity in the ICC statute’s reference to 
domestic judicial processes that are “unwilling or unable” to apply 
international norms themselves. What if, after a thorough review, the 
domestic prosecutorial institution determines that there is insufficient 
evidence to prosecute? Or what if the defendant prevails on some 
“technical” or procedural ground? Are these situations in which the 
domestic system has abdicated or failed and the supranational body 
should step in pursuant to its complementary role? Or has the 
domestic process “worked” and resolved the case, obviating the need 
for supranational intervention? As Dean Slaughter acknowledges, “it 
will take years of litigation to establish precisely what ‘unable or 
unwilling’ actually means, thereby establishing the precise parameters 
of ICC jurisdiction in relation to national courts.”445 
Complementarity is designed to respect domestic institutions, but 
there seems to be little way around the need for the supranational 
 
 443. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 444. Article III may pose a constitutional barrier to federal court decisions of international 
issues that lack preclusive effect in future litigation. The Court has suggested that some degree 
of preclusive effect is a necessary component of the finality requirement under Article III’s 
vision of the “judicial Power.” See Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 
700–01 (1927). However, the reasoning of the leading cases is somewhat opaque, and it is clear 
that a judgment may be “final” for Article III purposes even if it lacks the full preclusive effect 
that it might have under traditional principles of res judicata. See generally Glidden Co. v. 
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Tutun v. U.S., 270 U.S. 568 (1926). My focus here is on the 
practical advantages of preclusive effect; on the constitutional issue, see generally HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 105–07. 
 445. SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 149. 
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tribunal to review the adequacy of the domestic proceedings before 
determining whether to proceed.446 The alternative system, in which 
the supranational body’s ability to proceed would depend on 
something like a certification from the domestic institutions that they 
do not want the case, will strike many as too ineffectual to realize the 
substantive goals of the international rules being enforced.447 On the 
other hand, review of the adequacy of domestic proceedings will 
inevitably create considerable frictions between the two systems. No 
judge likes to be told that the proceedings in her court were 
“inadequate” and will therefore be ignored at a subsequent phase, 
and this irritation is likely to be far worse when the reviewing body is 
a distant supranational tribunal made up primarily of jurists from 
other countries. 
The system might evaluate the adequacy of domestic proceedings 
in at least two very different ways. The evaluation might occur 
“wholesale” in the sense of a general judgment about the adequacy of 
domestic legal institutions that is then reflected in the structure of the 
supranational process. The First Congress’s decision not to grant 
general federal question jurisdiction to the newly established federal 
courts, for example, reflected a general judgment that the state courts 
were adequate fora for adjudicating most federal statutory and 
constitutional claims.448 By analogous reasoning, we might reject a 
domestic exhaustion requirement if we thought national courts were 
never an appropriate place to adjudicate prosecutions for war crimes. 
Or the evaluation might occur “retail” in the form of supranational 
review of the adequacy of domestic proceedings in a particular case. 
Something like this seems implicit in the Mondev and Loewen 
opinions: while both opinions strike me as fairly intrusive in their 
review of the state court proceedings at issue, the Mondev panel 
seems to have had more confidence in the Massachusetts courts than 
the Loewen panel had in the courts of Mississippi.449 Accordingly, the 
 
 446. See Turner, supra note 333, at 6 & n.21 (noting that “[c]omplementarity will be 
administered in practice through ICC decisions on the admissibility of cases” and that, as a 
result, the court retains “the ultimate power to decide whether a country is ‘unwilling’ or 
‘unable’ to prosecute a case”); Burke-White, supra note 293, at 9. 
 447. For example, China and the U.S. both urged that either national courts or the Security 
Council make complementarity determinations in ICC cases, but this proposal was rejected by 
the drafters of the Rome Statute. Turner, supra note 333 at 10–11. 
 448. See supra note 15. 
 449. I cannot help suspecting that this judgment rested, a least in part, on regional 
stereotypes. 
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Mondev panel seemed more willing than the Loewen panel to defer to 
the state courts’ resolution of the issues. 
In the American system, this sort of adequacy determination 
takes place most often in the context of habeas corpus review of state 
criminal convictions. That regime seeks to mitigate the irritant 
produced by the federal courts’ final say over the adequacy of state 
proceedings by building in quite deferential standards of review.450 
Those standards are designed to respect both the substance of the 
state courts’ determinations and the procedures by which those 
determinations were arrived at. By this means, the institutional 
settlement of primary decisional authority in the state courts is 
reconciled with a final right of review in the federal judiciary.451 
Application of this principle would compel a quite different 
approach from that taken by the supranational courts in Medellin, 
Mondev, and Loewen. The procedural default doctrine is designed to 
give state courts a chance to rule on a litigant’s federal defenses; 
extended to the international level, it would require individuals to 
present their treaty claims to the domestic courts before their 
governments could bring those claims before the ICJ.452 The doctrine 
is simply an element of exhaustion, foreclosing supranational 
intervention unless the domestic courts—properly presented with the 
treaty claim—were unwilling or unable to respect it.453 Reasonable 
persons may disagree about whether the current American “cause 
and prejudice” standard for overcoming a procedural default is too 
high, but that is a question of detail. The ICJ’s seeming disregard for 
procedural default in principle in cases like Avena and LeGrand 
undermines the principle of complementarity that is necessary to 
build a workable relationship between the ICJ and domestic courts. 
The NAFTA cases, on the other hand, highlight the element of 
preclusion. NAFTA includes a preclusion principle: if a party chooses 
 
 450. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (providing for a deferential standard of review on 
substantive issues); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000) (codifying the doctrine of procedural default 
in some circumstances). 
 451. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (observing that the procedural default 
doctrine has “the salutary effect of making the state trial on the merits the ‘main event,’ so to 
speak”). 
 452. In the U.S. habeas scheme, the state court’s resolution of the federal claim does not 
have preclusive effect in the federal collateral review proceeding. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443, 487 (1953). 
 453. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004) (observing that the procedural default 
doctrine is “[a] corollary to the habeas statute’s exhaustion requirement”). 
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to present its claim to the domestic courts, then it is not permitted to 
seek a more favorable answer later on from a NAFTA tribunal.454 But 
the denial-of-justice claim recognized in Mondev and Loewen makes 
a mockery of that principle. Rather than relitigate the initial claim 
rejected in the domestic courts—state law contract, business tort, and 
antitrust claims—the Mondev and Loewen plaintiffs argued that the 
domestic courts’ ruling against them gave rise to a new NAFTA 
violation in its own right.455 Concern for complementarity, however, 
suggests the denial-of-justice claims under NAFTA should be limited 
largely to situations in which foreigners are excluded entirely from 
domestic courts. In a case like Mondev or Loewen, for example, there 
is little reason to believe that the NAFTA tribunal has any 
comparative advantage over the domestic appellate system in 
detecting errors of domestic law. To paraphrase Justice Robert 
Jackson, the NAFTA tribunal is final in such a situation not because 
it is less fallible than the courts that have considered the issues earlier, 
but simply because it gets the last word.456 The point is not that denial-
of-justice claims should be eliminated entirely, but rather that the bar 
for finding such a denial should be set much higher. 
However these issues of institutional detail are worked out, 
complementarity seems a promising rubric for protecting and 
promoting a strong role for domestic courts in the application, 
interpretation, and development of international law. The obvious 
irony is that the principle appears in the charter of the institution to 
which many proponents of national autonomy have expressed the 
greatest skepticism.457 No matter how one feels about other aspects of 
 
 454. See NAFTA, supra note 119, Art. 1121(1)(b) (authorizing the filing of a Chapter 
Eleven claim only if the claimants “waive their right to initiate or continue before any 
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement 
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to 
be a breach referred to in Article 1116”). 
 455. The Loewen panel thus concluded that “Article 1121 involves no waiver of the duty to 
pursue local remedies in its application to a breach of international law constituted by a judicial 
act.” Loewen, supra note89, ¶ 164. 
 456. Brown, 344 U.S. at 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (“[R]eversal by a 
higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. . . . We are not final because we are 
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
 457. See generally Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003) (canvassing reasons for U.S. opposition to the ICC). I do not say that 
such skepticism is wrong-headed. As Professor Goldsmith notes, “[t]he perceived efficacy of 
complementarity and other ICC safeguards turns on the level of trust a nation has toward the 
ICC. The United States has little.” Id. at 95. At a time of widespread hostility to the U.S. in the 
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the ICC as an institution, however, the complementarity principle 
deserves a close look. 
F. The Politics of Judicial Globalization 
Some of my proposals in this Part may be controversial; they may 
require, after all, a fairly significant change in the way we think about 
the relationship between international and domestic law. I want to 
close by suggesting, however, that any such controversy should not be 
political or ideological in nature. Much of our current debate about 
the role of international law has a Left-Right cast to it. When we 
speak of international human rights, for example, we typically see 
political liberals urging domestic application of “progressive” 
international principles—such as greater tolerance for gay rights or 
less tolerance for capital punishment—and political conservatives 
resisting such calls.458 I have chosen my primary examples with some 
care, however. When we turn to free trade law, by contrast, we 
typically see political conservatives preaching free trade and 
globalization while political liberals fear that these trends will 
undermine the domestic regulatory state.459 For my own part, I worry 
about both scenarios. But the gentle reader can choose the nightmare 
that he or she finds most unsettling: the point is that neither political 
liberals nor political conservatives should be sleeping peacefully.460 
It is also worth remembering the centrist tradition of the Legal 
Process School that I have invoked. That School had its origins in 
responding to critiques of prior ways of thinking about the law from 
Legal Realists on the Left, but it responded by accepting many 
 
international community, that attitude may well be sensible. But the concept of 
complementarity itself nonetheless seems worth exploring. 
 458. Compare, e.g., Koh, World Opinion, supra note 255 (urging reliance on international 
law to limit capital punishment), with Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting such calls and stating that “equally irrelevant are the practices of the 
‘world community,’ whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people”). 
 459. Compare, e.g., CAFTA’s Benefits, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2005, at A12 (supporting the 
latest free trade agreement from a politically conservative perspective, and discounting 
“sovereignty” concerns arising from NAFTA-like dispute resolution procedures), with Mark 
Engler, The Trouble with CAFTA, THE NATION, Jan. 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040202&s=engler) (making the politically liberal case 
against CAFTA). 
 460. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 2017 (“[T]he right is internationalist where 
international law pursues a property- and commerce-protecting agenda, while the left is 
internationalist where international law pursues an human rights or use-of-force or 
environmental protection agenda. In each case, support for international law is adventitious.”). 
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elements of those critiques, and it was centrally concerned with 
preserving elements of the modern regulatory state that both political 
liberals and conservatives have come to accept.461 More importantly, 
the incremental nature of the Legal Process approach and its central 
tenet of respect for decisions by other actors even in the face of 
disagreement on the merits are both conducive to accommodation of 
disparate perspectives. 
I also want to stress that the approach I have outlined here has 
something to offer both nationalists and internationalists. Just as the 
web of interjurisdictional doctrine that is the subject of the Federal 
Courts field was designed to preserve traditional notions of 
federalism and separation of powers while facilitating workable 
governance at the national level, the extension of that field would 
protect a meaningful role for international law by seeking to mediate 
conflicts with domestic institutions. The point is to take international 
law seriously as law, by subjecting it to the same sorts of institutional 
give and take that have characterized our domestic legal 
arrangements throughout our history. Moreover, Dean Slaughter has 
demonstrated that developing relationships of mutual respect and 
direct communication between national and supranational courts has 
great potential to strengthen the position of the latter.462 
Failure to develop thoughtful accommodations between 
supranational and domestic institutions will undermine international 
law, especially in a community like the U.S. that is already ambivalent 
about constraints on national sovereignty. Speaking of cases like 
Loewen, for example, Renée Lettow Lerner has observed that “[o]ur 
desire for international trade is starting to collide with our unusual 
(by international standards) system of civil justice, and that collision 
may generate tension that saps support for international trade 
agreements.”463 And the U.S.’s recent withdrawal from the Vienna 
Convention’s dispute resolution protocol in the wake of Avena 
demonstrates this risk of backlash in the most concrete way.464 
Demonstrably workable accommodations, by contrast, should allay 
 
 461. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 58, at 693–94; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 60, 
at xci. 
 462. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 6, at 146, 150. 
 463. Lerner, supra note 27, at 233; see also Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2043 n.52 (“If Chapter 
11 and other investment-review mechanisms do not develop in a careful and sensitive fashion, 
there is every reason to fear a backlash . . . .”). 
 464. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
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fears about the loss of sovereignty and to build public confidence in 
international institutions. To be sure, both nationalist opponents and 
internationalist proponents of international norms have something to 
lose in this sort of compromise. But the benefit of the bargain is a 
stronger, if more moderate, international law. 
CONCLUSION 
International law increasingly features supranational institutions 
that interpret, apply, and develop international law. Some of these 
supranational judicial institutions are new and some are not; even the 
old ones, however, seem likely to play roles that increasingly intersect 
with domestic legal arrangements. Robert Ahdieh has thus observed 
that “[i]nternational tribunals have become more willing to engage in 
the review of national courts in recent years,” and that they have 
“growing power to make such review stick.”465 As supranational 
courts interact with domestic ones, they will give rise to a host of 
interjurisdictional problems involving standards of review, the 
allocation of jurisdiction, remedies, and similar issues. It is only a 
matter of time before Medellin—or some case like it—returns to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, and the trade cases cannot be far behind. 
Whatever one thinks of the particular approaches I have suggested 
for thinking about these problems, the first central point of this 
Article is that it is time to think about them systematically. 
The second point is that the Legal Process jurisprudence that has 
served Americans well in dealing with parallel interjurisdictional 
problems in our federal system can also serve in an era of judicial 
globalization. In particular, the notion of institutional settlement—
that authority to decide should be allocated to particular 
decisionmakers, and that decisions reached by those institutions 
should receive some level of deference from other actors in the 
system—seems even more important on an international plane 
featuring multiple sovereigns with diverse cultural and legal 
traditions. Accepting that notion, of course, still leaves a host of 
questions to be answered: In which institutions should authority to 
decide in the first instance be settled? How much deference should 
these decisions receive from other actors? To ask these questions is 
not to challenge the place or status of international law and 
 
 465. Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 2148. 
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institutions, but rather to take them seriously enough to integrate 
them into our other legal arrangements. 
